THE SELF AND ITS BODY

IN HEGEL'S

Phenomenology

of Spirit

JOHN RUSSON

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Hekaton, and Apollonios of Tyre in Book I of *About Zeno,* say that when he con-
sulted the oracle about what he should do to live the best way, the god answered
that he would live the best way if he would mix his flesh with corpses [*sugchrôtizoito
tois nekrois*], from which he understood that he should read the works of the
ancients [*ta tôn archaiôn anaginôskein*].

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Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,* VII.1

</div>

It is necessary to insist upon this idea of culture-in-action, of culture growing
within us like a new organ [*un nouvel organe*] ...

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Antonin Artaud, *Le théâtre et son double*

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Acknowledgments

University, and from the Department of the Classics at Harvard University. Finally, I thank Catherine Frost for her careful copy-editing of the entire manuscript and Ron Schoeffel, the editor-in-chief of the University of Toronto Press, for his help (and patience).

J.E.R.
University Park, Pennsylvania
28 March 1996

A Note on the Text

This study focuses on G.W.F. Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* of 1807. All references to this Hegelian text will be to *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, hrsg. v. Hans-Friedrich Wessels und Heinrich Clairmont, and to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller. Citations of this text and translation will be given as follows: reference to the paragraph in the Miller translation will be given first, as M, followed by the paragraph number, and reference to the page in the Wessels-Clairmont edition will follow as W/C, followed by the page number. Periodically, the page number of the German text will be followed by a decimal point and a number or numbers; this will indicate the precise line numbers of the passage under consideration. Throughout I shall cite Hegel's chapter numbers in roman numerals, and give the title of the relevant chapter or section; I shall refer to my own chapters using arabic numerals. Unless otherwise indicated, English translations of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are taken from Miller's translation.

Publication information for all works cited in the notes will be found in the bibliography.

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Introduction: The Project of Reading Hegel's Phenomenology of the Body

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the systematic treatment of a particular philosophical issue, and Hegel describes it as 'the Science of the Experience of Consciousness';[1] basically, this means that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* proceeds by rigorous argument from the comprehension of the most primitive forms of conscious experience to the comprehension of that form of experience that is this comprehension itself; that is, it proceeds to 'the absolute standpoint,' the epistemological or existential stance that is consistent with itself in its efforts to comprehend experience. My project in this work, however, is not Hegel's project in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. My intention is to proceed by rigorous argument to comprehend something else, namely, the human body. This will be a presentation not of the science of the experience of consciousness but of the science of the embodiment of consciousness. My argument is that such a phenomenology of the body is implicitly carried out in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the effort here will be directed to extracting from Hegel's text the philosophy of the body that is there implied and to showing how this is the rational comprehension of human embodiment.

The work that has been done on Hegel's treatment of the body focuses in the main on two very rich Hegelian texts, namely, the 'Anthropology' section of the *Philosophy of Spirit* in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, and the 'Observing Reason' section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[2] In both these texts Hegel writes explicitly about the body; my work, however, is not about what Hegel says the body is, but about what he is required to say; that is, it is an argument about the conception of body that is systematically implied by his phenomenological analysis of the experience of consciousness. Although Hegel does discuss the body in the aforementioned texts, his remarks are more or less 'editorial'; that is,

the claims Hegel makes are not being *derived* in the sections under analysis and thus cannot legitimately count as aspects of the argument that sets for itself the condition that it be entirely self-developing, that is, that it have no external input. The discussions in these sections presume the full-blown argument and do say useful things on the basis of this presumption, but they do not systematically develop the argument; it is the latter, legitimate, systematically self-deriving presentation of the body that I am after, and I look for it in various sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

Though my intention in this book is to display the self-development of the internal dynamism of the concept of the body, I can describe what the result will look like. Described in relation to the history of philosophy; (i) Hegel's philosophy of the body is essentially an interpretation of Aristotle's psychology; (ii) this approach to body is comparable in its implications to the phenomenological or existential approach to the body developed in Merleau-Ponty's *La Phénoménologie de la Perception*; (iii) it is a rigorous refutation of Cartesian dualism, which ultimately shows the logic of the Aristotelian psychology to have already accommodated the legitimate demands for the autonomy of mind, which provide the greatest support for the Cartesian position; and (iv) it defends a version of the Romantic notion that for human life embodiment and expression are the same. Some form of each of these claims can be found separately in commentators, although I do not know of any attempt to develop them in conjunction or of any attempt to show how Hegel's philosophy is the legitimate systematic development of the first two of the conceptions (although it is a commonplace at least to *say* that he is refuting Descartes).[3] By way of providing a context for the analysis I shall give in this work, I shall both articulate what I am responding to in Aristotle and Merleau-Ponty and use a passage from Plotinus to introduce the notion of expression.

For Aristotle, the subject-matter of physics (the study of *phusis*, "nature") is those bodies that have an intrinsic principle of motion: a physical substance is a self-moving body. To talk of *phusis*, then, is to talk of a body as containing within itself an impulse to its characteristic form of motion or behaviour.[4] For Aristotle, physical substances can be organized into a scale of greater or lesser sophistication of organization, where the complexity of organization refers simultaneously to the embodiment and to the activity. The most primitive physical substances are the elements, which (i) cannot be broken down into less sophisticated physical substances and (ii) have motion to proper place in relation

to the other elements as their characteristic form of change. Plants are more sophisticated self-moving bodies that (i) engage in the logically more complex operation of self-nutrition and growth and (ii) have more complex bodily organization.[5] Animals are yet more complex, and so on. What is relevant to our concerns in this work are two things.

First, the conception of the body as a unit that has its own immanent principle of action – we could call it an *intentionality* – will be central to the Hegelian understanding of body. We shall find that we must understand the body as that which, so to speak, gets its own work done for the self of which it is the body without that self ever having to enter into self-conscious reflection. Second, the Aristotelian approach to the increasing complexity of bodies will also provide the key to the Hegelian logic of the body.

For Aristotle, each physical body is, as it were, 'single-minded'; that is, it is systematically organized around that form of activity that is its characteristic function. Each body thus functions as a seamless whole, a single functioning system in which the significance of the various body 'parts' is understandable only in terms of the relevant contribution of these parts to the carrying out of the overarching project.[6] On the other hand, just as the body as a whole has an *unreflective* propensity to act in a characteristic fashion, so too does each part have its own '*phusis*'; that is, each part too carries out its own proper functioning *within the context of the functioning of the overarching whole*. An Aristotelian physical body, then, has to be understood as a system (an organism) that itself is built out of subsystems (organs), but wherein the subsystems themselves depend upon the functioning of the bodily whole that provides the context or environment for their own particular, distinctive functioning.

These two notions, the notion of unreflective, bodily intentionality and the notion of the functioning body as a seamless whole that has the form of a system of subsystems, are what I take to be the core of Aristotle's conception of *phusis* as it relates to embodiment, and they provide the inspiration for the category of *phusis* that I shall develop as a determination of the Hegelian concept of body.

From Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological project I want to isolate only two themes that are relevant to my analysis of the Hegelian concept of body. The first is what amounts to a development of the Aristotelian notion of the unreflectiveness of bodily intentionality. The second is the conception of habit as embodiment.

In the first paragraph of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel refers to anatomy as a study of the body that treats body parts as dead things. Anatomy

is an attempt reflectively to grasp the body, which fails to do justice to the body *as living*. This distinction between reflectively grasping the body as dead and a grasp of the body as living is a central theme of Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la Perception*.[7] The key to Merleau-Ponty's argument is that the grasp of the body as living is a lived grasp, that is to say, to grasp the body as living is to live it. The very notion of embodiment, as we saw in Aristotelian physics, is that it is an unreflective performance of its characteristic operations; that is, the self's body is precisely that aspect of the activity of the self of which the self is unaware. The focus on this aspect of embodiment allows us to understand why we make the transition to the next theme in Merleau-Ponty, namely, the concept of habit as embodiment.

For Merleau-Ponty, the development of sophisticated forms of action involves the development of habits that precisely play the role of making unreflective those operations that formerly required reflection in order to be carried out. Developing habits is developing new spheres of unreflective operation, that is, new spheres in which one can automatically perform in a sophisticated fashion without having to attend self-consciously to one's actions. Thus, it is our habits that *embody* our more sophisticated operations.[8]

What is particularly interesting is that Merleau-Ponty argues that we must understand, for example, the habitual dependence upon a cane on the part of a blind person to be that person's development of *a new bodily organ. From the point of view of our lived relationship to our world,* the cane must be understood as a functioning part of the body of the blind person. The Aristotelian conception of body as the unreflective dimension of selfhood allows us to see why we should consider habit as embodiment: in becoming habitual, the operation has become a system with its own *phusis;* that is, it is 'self-motivated,' and it supports the more sophisticated activities of the reflective life of the agent precisely by *not* operating under reflective control, but having 'a life of its own.' Against an empiricistic objection that 'the body ends where my feeling ends, and thus the cane is not part of my body,' Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that precisely what phenomenological reflection reveals (in opposition to the 'anatomical' reflection of the empirical scientist) is that the blind person feels actually *at the tip of the cane,* not where the hand touches the handle.[9]

We have, then, from Aristotle, the conception of a system of subsystems that unreflectively carries out its own work and, from Merleau-Ponty, the notion that our habits – our 'institutionalized' forms of behaviour, which I shall designate by the term *hexis* – fulfil this same function and, further,

that such habits can actually involve an *incorporation* of new body parts. These are the crucial themes that will be taken up in the account of the Hegelian concept of embodiment. We shall ultimately see how Hegel completes this picture in his development of the dialectical method of cognition, which is *equally* the living *and* the cognizing of the body: only thus can the body be reflectively approached in a way that does do justice to its life, its *phusis*.

From Plotinus, I want to draw attention to only one text: Chapter 6 of Treatise III.8. In this passage Plotinus discusses how the soul, whose very defining essence is its pursuit of self-knowledge,[10] expresses itself in all its practices: all its action is a self-expression. This expression – the *logos prophorikos*[11] – is not incidental to the soul's constitutive project, however; it is only by seeing how its expression is a reflection of itself that it is able to advance in its task of self-knowing. This self-outering is thus the activity that *produces the very means* of the soul's pursuit of itself. For the soul, its identity cannot be achieved except through self-expression. This idea of an identity that cannot exist except in so far as it is embodied in and as an expression is found also in figures from Hegel's day, such as Hamann, and in many figures in our own century.[12] I shall argue that for Hegel this notion of expression characterizes all embodiment – I shall designate it as the moment of *logos* – and that it is ultimately when we understand how embodiment is expressive that we understand it in its truth.

I offer these discussions of other philosophers as hints for the reader, but they themselves are not a set of theses of which the remainder of the book is a defence. This is so, first, because my argument in this book is not about Hegel's relationship to other figures in the history of philosophy, but about how to comprehend the embodiment of the human self that Hegel studies in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; this is so, second, because my method is not this 'external' method of elaborating theses and then offering arguments in support of them. On the contrary, following the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, my intention is to lead the reader herself through the various stages being articulated; that is, my argument aims as far as possible to articulate the self-development of the reader's own point of view. Thus, in each chapter there will be a development from some starting position to some new cognitive orientation, which will make possible the investigations in the following chapter.

In Chapter 1 I shall develop the notion of the free self, beginning from the concept of the self that can say 'I' – a self with which every reader can identify – and leading to the concept of the self that posits itself as a relation to a transcendental ego. This analysis of the concept of selfhood will

generate the necessary conceptual tools to allow us to proceed to the phenomenology of the rational self in Hegel's Chapter V, 'Reason.'

In Chapter 2 I shall outline the dialectic of 'Reason,' in which we encounter the experience of rational self-independence. The goal of Chapter 2 will be to articulate the general form that the self-development of reason takes, in order to show how it is driven, by its own immanent dynamic, to the necessity of recognizing the need to alter its sense of independence to include a necessary dimension of dependence; that is, reason will be driven to the point of recognizing that it is not independent of its embodiment but is, rather, independent only in and through its embodiment. This will be the cognitive orientation necessary to follow through the rest of my analyses, and, more immediately, it is what will allow us to move on to the consideration of the embodiment of 'Life.'

These first two chapters in which the concept of selfhood is articulated are essentially a propaedeutic to the main study, for in them I explain the Hegelian concept of self-conscious selfhood. In Chapters 3 to 5 the concept of selfhood developed in these first two chapters is used and the analysis proper of the body of this self is provided.

In Chapter 3 I shall use the cognitive orientation developed in Chapter 2 to return to an earlier section of Hegel's text, namely, the opening sections of Hegel's Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' in which he analyses the concept of 'Life.' In Chapter 3 I shall derive the concept of the body of the self-conscious self from Hegel's analyses of 'Life,' 'Lordship and Bondage,' and the 'Struggle to the Death.' I shall argue that each of these existential dramas makes thematic a particular dimension of the human body, and from these three dramas I shall draw out what I shall take to be the three logical determinations of the concept of body. I shall call these determinations *phusis* (nature), *hexis* (habit), and *logos* (expression). In the course of my analysis I shall define precisely what I mean by these terms: respectively, the unconscious system of mediative action, the qualitative determinateness, and the being-for-others of the self. In this chapter I shall argue that 'body' does not name a particular thing or phenomenon, but specifies rather a relational role within any behaviour, and that these three determinations adequately specify that role; further, it is action that is embodied, not some substantial self, and consequently to know what 'the body' is requires proper identification of the definitive parameters of the activity under investigation. This point is crucial for understanding human embodiment; for I shall argue that, because self-conscious activity depends on the recognition of others, properly human action is always inherently social. Now, while the *phusis* (the unconscious

system of mediative actions) properly so called of mere human *life* is the world of nature, human social and cognitive existence – human existence *qua* human – cannot be so embodied. In Chapter 4 I deal with the embodiment of these dimensions of human existence.

The elaboration of the conceptual determination of the concept of body as *phusis, hexis,* and *logos* allows us to see how to find the body of human social and cognitive life; here we shall be considering the body as *hexis* or as the 'built-up' or qualitatively determinate moment of the unconscious mediation of human activity. I shall outline the argument of Hegel's Chapter VI, 'Spirit,' as an argument in what Hegel calls 'philosophy of right,' that is, as a development of the dialectic of recognition that inaugurates self-consciousness, and I shall note two essential things: first, that the self that acts in human social activity is always an 'I' that is a representative of a 'we,' or, rather, it is always a 'we' that acts in and through the 'I'; second, we shall find the embodiment of this 'I that is we and we that is I'[13] in social institutions, and the whole functioning world of social, cultural life will have to be recognized as the body of the properly human self (where the body as nature was not yet the body of the human proper). Finally, in the culmination of the systems of right or recognition in conscientious forgiveness, we shall find the imperative for the self (the 'I that is we and we that is I') to become self-conscious in its embodiment. This will allow us to make the transition to the last stage of our procession, namely, the analysis of the self and body of 'absolute knowing.'

In Chapter 5 the account of body will be completed in so far as the account will be of the self-cognition of the body itself. Here I shall argue that the culmination of the project to be a human self is to be found in the conscientious attempt to do absolute science as the attempt to find one's independence precisely through the effort to give due recognition to all the facets of one's dependence (which is what it means to be free). This is found in the drama of the experiencing self for which all the determinations of its world are recognized as its own self-expression, that is, its own being-for-others, that is, its own body as *logos.* This will complete the phenomenology of the human body in proper Hegelian fashion in so far as it will have provided both the elaboration of the concept of body and the syllogistic system of the self-judging of this concept, which ends in a self-completing act of self-transcendence by which body shows itself to be mind.

In sum, the phenomenology of the body worked out implicitly in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* develops the full implications of a rejection of a dualistic conception of self and body. The immanent dialectic of the

body of the self-conscious self develops from the natural body to the institutional body to the communicative body as the latent tension within the three constitutive moments of body develops and shatters any form of simply static equilibrium.

The three constitutive moments of body are *phusis*, that is, the unconscious system of mediative behaviour that allows the self immediate access to the objects of its desire; *hexis*, the qualitative determinateness or constitutive formedness that characterizes the material conditions of self-conscious life; and *logos*, the expressive being-for-other of the self. These three moments characterize any body, and the logical supremacy of each of these three moments demarcates three distinct species or stages of the human body.

The simply natural body, which indeed has a constitutive relation to the natural system as a whole, is that body within which the moment of *phusis* is primary; it is that body that *in itself* is unconscious. A natural body is equally a *hexis* in that it is qualitatively determinate in its organization, and it is a *logos* in that it is its characteristic physical activity that demonstrates what kind of thing the body is. The phenomenology of self-conscious selfhood reveals, however, that the 'natural body' – the *phusis* – of the self-conscious self cannot be this in-itself unconscious body, but must be a body that has been 'built' by self-consciousness; it must be a 'second-nature' or 'habit,' that is, literally, a *hexis*.

In the dialectic of the three institutional shapes of free human community, '*Sittlichkeit*,' '*Bildung*,' and '*Moralität*,' there develop, respectively, the moments *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos within* this habitual or institutional body, but, whereas each of these moments is necessary to the adequate concept of the spiritual body, the first two of these three stages of the development are one-sided attempts to recognize only one of the logical moments. In conscientious forgiveness, however, the equal essentiality of all three moments is recognized, but this very recognition propels the dynamic of body into its final stage, which is the recognition of the *primacy* of the expressive dimension of the body, that is, the primacy of *logos*.

'Absolute Knowing,' presents the completion of the dynamic of self-conscious selfhood at the same time as it completes the dialectic of the body of this self. The logic of selfhood is completed only in the concept of a communicative community – a 'we' – and the body of this 'we' is the world of experience recognized as a living system, which is a process of communication: indeed, it is the 'we's own attempt at self-communication. This is the completed condition of the body, and it is that form of body in which the moment of *logos* is primary. Within this absolute body,

the moment of *phusis* is the world of nature, the moment of *hexis* is the world of culture, and the definitive moment of *logos* as such is logic or language, that is, the system of communication. The last point allows us to conclude that the system by which a 'we' communicates itself to itself is the fundamental phenomenon of self-conscious life, and this is the dialectic of religion, of which the absolute philosophy with which we are engaged is the culminating moment.

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Section A

Self-Conscious Selfhood

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1

Unhappy Consciousness and the Logic of Self-Conscious Selfhood

Introduction

Any study of Hegel's philosophy of self-consciousness must focus on what he calls the 'Unhappy Consciousness,' which Jean Hyppolite, one of the best interpreters of Hegel, rightly identifies as the fundamental theme of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[1] In this chapter I shall work through Hegel's phenomenology of self-consciousness in order to see why, and in what sense, unhappy consciousness is at the heart of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; essentially, the unhappy consciousness will be the self-conscious positing of a distinction between transcendental and empirical selfhood, and this will be the cornerstone of self-conscious selfhood.

The section called 'The Freedom of Self-Consciousness,' which contains the analyses of 'Stoicism,' 'Scepticism,' and 'Unhappy Consciousness,' also provides an excellent text to bring into focus the issue of the transcendental argument and its relation to the images, the *Vorstellungen*, through which it is presented. It is commonplace among interpreters to consider the treatment of 'Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness,' as a piece of history, since 'stoicism' is a term clearly connected with a historical philosophical movement; it is a mistake, however, to treat this history as anything other than illustrative; for the argument is a transportable piece of transcendental psychology or epistemology, which can equally be used to articulate the logical relations that hold in experiences other than those Hegel uses as examples.[2] After briefly considering the ground laid in Hegel's treatments of stoicism and scepticism, I shall analyse those aspects of unhappy consciousness that are crucial to my subsequent chapters, and the logical relations that I take to be 'transportable' will be apparent. The analysis of these texts thus will both differ-

entiate transcendental argument from the images through which it is presented and develop the frame for the account of selfhood that is the subject of Part A of this work.

We can now turn to the analysis of free selfhood, beginning with a self we all can recognize as our own, that is, the kind of self about whom it is said, 'it's up to you to decide how to deal with the situation'; we turn, that is, to the self who can reflect and say 'I' and thus withdraw and differentiate herself from the immediate absorption in the experienced situation: we turn to the stoic.

1. Stoicism

We all are essentially stoics, and this is shown by the simple fact that we can say 'I': the saying of 'I' is what shows one to be a 'free self-consciousness.' By saying 'I' one is already committed to all the premises that the stoic needs, and Hegel's argument is that the stoic treatment is rigorous, which means one first has to see why the stoic is right before one can get any further;[3] if one has not already taken stoicism seriously, one can never, for example, take scepticism seriously.[4] Those who do not say 'I' are not sufficiently free and cannot read further; those who can say 'I' but do not immediately identify with the stoic either have transcended stoicism (in which case in an important sense they have already had to identify with it) or have not yet come this far in reflecting on the implications of their own self-consciousness. Stoicism, then, is the philosophy that works out the implications of our ability to say 'I' in the face of the world; to the extent that any of us explicitly distinguishes 'me' from 'it' or 'myself' from 'the world,' one has already granted all the necessary premises in the stoic argument, which takes this power that we actualize on certain occasions and universalizes its import to develop out of it a whole program of metaphysics and ethics.

The stoic is the individual who takes herself to be immediately self-sufficient; for a stoic self-consciousness, nothing within the world can affect her power of decision-making, and thus she is unmoved by the world and open to influence only from her own self. According to the stoic, each individual is solely responsible for her happiness. Such individuals can be found in a great variety of different circumstances and cultures, and they are by no means native only to the Hellenistic cultural movement that actually took the name of stoicism; indeed, while the *Manual* of Epictetus is one of the best sources for this conception of selfhood, Sartre's *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme* is equally valuable. None

the less, the stoics of the pre-Christian world provide an excellent exemplification, an excellent *Vorstellung*, of this conceptual formulation of a characteristic mode of self-consciousness, and I shall draw from the language of Epictetus in particular and the ancient stoics in general to explicate the logic of this stance of self-consciousness.[5]

Most fundamentally, the stoic distinguishes between what is her or hers, and what is alien, that is, what she can control and what she cannot.[6] What she cannot control is what appears to her; what she can control is her attitude towards these appearances: the stoic can decide whether or not to assent to the appearances.[7] The story is told of the slave Epictetus that, as his master was twisting his leg, he said, 'if you go on, you will break my leg'; when this in fact transpired, Epictetus's calm response was, 'I told you so.'[8] The point, of course, is that the pain of the breaking leg exerts no influence over the *self*; rather, the pain is alien to and appears to the self, and it is for the self to choose its attitude towards the pain, Epictetus in this case choosing to assent to it. As a being that can distinguish itself from the world, the self-conscious self can always differentiate, and say, 'me and my pain'; that is, there is no *immediate* identity of the pain and the self, and thus the concern (happiness, unhappiness, or indifference) that one has in the face of such pain will always be a matter of the response of the self to what appears to it, and never a direct imposition. In general, then, the stoics conceive the relation of the self that can say 'I' to the objects of its awareness as a situation in which a completely self-reliant self faces appearances as a kind of material open to the formative operation of choice, where the choice is essentially the choice of acceptance or rejection.[9]

For the stoic, however, this conception of how things are carries with it a moral expectation or imperative: this description of the nature of self-consciousness is equally a prescription. What this analysis of the constitution of selfhood reveals is that happiness cannot come from things outside the self's control, but can come only from the self's own expectations; thus, it is not coherent, or, as the stoics say, not rational, to stake one's self on controlling that which one cannot control. The stoic self, recognizing that to base one's happiness on the state of things outside one's control means to use one's power over oneself to try to give up power over oneself, strives to accept things as they appear. Thus, says Epictetus, 'don't seek for the things that happen to happen as you wish, but wish that things happen as they do happen and you will go along well.'[10] Thus, as we saw from the beginning, the stoic distinguishes two fundamental realms, the realm of free self-conscious choice and the

realm of what appears, the latter of which has its own internal source of controls over which the stoic self has no power. The stoic lives well by recognizing and accepting this state of things; this appears to be the rational way to act, since any other action would be to act irrationally against the nature of reality, that is, against the distinction between the sphere of one's free control and the sphere of the alien nature with its own source of determination.[11]

From the point of view of Hegel's analysis, it is especially important to notice three things about this stoicism. First, and this is the point just noted, the stoic view entails a dualistic ontology of the free selfhood that controls its own powers of assent, and what the stoics call nature, or that self-governed world that functions outside the control of the free self.[12] Second, each of these two realms remains statically outside the other and apathetically tolerates the internal workings of the other; there is no imperative for any sort of *rapprochement*.[13] Thus the self is withdrawn from, and is other than, the world, and, to use the language of Hegel's speculative logic, it is other as one determinate being is other to an other.[14] Third, the analysis of assent and choice reveals that the stoic is only ever in relation to herself, that is, all the stoic ever sees in her experience is a reflection of her self, that is, her basic values; it is, in other words, only the stoic's own evaluations that the stoic ever encounters. The experienced world is thus of the stoic's own making, and in the quality of her world she must learn to recognize a reflection of herself. Thus, in and only in the immediate products of her own choice (as simple assent to the world or dissent from it) the stoic self has self-consciousness.[15]

In sum, then, the stoic self is self-conscious in and through the self-determined abstract evaluations she directs at an alien world, which serves as the matter for her evaluation. From this conception of the simple independence of self-conscious selfhood that indifferently characterizes anyone who can say 'I,' we turn to Hegel's account of scepticism[16] and to the argument – which equally applies indifferently to all 'I's – that the I is not one sphere of being set off against another, but is, rather, the totality of one's experienced reality.

2. Scepticism

Scepticism is again a form of self-consciousness that can be found in various situations, but it is put in front of us, it is *vorgestellt*, by Hegel in terms of the ancient scepticism that responded to the ancient stoicism, and, again, this seems a good, but not a necessary, *Vorstellung* to

keep. The basic doctrine, which is here the 'transportable' logic of self-conscious selfhood, is the recognition that the notion of an 'outside' to self-consciousness itself is posited *within* self-consciousness, and that consequently, one's relation to any such supposed outside is always mediated by the evaluative or interpretive activity that is the essence of consciousness; hence the basis for sceptical doubt.[17]

In terms of the Hellenistic philosophy that is providing us with our images, we can recall that, whereas Epictetus and the stoics had found in their experience of the freedom of self-consciousness the imperative to assent to nature, Sextus Empiricus and his sceptical tradition argue for an imperative not to assent, and their philosophy is an argument for the impossibility of rational assent. Whereas the stoic had argued that the rational way to act was to assent to the rationality of what one cannot control, the sceptic shows that the demands of knowledge always end in a reliance upon one's choice, that is, upon the judgmental power over which one does have control; thus there is no unmediated and compelling route to knowledge that bypasses the essentiality of choice – of 'negativity' in Hegel's vocabulary. For, the sceptic shows, there are always equally compelling but contradictory appearances to which one would be required to assent, and, therefore, it is not possible to rest responsibility for one's beliefs upon 'self-evident' appearances and rationally to choose to assent to one appearance over another. Thus, a suspension of judgment is all that is rationally possible.

What the sceptic proclaims is thus the absoluteness of the 'negativity,' this evaluative power, of self-consciousness; that is, every facet of experience is recognized as something that is *not* present simply immediately, but that, as a product of choice, has had its unmediated form of existence negated. There is nothing the self faces that is not a product of its own activity, and the appearances that the stoic faces are always only that, namely, different ways in which powers of the self-conscious agent present or manifest themselves or their own activities. The stoic self is in a position of assenting never to *nature*, or to a given world, but only to various ways in which the self gives *itself* to itself, and the apparently 'alien' other to which it stands in negative relation is really, by virtue of its appearing *to* self-consciousness, already a product of the self's own negativity[18]: the self can only ever encounter its own evaluations. Again, rather than having 'immediate' appearances upon which one performs an act of judgment, a fundamental act of judging or evaluating has *already* happened in the act of 'receiving' the supposedly immediate appearances; thus one's explicit act of judgment – negation – is a judgment

upon what has *already* gone through a process of interpretive evaluation – negation – and the choice of assent or dissent is thus a negation of what is already the product of negation.

In terms of Hegel's logical categories, self-consciousness is an *absolute* negation, or the negation of the *whole* sphere of determinate or specific negations, and this absoluteness first manifests itself as the sceptic rejection of the possibility of assent or dissent where this is construed in the fashion of the stoic as an *immediate* negation. Consequently, there can be no ground for distinction or discrimination between appearances, since all are at root the same; they are merely different 'magnitudes' of critical-judgmental power or self-conscious negativity.[19] The sceptic self is thus not a determinate being apart from these appearances, but itself is just what Hume calls the 'bundle' of these 'perceptions,' or what Hegel calls a 'medley of sensuous and intellectual representations,' 'a purely casual, confused medley,' a 'restless confusion.'[20]

Yet equally, the sceptic self *is* a single self opposed to this flux and multiplicity; the sceptic is precisely the simple power of negativity which recognizes the groundlessness of all its experienced difference.[21] Even if it is true that all the seemingly immediate, positive determinations of consciousness are already mediated by self-conscious negativity, and even if self-conscious negativity must be recognized as the very substance of appearance, that negation (i) which has already operated in providing for the self a world of appearance and that negativity (ii) which is now called upon to assent to or dissent from these appearances are still logically differentiatable features within self-consciousness.

In fact, Hegel argues, the reality of the sceptic self is precisely the unreconciled relation of these two determinations of selfhood, each rising to the fore in a way that depends on the other. To argue that the self is just the flux of appearances presupposes the negativity of a self that posits (negates) the independence of the differences; to argue that this self-identical unity is the true determination of sceptical self-consciousness, one must presuppose the presences of those immediate negations that constitute consciousness of which this unified self is the essence and negator and upon which it thus depends.[22] Sceptical self-consciousness is thus a vacillation between the conception of the self as an independent, self-sufficient power of negation, and the self as a flux of non-self-subsistent determinations. To advocate either requires advocating the other in its place[23]: scepticism 'pronounces an absolute vanishing, but the pronouncement *is*, and this consciousness is the vanishing that is pronounced'[24]; that is, in the very performance of its annunciation of

the absolute contingency and changeability of all the determinations within consciousness, the sceptic implicitly asserts its own necessity and self-identity as that for which, or relative to which, the determinations 'are not.' There is thus an equivocation concerning the notion of self-conscious negativity that characterizes the logic of scepticism – the conflation of immediate and absolute negation. This was also the logical error in stoicism: the stoic sees only the immediate opposition of the subject of consciousess and its object and does not recognize that this negation – this distinction – itself is a distinction within consciousness rather than between consciousness and nature; the sceptic recognizes self-conscious negativity to be absolute (universal within consciousness) but conflates this fact with the immediate negation according to which the singular objects within consciousness are not the singular subject of consciousness. It is this logical confusion regarding immediate and absolute negation that will be overcome in the conception of self-conscious selfhood, which Hegel calls 'the unhappy consciousness' (*das unglückliche Bewußtsein*), which will be the self-consciousness that distinguishes between the determining ground of its consciousness and the determined shape in which it exists as a consciousness. Before turning to unhappy consciousness, let us review what we have learned about the concept of self-conscious selfhood as it has developed through the categories of stoicism and scepticism.

The positive contribution of stoicism is that it rightly advocates the freedom of self-consciousness and finds this freedom in self-determination and in the recognition of itself in its products; the problem with stoicism is that it too narrowly and immediately defines the limits of the activity of the self.[25] The positive contribution of scepticism is that it rightly broadens the conception of 'products' to the totality of the determinations of consciousness; the problem with scepticism is that it rightly identifies two constitutive dimensions to selfhood, the absolute power of negativity and the determinate products of this negativity, but it tries immediately to identify its self with both, and immediately to identify each feature with the other. What results is an internally contradictory vacillation between the advocacy of one side or the other, without a recognition either that the two assertions are different, or, consequently, that there is a determinate logical relation between the two aspects that itself is constitutive of both the identity of the two and of their difference. What is required, then, is a *mediated* account of the relation of these two constitutive features of selfhood. This is what is developed in 'the unhappy consciousness.'

3. Unhappy Consciousness

'Unhappy consciousness'[26] is that characteristic pattern of self-consciousness that, like the sceptical self-consciousness, identifies two constitutive features of selfhood (namely, the infinite power of negativity and the concrete determinations of this negative activity), but that, unlike the sceptic, recognizes them as different features, and as features *the relation of which* constitutes the reality of selfhood.

The characteristic moment of self-consciousness that distinguishes the unhappy consciousness from the stoic and the sceptic is that the unhappy consciousness is aware that it is *not* in immediate identity with the pure negative that is the absolute self. Both the stoic and the sceptic assert that the self makes evaluations and then assert 'I am that self.' Unhappy consciousness, however, is, as it were, a 'fractured' I, since it cannot thus immediately say 'I am myself'; rather, the unhappy consciousness recognizes a relation of appearance and reality *within* self-conscious selfhood – within itself – and recognizes itself on the side of appearance: it is how who it is appears to itself. The unhappy consciousness thus stands in relation to its own reality as a subject and a student. This final shape of self-consciousness is thus truly distinguished by the nature of its consciousness of its self, and what it is conscious of is that its own immediate identity is to be the moment that is *negated (judged) by* the self proper: the unhappy consciousness immediately identifies with the moment that, for the sceptics, was a confused medley of sense and understanding, without being able immediately to identify with the absolute negative that is the ground of the otherwise groundless determinations that constitute this self. Unhappy consciousness is 'unhappy' because it is not in communion with its real ground, and it is 'consciousness' because, within the context of self-consciousness, it adopts a standpoint of consciousness to that which constitutes its real self; that is, it takes itself to be an external viewer.[27]

I want to draw attention to what is being distinguished here, because the analysis of the subsequent chapters will depend on this point. The unhappy consciousness recognizes both that it is one of the players within its experience (the empirical self as opposed to the empirical other) and that its identity is in some way beyond the totality of its experience as its determining ground. This is the self-consciousness that finds itself already involved with what it immediately is not and recognizes that its own reality is to be found in that which has 'given' this 'given' relation as a whole: it is precisely the recognition that to know its own truth, its own real self,

means that its experience *as a whole* needs to be accounted for. This culminating form of selfhood marks the completed structure (*Gestalt*) of self-consciousness in that it identifies the dynamic of self-consciousness as defined by the 'syllogism' (in Hegel's technical vocabulary) of (i) an empirical ego, or an apparent (*für sich*) self (the moment of the changeable); (ii) a transcendental ego, or a real (*an sich*) self (the moment of the unchangeable); and (iii) their relation.[28] Subsequent chapters will deal, among other things, with the question, 'What is this real self?' It is in preparation for this that we must focus now on how the dynamics of the relation of the real and the apparent self – the transcendental and the empirical ego – work themselves out in the logic of unhappy consciousness.[29]

There are three different forms unhappy consciousness takes, and the specific difference of each of these forms is how it understands the relation between the two logical 'moments' of self-conscious selfhood: 'There is thus a threefold way available to consciousness for how the singular is connected with the unchangeable. *Firstly* it comes to itself again as opposite to the unchangeable essence, and it is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which remains the element of the whole relation. *Secondly*, however, for it the *unchangeable* itself has *singularity in it*, so that singularity is the shape of the unchangeable in which herewith passes the whole way of existence. *Thirdly* it finds itself as this singular in the unchangeable.'[30] In this quotation, 'singularity' corresponds to the moment of the determinate products of negation, that singular moment that is the 'bundle of perceptions' or the empirical ego, and 'the unchangeable' corresponds to the moment of the pure power of negativity or the transcendental ego. For the remainder of this chapter I want to explicate Hegel's account of the unhappy consciousness in a way that makes sense of this quotation and will set up my subsequent analyses of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Hegel identifies three distinct modes of unhappy consciousness, each defined by the way the relation between the unchangeable and the changeable, the real and the apparent self, is understood by the unhappy consciousness; the three modes, in other words, are three ways in which the empirical ego construes its relation to its own selfhood proper. Articulated in this way, it is obvious that I am addressing the 'portability' of the argument about the logic of selfhood, and it is precisely this aspect of transcendental psychology or epistemology that I want to derive from these texts. In the interests of familiarity, however, it is worthwhile, again, to bring out this point in tandem with a naming of these relations as they

are exemplified by the *Vorstellungen* Hegel chooses, since this may help to illustrate the logical relations involved. Let us, then, name the three *Vorstellungen* that correspond to the three ways in which unhappy consciousness is conscious of its self.

The three logical relations are, first, the changeable single self identifies itself as simply opposed to the unchangeable essence, which latter is thus an alien being that passes judgment on the former; second, the single self recognizes that the unchangeable itself is present as a singularity, and a reconciliation (contact) with the unchangeable is made possible inasmuch as both the changeable and the unchangeable selves are singular presences within a common field of existence; and third, the single self finds itself already in the unchangeable and the unchangeable already in itself, such that it is already reconciled.[31] The images that exemplify these relations are religious: the unchangeable in these three relations is, respectively, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the relations to the unchangeable are, respectively, Old Testament Judaism, Medieval Catholicism, and Modern Protestantism.[32] I shall not go through the analyses of all these shapes, since my interest is in only the third. I shall, however, draw attention to one important feature of Hegel's treatment.

From the text I have just been considering, it is clear that 'the unhappy consciousness' does not refer to a single static form of the relation to the unchangeable, but refers, rather, to the basic conception of self-consciousness *as* a syllogism of changeable, unchangeable, and their relation, and to the intrinsic logical dynamic by which this relation self-develops. This point is important to note because it is the key to my usage in subsequent chapters. It also needs stressing because in the text in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' Hegel announces and articulates the basic logical relations of all three modes of unhappy consciousness, but he analyses only the second in detail. The first is given short treatment[33] and the third is not analysed at all, apart from the basic articulation of its logic already mentioned and its description in the first paragraph of Chapter V, 'Reason.'[34] The second, however, is treated in great detail: it is itself broken down into three further modes of relation, and the analysis of these three fills the remainder of the chapter.[35] This emphasis gives the impression that it is this second form that is the proper referent for 'the unhappy consciousness,' although the above quotation belies this interpretation; none the less many commentators simply identify 'the unhappy consciousness' with *unreconciled* forms of unhappy consciousness.[36] Doing so, however, destroys the logic of both the section and the chapter, since this approach would leave incomplete the analysis of

self-consciousness in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness.' My use of 'the unhappy consciousness' thus will not refer uniquely to unreconciled forms of unhappy consciousness, but will refer, rather, to the basic logical relation and to the totality of its intrinsic dynamic. In fact, I shall in general be most concerned with the third, reconciled form. My argument, as I suggested in the first half of this chapter, will be that all subsequent chapters in the *Phenomenology* are workings out of the logic of the third form of unhappy consciousness and are thus logically contained *in* the last movements of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness.' I shall conclude this chapter now with an account of what I take to be the essential logic of unhappy consciousness, especially in its third form, as it pertains to the issues that will be of concern to my analysis in subsequent chapters. The logical key to unhappy consciousness is that it is *the experience of necessity.*

In scepticism it was realized that the cause and essence of the determinations of experience is the negativity – the recognitive, judgmental power – of the absolute self; this insight is retained by the unhappy consciousness, but the unhappy consciousness finds it cannot immediately identify itself with this its cause and essence. Thus, the unhappy consciousness knows that its own true self is the cause of its experience, but it also posits this true self as beyond its immediate self. The unhappy consciousness *finds itself subject to* the determination of its own real self. The unhappy consciousness, like scepticism, recognizes that absolute subjectivity (God, according to the *Vorstellungen* of Hegel's presentation) is the absolute ground, but, unlike scepticism, it does not find in this recognition the proof of its own arbitrary freedom, but finds, rather, the real source of its subjugation. Again, however, like a stoic and unlike a slave, the unhappy consciousness has its master in itself, not in something external, and thus the necessity of the commands is intrinsic to its very being and is not an externally imposed legislation. The unhappy consciousness, then, is the experience of finding oneself obliged in one's very being to obey certain commands; one finds oneself *subject* to one's true self, not simply in command of oneself.

The first form of unhappy consciousness is that for which its real self remains essentially beyond and unapproachable. Here the empirical self is committed to a law that confronts it as an immediate being, that is, a self-contained and opaque reality that is intrinsically indifferent to the actions of the empirical ego or to any discursive attempt of the empirical ego to identify with the transcendental ego; here the transcendental ego appears to the empirical ego as a transcendent being.

This extreme dualism is problematic, for there is in principle no way to

achieve a relationship between the two terms. No devotion, no penance, no action can ever bridge the gap. Indeed, the very recognition of the relationship is impossible, since such recognition requires the empirical ego (the believer in Hegel's *Vorstellung*) to identify the other term, but this is by definition impossible, since no relationship to that other is possible. This dualism of empirical and transcendental ego cannot be the adequate logic of self-consciousness; for the empirical ego could not truly recognize itself as subject to its real self, nor could the transcendental ego actually function as ground or cause for the changing consciousness that is the empirical ego.

The second form of unhappy consciousness again experiences the transcendental ego as not in any way dependent upon the empirical ego; that is, the transcendental ego remains an immediate and transcendent being, but the empirical ego also finds itself able to approach, and be recognized by, the real self through a mediating reality or practice that is external to both the empirical and the transcendental ego but that has some aspect according to which each of the two sides separately can identify with this intermediary. Christ as a historical agent, devotional practices, or the intercession of a priest are examples of such an external mediator that fulfil this role within Hegel's *Vorstellung* of a believer seeking reconciliation with God: each of them can be posited as that by which a reconciliation is achieved between the two parties, which otherwise are unreconcilable. In each case the intermediary can relate to the believer by virtue of one aspect of its (the mediator's) being, and can relate to God by virtue of another aspect. Any activities that enact these same logical relations of appealing to some third party for legitimation within the dynamic interaction of the apparent and the real self would qualify as actions of the second form of unhappy consciousness. These basic logical relations of mediation are equally exemplified, for example, in the relationship between a reader, a text, and a commentary, where the posited inability of the reader to understand the text leads to the valuing of commentaries that 'mediate' and transmit the textual meaning in a form accessible to the reader.

What is problematic in this whole approach to mediation is that the relation of mediation is left unexplained; for, while the question of how the believer can relate to God or the reader to the text has been bypassed by no longer insisting that this relation ever need be actually achieved, an equivalent question immediately reappears: How can the two aspects within the mediator themselves 'communicate' one with the other? Hence, the question of how Christ's human nature, by virtue of which He

is accessible to humans, relates to His divine nature, by virtue of which He is accessible to God. It is possible for the two aspects to relate within the mediator only if it is already possible in principle for the two types of reality to enter into relation. Thus, to follow out my *Vorstellung* of textual interpretation, the only way a commentary can communicate the meaning of the text to the reader is if one and the same author both read the text and wrote the commentary; that is, the external mediation of text to reader is possible only if it is itself premised on a more fundamental internal mediation according to which it is already possible in principle for the text to be read.[37] When this internalization of ground of mediation that was to be supplied by the external mediator is identified in the dynamic of transcendental and empirical ego, one has identified the third form of unhappy consciousness.

This concluding form of unhappy consciousness is that which still posits both a difference and a relation between the apparent and the real self but which equally recognizes the possibility and, ultimately, the necessity of their root identity. Here, the empirical and transcendental egos (or, in Hegel's *Vorstellung*, the believer and God) are not posited as mutually indifferent determinate beings but are seen as constitutive moments of a single process in which each is defined by its relation to, and dependence upon, the other. The empirical ego, in other words, is already in communion with the transcendental ego, and the issue can only be one of developing or transforming an already existing relation, not one of bringing the relation into existence. In other words, precisely the relationship that would have to hold if external mediation is to be possible – namely, that the two natures are already in principle relateable – rules out the very need for that external mediation. God and believer, transcendental and empirical ego: in either scenario, both terms must be recognized as dependent on the other in that both are really to be understood as moments that exist only in the context of the dynamic activity that is their relation. The third form of unhappy consciousness, then, is the phenomenon of the self that recognizes that its own identity is beyond its own immediacy but that it must be the case that within itself there is a 'ladder to the absolute.'[38]

Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to show how subjectivity can be objective by showing that there is an experienced necessity in the form of objects and that this experience of necessity is the expression of the transcendental structures of subjectivity. Notice that it is this structure according to which who I really am is revealed to me as how objects have to be formed that is the basis of unhappy consciousness. The unhappy

consciousness is the experience of the call of necessity within itself: it recognizes its real self as that to which it is subjected. But this necessity in the structure of its subjectivity shows itself in its consciousness as the necessary structures of its experience of the world: the real self shows itself as the judgment it passes on the world. Unhappy consciousness knows who it is when it knows how it has to see the object, so the unhappy consciousness finds its true self – its truth – expressed in the necessity that informs the object of its experience: its own truth is the truth of all reality. The unhappy consciousness thus ultimately sees its own self reflected as the necessity within objectivity. We shall see this necessity within objectivity take progressively more sophisticated forms, beginning with the formal necessity of the reason that applies to any self-identity and leading to the various forms of intersubjectivity. In general, the phenomenology of the third form of unhappy consciousness will reveal more and more profoundly the need to fill the role of the transcendental I – the absolute – with the concreteness of embodied intersubjective experience, to embed the transcendental in the empirical (or equally to find that the empirical itself is the working of the transcendental), and to eliminate the alienation – the separateness – of the absolute from the contingency of human experience: the education of self-consciousness will be its progressive realization that the Other that calls upon it is none other than its others, and the absolute will be known/realized only in and as the call of conscience.

Hegel's *Vorstellung* in this section would suggest that participation in the Christian community as a literal functioning member of the body of Christ is the exemplification of this third form of unhappy consciousness; the rest of my analysis of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will look at how different relationships exemplify this third form of unhappy consciousness, and in looking at the embodiment of the real self, it is this body of Christ that we shall be pursuing.

Conclusion

Starting from the notion of the free self that can say 'I' in opposition to a world, we have proceeded, via the sceptical recognition that all the I ever experiences is itself, to the notion that, even if one is the organizer of one's own experience, truth can still be found within this consciousness to the extent that one *finds oneself compelled* to organize in the fashion one does; for it is this compulsion that is the expression of that 'self' that is the organizer of one's experience. If the sceptic showed that no knowl-

edge of reality is possible because one only ever encounters appearances, the unhappy consciousness, by putting the distinction between reality and appearance *within* self-consciousness, has rejoined that truth is possible inasmuch as one can come to identity with one's real self. The unhappiness, then, that characterizes unhappy consciousness is not merely the insurmountability of the distance that inadequate forms of self-consciousness posit between the empirical and transcendental egos, but is, rather, the fundamental condition of self-consciousness as such, inasmuch as the empirical self is not in immediate control of itself but must always *wait upon* the synthetic action of the transcendental ego; unhappiness is the condition of the self-conscious ego that finds itself always having syntheses enacted through itself in the experience of lived necessity or compulsion.

This necessity to wait upon the synthetic action of the transcendental ego makes the category of *habit* absolutely essential to the concept of self-consciousness. Habits amount to the building up of the sufficient conditions for synthesis, that is, the creating of an appropriate medium within which the synthesis can enact itself. We shall see that habit – *hexis* – is the crucial category for developing a Hegelian philosophy of the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood, and this primacy of the concept of habit for both the concept of self-consciousness and the concept of embodiment will allow us to see that it is indeed be the developing of appropriate *bodily* conditions that makes possible the achievement of more and more adequate forms of self-consciousness.

Throughout the rest of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel is engaged with studying various forms of those experiences of compulsion that reveal a dynamic of transcendental and empirical selfhood at play. Using this general schema of the dynamic of real and apparent selfhood, which we have identified with the third form of unhappy consciousness, we can now turn to the question of the embodiment of the the self-conscious selfhood that experiences such compulsion, beginning with the relation of rational self-identity and the embodiment of identity in difference in Chapter V, 'Reason.'

2

Reason and Dualism: The Category as the Immediacy of Unconditioned Self-Communion

Introduction

Hegel's philosophy in general will not tolerate any unreconciled dualism, and how this commitment works itself out in relation to the philosophy of mind is the particular subject-matter of this work. The dualism of self-as-mind and body, which is often associated with the name of Descartes, always has been, at least since Plato's 'Phaedo,' the strongest opponent of the non-dualistic view; the key to the Cartesian argument is that self-consciousness is constituted by a direct identification with universal and necessary rational truths that are not dependent on any bodily conditions, and, thus, the self *qua* rational is independent of the body. The crucial logical feature of this dualism, then, is the conception of an *immediate communion* of an independent, autonomous self with itself. This dualistic conception of the rational self and the body is present as the animating spirit throughout Chapter V, 'Reason,' but it has two important anticipative precedents in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness.'

The most immediate form of a dualism of self and body appears in the dynamic of desire at the beginning of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness' (which will come up for consideration in Chapter 3); here the positing of self as independent and immediately self-present reality was non-reflective, and the body from which it was differentiated was all otherness. The second dualism that anticipates reason appears as the stoicism we considered in Chapter 1; here the self was explicitly posited as an independent determinate being, and the body of nature from which it was differentiated was equally posited as a self-contained determinate being. In 'Reason,' finally, we have the ultimate form of this dualism, wherein the self as independent reality is posited as in principle equal to all reality; it

is the articulation of its attempts at putting into practice this identifica-tion-in-principle that will be the focus of this chapter.[1]

An a priori refutation of such dualism is not hard to articulate. If mind and body are truly independent, then there can be no state of either that is dependent upon the other; that is, in principle there can be no relation between the two independent realms. This entails that there can be no knowledge of body, for that would amount to a state of mind dependent upon body. Thus even the articulation of the dualism becomes impossi-ble, since it is not possible to articulate that from which mind is being differentiated.[2] Mind-body dualism is thus a meaningless name. This explains why, if the possibility of a relationship is presupposed, the attempts to account for such a relation are doomed to failure. To account for the means by which the body affects the mind will involve positing a bodily means; that is, since the body exerts a bodily causality, what body affects will always be body. Thus, the question of how the relation is effected will always involve positing a body as the mediating moment between body and mind, which will still leave unanswered the question in principle of how a body (now the mediating body) can affect mind. Simi-larly, to account for how mind affects body will involve the same positing of new moments of the mental as mediating moments, forever leaving unanswered the question in principle of how the mental stimulus can ever affect the body. Hegel is certainly familiar with these arguments[3] – indeed the problem of mediating a dualistic relation is a pivotal theme in all his thought – but such refutation is not his goal in Chapter V, 'Rea-son'; rather, Hegel's treatment of reason lays out how such a dualistic rea-son *comes to refute itself through its own immanent dynamic.*

Hegel's account of reason is long and complex, and I shall not analyse it in detail; instead, I shall trace the general logical movement that is rele-vant to my subsequent account of the notion of body operative in Hegel's analyses. In accordance with the treatment of self-consciousness in Chap-ter 1, I shall consider reason as an example of the third form of unhappy consciousness; that is, I shall focus on reason as a way in which an identifi-cation is posited by the singular empirical self and the universal rational self.

What will become clear through the analysis is that *on its own terms* rea-son is inadequate; for its constitutive commitment to different forms of dualism will in each case preclude it from fulfilling the project of univer-sal identification to which it also has a constitutive commitment. In study-ing Chapter V, Section A, 'Observing Reason,' we shall see how reason's conception of selfhood implies a dualism of reason and nature, of inner

and outer, of identity and difference, and how observation animated by such a commitment to dualism is ultimately sterile and unable to live up to its own constitutive principle, namely, the 'scientific imperative.' In Section B, the same reason, now 'practical,' will be unable to live up to its constitutive objective of winning the intersubjective world over to rationality, because again it is plagued by a dualism, but in this case the dualism is between reason and social institutions, rather than reason and nature. In Section C, 'self-determining' reason is unable to recognize that the process of expressing or acting on an intention can reflect back on that intention, and this dualism of intention and actualization will keep the rational individual from fulfilling its project of being in accord with the universal. Overall, then, reason's commitment to the immediacy of the self-communion of the rational self excludes *nature, institutions,* and *expression* from having a constitutive role in rational self-identity, and in each case this commitment to the exclusion of mediation will lead to the failure of reason to fulfil its own definitive project. Before we study these various forms of reason in detail, however, a short account of reason in general will be helpful.

1. Reason in General

Hegel begins his account of reason by identifying it as a form of consciousness that is the product of a history of development and, as such, bears the mark of this history in itself, but one that itself does not recognize that it is such a product: reason believes itself to have entered onto the scene full blown and immediately.[4] What in general characterizes the stance of reason is its desire to reduce all experience to a rational unity, and it believes that in so doing it is performing a natural task which can and should be performed by all agents facing the same situation. Reason will take any opponent and show how its position is not rationally supportable, or show how the rational evaluation of the evidence points to a different point of view, and so on. The behaviour of reason is indeed reasonable; what we must first see, however, is how reason's rational behaviour of responding to every challenge with an appeal to canons of rationality is a product of its own history of development, and especially how it is a form of unhappy consciousness. There are, I contend, three essential lessons that the self-conscious self had to learn in order to be a rational self. The achievement of rationality is founded on the recognition of *challenge, respect,* and *authority.*

As we shall see in Chapter 3, the entire dynamic of desire that is devel-

oped in the opening section of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' is animated by the attempt by the self to eliminate the possibility of *challenge*; for the simple desiring self, every determination of being amounts to a challenge to the centrality and independence of the self, and the dynamic of desire is the perpetual attempt to overcome this challenge through consumption. The advance to subsequent shapes of self-consciousness is made through the tolerance of such challenges, that is, through the recognition that they are essential and constitutive to the nature of self-consciousness and, therefore, inescapable.

The subsequent dynamic of 'lordship and bondage' in the same chapter culminates in the analysis of the new and more sophisticated form of self-conscious selfhood that is developed through the institution of slavery. What especially defines this new slave-self as more sophisticated than the simply desiring self is its *respect* for what it faces; the slave learns that, and how, she must respond to her other on terms that *it* sets, and that she is not simply independent, and free to act according to desire.

Finally, as we saw in Chapter 1, the dynamic of 'the freedom of self-consciousness,' which culminates in the phenomenon of the unhappy consciousness, reveals a self-conscious selfhood that becomes progressively more sophisticated as it finds itself progressively more compelled to recognize itself as *already subject* to an *authority* the necessity of which is *intrinsic* to the very nature of the self. It is such a self that respects the integrity of the challenges of otherness according to the demands of an intrinsic authority who acts out the drama of Chapter V, 'Reason.'

What reason amounts to is a commitment to 'the category,' which we can define in terms of our analysis of unhappy consciousness as an immediate identification of the apparent self with the real self; what reason knows according to this identification is that it can and must find the unifying ground of things, and that this ground is identical with *its own* self and equally is the ground of *universal* agreement, since precisely what it has immediate access to are the canons of *necessary assent*. Reason knows that things must *be* in whatever way they *must appear* to the rational self. Reason's imperative is (i) to notice what appears (which marks the continuing status of, or, in Hegel's terms, is the *Aufhebung* of, the moment of challenge),[5] (ii) to see what appears in its proper (scientific) perspective (which is the *Aufhebung* of the moment of respect), and (iii) to perform these operations in a form that is universally defensible to all other rational selves (which is the *Aufhebung* of the moment of authority). Reason's imperative is to see how it is that what appears appears as a logical unity.

The germ of the method that governs reason's operations is the posit-

ing of the primacy of identity in its pursuit of unity, but it is a positing of identity that excludes difference, and this ultimately leads to a sense of identity modelled on the identity of inert substance rather than on the identity of subjectivity.[6] Simple identity can be found in experience, and this lends the method necessity, and, insofar as every empirical ego can identify with the transcendental ego by positing identity, the arguments of reason do have universality. Thus reason *is* authoritative. Hegel's argument does not dispute this absoluteness of reason's claims, but it shows, rather, that their abstractness (and essential substantiality or positivism) cannot pay adequate respect to the challenge of otherness.[7] This is what reason learns through its own dynamic throughout the drama of Chapter V, 'Reason.' The three sections of Chapter V follow reason in its attempt to find or produce the rationality of its object through three different 'methods': first, through the (supposedly) passive observation of what it takes to be substantial 'things'; second, through the active transformation of social relations; and finally, through the rational transfiguration of its own self. We can now turn to a brief consideration of each of these three stages.[8]

2. Reason and Observation

In Chapter V, Section A, 'Observing Reason,' we watch the drama of scientific reason; reason here wants a rational account of why things are the way they are – that is, why they have the identity they have – and, to find this identifiability of things, it looks. There are two crucial points to note here: first, the *passive* stance adopted by reason; second, the *external* nature of reason's reflection. Understanding these points will allow us to see that 'Observing Reason' essentially provides a *reductio* argument against the possibility of reason finding itself reflected in simple *being*, or static, substantial externality, and this precipates the move to Chapter V, Section B, 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Itself,' and the attempt to find reason reflected in *action.*

Although the various stances through which observing reason passes represent quite different degrees of philosophical sophistication *at some levels*, what unites them *as* observing reason is their ultimate adherence to an ethos of 'passive empiricism.' Within the treatment of 'the observation of nature,' the opening section on simple description[9] is very much a simple Lockean-style empiricism, while the closing sections on the observation of organic nature[10] are clearly derived from the Schellingean school. Yet what both share at decisive points is the commitment to the discovery

of a simple, observable being, which will determine the identity or intelligibility of that being studied; the initial approach tries to establish identity through a simple enumeration of observable features,[11] while the culminating form seeks the essence of the embodiment of life in e-numerating differences in 'specific gravity,' here taken as an observable property which accounts for all other bodily properties.[12] In each case, reason wants to *find* something that will *tell* it (reason) what the object of its study is, and why it is so. Reason thus takes itself to be passive, that is, just receiving what is already 'there,' and what it takes itself to be receiving is a given, simple, immediate being: 'data.' This is equally true of the approach taken to the observation of self-consciousness, which, in its generation of logical and psychological laws, again seeks a static, measurable content that will account for the rational identity of the subject of its observation,[13] and it is what is indeed most definitive of the operations of physiognomy and phrenology, the analysis of which concludes this section on observation.[14] Reason, Hegel argues, is, however, not passive; for it is really 'putting nature on the rack' and forcing it to answer its (reason's) question, namely, the question of what is the rationality of the identity of the observed.[15] We can see this better if we go on to the second crucial feature of observing reason: the *externality* of its reflection.

The externality of reflection is really implied in the passive stance just identified, since reason's observation *defines itself* by its relation to a 'given,' that is, to something that is not its own product, or, again, to something to the inside of which it has (or has had) no access. The observational stance thus begins by positing the self-containedness of its object and posits itself as a parasitic voyeur whose own activity is *indifferent to* and *outside of* its object.[16] What observing reason will produce, then, will only ever be something superimposed on its data; having defined itself and its object as indifferent, self-contained beings, all it will ever encounter is its own formalization of the observability – the outside – of its object. There is more to say about the epistemological problems this externality engenders, but first we must note the essential dualism of inner and outer, or of identity and difference, that it implies.

By virtue of the phenomenological investigation in the first four chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel is able to claim that the essential thesis of reason – its scientific imperative – is to find itself to be identical to all reality,[17] and *we* have defended the propriety of such a claim on the basis of the concept of unhappy consciousness. This remains *for reason*, however, a merely lived imperative; that is, this is not a demand it self-consciously posits, and reason is thus properly only the 'instinct' of rea-

son, *Vernunftinstinkt*.[18] What we see, in fact, in our observation of observing reason is that the method of observation that it adopts – namely, external reflection – is *necessarily* at odds with its implicit objective; for precisely what this method *presupposes* is that reason *cannot* identify with its object, since the given is, again, outside and indifferent to reason; that is, it is *defined* as excluding reason.[19] Reason is thus *essentially* dualistic in its presuppositions, since it operates on the basis of (i) an ontological, that is to say essential and necessary, distinction between itself and its object; (ii) the concomitant distinction between the given outer and the hidden inner; and (iii) the equally essential distinction between the identity it will discover/produce through its investigations and the differences it will pass over to get to this identity. The first two of these dualisms are just reformulations of the dualism of observer and observed already explicated in relation to the practice of external reflection, but the last dualism, the dualism of identity and difference, can be better seen if we proceed to consider the epistemological problems that necessarily plague observing reason, and to do this we must first see how the phenomenology of observing reason is structured.

In the successive subsections of the 'Observation of Nature' (and, indeed, in the observation of self-consciousness and of its immediate actuality, but here in a less detailed fashion), the object under investigation becomes progressively more sophisticated, moving from inert inorganics to chemicals to organisms, and *up to a certain point* so does the method of observation.[20] I have already argued that the method throughout remains one of passive empiricism, but there are refinements to this method in the three main subsections of the 'Observation of Nature': the method changes from simple description to a search for laws to a teleology.[21] What is interesting here is that, up to a point, the methods are suitable to their respective subject matters. Because absolutely inert inorganic matter would have no constitutive moment of being-for-self, all one could ever really do is describe it, that is, describe the forming that it happens arbitrarily to undergo, and because chemicals have a constitutive tension between their being-at-rest and their being-in-relation, all one can ever do is know them in relation to a law of their transformations.[22] Finally, because the organism is an individual, that is, a totality that is reflected-into-itself, it is proper to understand it as goal directed.[23] Thus Hegel's phenomenological description of observing reason does not merely amount to criticism, but it equally shows the positive developments within observing reason from the point of view of the Hegelian project of philosophy of nature, and it is crucial to the reading of this sec-

tion to recognize that this is going on.[24] Where then is the problem in observation? The problem is that the development here is visible only from the point of view of Hegel's philosophy of nature, and the *Vernunft-instinkt* that makes this development does not, itself, know what it is doing.

Although in its practice it moves from description to chemical laws and organic teleology, in its philosophy observing reason remains animated by the project of description. The crucial move from description to law is the move from perception to understanding; that is, it is the move whereby one recognizes that only through *understanding* it can one recognize the unity of the process, and that it is only on the basis of this understanding that the relata can be identified and known[25]; observing reason, however, thinks its knowledge still is coming through its *observation* and thus posits the relata as primitive and the law as derivative.[26] Likewise, the crucial move from law to teleology is the move whereby one recognizes a *reflective totality* – that is, one recognizes a unity that *maintains itself in and through* the distinct operations of *the differences thus united* – or, again, it is the recognition of a totality that operates *as* a unity, where the *goal* of that activity is simply *itself*. Observation, however, posits the goal that accounts for the unity outside the differentiated totality that does the acting, since, *qua* observation, it posits only immediate, not reflected, determinations.[27] In other words, in both the case of the relata of the law and the case of the organs of the organism, these determinations are recognized (understood) *as* relata or *as* organs only by seeing that their very being is determined intrinsically by the relation to the whole (the legal *relation* or the organism) and to the others that make up the whole, but this recognition requires positing an *unobservable* determining ground; that is, it means seeing the observable in terms of the understood ground, rather than deriving the law on the basis of the observable.[28] Thus, to the extent that reason remains governed by the ethos of observation, it can never even appreciate the progress it actually makes in these successive developments of its science. We can now say something about the epistemological problems its science is left with as a result of its inability to move beyond a doctrine of external relations to one of internal relations.

Reason wants a rational account for why things are the way they are – that is, why they have the identity they have – but, *qua* observation, it takes this account to be the discovery of some 'thing,' rather than the assembling of the elements of its observation into a coherent story in which they are the participant members. The story reason really needs to tell is the story of how the observed is really the necessary expression of ration-

ality as rationality; that is, it needs to develop the forms of the given from out of the very concept of reason (which is what the Hegelian philosophy of nature achieves). To do this, however, would require positing the objects of its experience as intrinsically mediated; observation, however, takes what it finds to be immediate existences, and even when, in teleology, it posits a determining goal or when it posits an inner for the observed outer, the goal and the inner remain external to the observed being, and the observed being is still treated as a self-contained immediate existent (and, indeed, so is the posited goal or inner). By thus again setting up a dualism, here excluding the mediating being from what it mediates (which is just the dualism of inner and outer referred to above), reason precludes the possibility of its ever giving an account of the given as rational; for it takes what it immediately finds to be *intrinsically* immediate and, *ipso facto*, not intrinsically mediated by reason. This leaves observing reason with only three options for the form its science can take, all of which are inadequate to reason's project.

Since the given is always a self-enclosed immediate being, no relation between it and any other being could be *constitutive* of the being of it or its other. Thus, any 'law' 'discovered' by observing reason will ultimately end up as either (i) an empty tautology, because it simply defines conditions that apply irrespective of the determinate conditions of its supposed relata, since these determinate conditions, because self-enclosed, cannot enter into the terms of the legal mediation; or (ii) the simple description with which observing reason began, which simply enumerates features without being able to advance any explanatory ground. That is to say, it can only articulate the simple condition of empty self-identity, or else provide an uninterpreted list of simple differences; these are the two ways its pursuit can end. There is a further possible route, although it takes the form of a bad infinite, that is, a pursuit that can never end.

The above two results are results that can be had when the goal of explanation is given up; as long as observing reason tries to explain, however, it will face a never-ending task. The limitation of its method, *viz.*, its methodological inability to recognize anything other than immediate beings, means that any time observing reason posits an explanation, it must posit an immediate being. If, for example, it wants to explain the outer, it must posit an inner, where each, outer and inner, is posited as an immediate being; here, of course, nothing is explained, since the relation between the two beings remains a mystery. If, then, it tries to explain the relation between these two beings, all it can posit as an explanation is another immediate being. This solution will face the same problem, and

thus the process will have to be repeated ad infinitum, and no explanation will ever result. Observing reason is thus faced with three options: empty tautology, empty description, or the empty, infinite multiplication of middle terms.[29]

The problem observing reason faces really can be expressed by the dualism of identity and difference mentioned above. It seeks the identity of things, but it needs to recognize that identity is a reflected determination; that is, it is mediated, rather than simply immediate, and its mediation is a self-mediation. In the organism, 'the organism' is not some further 'part' above and beyond the organs, but is simply the unified totality of the functioning organs themselves. The identity *it* (the organism) has is an identity *they* (the organs) share and constitute; that is, it is an identity only in and through the reciprocal determination of differences. The logic of identity is thus a logic of reflection, and it cannot be captured in a simple logic of immediate beings.[30] As the objects of observing reason grew more sophisticated, it was precisely their internalization of difference that constituted this sophistication. What this means is that the very ability of observing reason to *recognize* these observables *as* units *presupposes* that reason's cognition is *implicitly* animated by a logic more sophisticated than that which it explicitly adopts in its scientific practice. What we, the phenomenological observers, recognize is that it is only reason's own sophistication in the posing of perceptual questions that allows it to recognize the more sophisticated objects of its experience, and we who have studied the first four chapters of the book know the drama through which this cognitive capacity developed; we thus know that the answer reason seeks to its question of the determining ground of the identity of the objects of its experience will be found only through the *self*-investigation by which it comes to perform the very phenomenological observation that has been under way in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* for four chapters. When observing reason turns to itself, however, its observational limitations will allow it to find only its own inadequate method,[31] since it still needs to develop from its own self the recognition of an identity in and through difference, and precisely where it will first be driven to find this is in its own attempts to be *responsible* to its own identity; this will be the culmination of Chapter V, 'Reason,' but before we get to that point, we must first consider that form of reason that recognizes that the rationality of its world is a product of its own activity. This will be a form of reason that has advanced beyond the attempt to find reason – identity – embodied in an immediate being and has turned to a *dynamic* embodiment of reason. This is clearly an advance, in so far as we saw in our con-

sideration of the concept of the organism as a reflective totality that it was only in the unified activity of self-maintenance that the infinite self had its selfhood, but this approach will remain limited to the extent that the activity in which reason finds itself reflected will still be construed as not intrinsic to its own nature, that is, not intrinsic to *being* rational, but only intrinsic to making its *object* rational.

3. Reason and Action

Whereas observing reason took itself to be passively observing data, we recognized from the start that it was in fact engaged in a process of actively transforming its cognitive environment from contingent perception to rational comprehension; reason, we said, was the certainty of its identity with all reality, but the reality with which it is identical is only a reality won over by reason. The truth of reason's behaviour, then, is that it transforms what is rationaliz*able* into what is actually rational, which means that reason is fundamentally to be found in an act of *making ratio-nal* – a dynamic activity – not in an inert immediate being. Given, then, what we know about reason's own character, we can see that the very project of observation was doomed from the start, since (i) reason misconstrued the nature of its own activity and the relation of this activity to its object, and (ii) the object in which it hoped to find itself reflected could never provide such a reflection. The dialectic of Chapter V, Section A, has made these points clear, and Section B, 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Itself,' gives a phenomenology of the next more sophisticated kind of rational activity, an activity that addresses these very problems that we identified with observing reason. We shall see here again, however, that this self-actualizing reason, while making an advance over observing reason, will still be plagued by the same basic dualism of immediacy and reflection, identity and difference.

All the forms of self-actualizing reason are forms of social revolution, that is, activities that seek to advance the social order from its existing irrational form into the rational form that is its destiny. The advance over observing reason is clear,[32] in that reason does not now pretend to be passive, but actively seeks to transform, and it finds reason embodied, not in inert immediate being, but in what is achieved in its action.[33]

Reason, we said, begins with the *imperative* to identify, that is, reason is always characterized by the obligation to make rational. In Chapter V, Section A, the practice of observing reason operated on the presupposition that this was not the case. Here in Section B, however, this impera-

tive to transform is now operative, that is, it is the presupposition of the practice of self-actualizing reason that it must make its object rational; this imperative remains, however, inexplicit or unthematic. (This notion of reason as imperative will become explicit to reason only in Section C, 'Individuality which to itself is real in and for itself.') What this means, then, is that the self-conscious agent we here consider must be working to make the world rational. This is essential to its status as reason: the revolutionary practices must not be based on *merely* idiosyncratic desires, but must be rooted in the *assurance* – if not the express assertion – that it is *qua* rational (that is, universal and necessary) self that one has the right, or rather the duty, to change society.

In order to transform its object, then, the rational self-consciousness must posit that object as *destined* to be rational, and recognizing itself as the carrier of the destined rationality, it must posit rational self-consciousness itself as the very goal; thus the object to be transformed into rational form will be the object as self-conscious, that is, society.[34] We can now consider briefly the three forms of social revolution that Hegel describes; we shall consider them in relation to the themes of self-identity and difference.

'Pleasure and Necessity,' is the first drama of self-actualizing reason[35]; Hegel draws his images here from Goethe's *Faust*, but we might just as easily imagine characters from Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*. Here, the would-be agent of the world's destiny sees the vindication of the world in its providing fulfilment for her personally.[36] In 'Pleasure and Necessity,' the rational self-consciousness actualizes herself through love; that is, she finds the world to have achieved its destiny in providing her with another singular self-consciousness in whom she is reflected. This is not simply the desire of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' which consumes its object; for (i) she preserves the immediate being of her other and enjoys only the conversion of the other's self-consciousness,[37] and (ii) even though she wants to see herself as a singular agent reflected, she maintains that it is *because she is a rational agent* that it is right for her to be thus reflected – that is, the agent of destiny sees this love as the goal of reality *only because this agent sees herself as the fulfilled shape of human individuality*.[38] In holding out her love as an ideal for the world, the agent of destiny realizes that the great mass of society opposes her,[39] but she has no concern for society, since rationality is to be found in singular self-conscious selfhood.

This elevation of herself beyond the limits of society proves impossible, however, for the very fulfilment of this elevation – the consummation of love – is the institution of a society; that is, love means entering into a

commitment to an other and finding oneself to be dependent on the reflection of that other. Thus the consummation of the celebration of individual excellence is achieved only in the *overcoming* of singularity and the instituting of an intersubjective universal.[40] Through love, the agent of destiny had tried to celebrate the rational excellence she already carried, but the fulfilment of this goal reveals the singular self to be only a moment in the true self-actualized rational self-consciousness. This contradiction between the intended goal and its actual fulfilment is felt by the agent of destiny as the simple shock – the 'riddle' (*Rätsel*) – of finding the unity of love replaced by the pain that accompanies the death of the other. *We* can see that this is the necessary outcome of the pursuit of reason that institutes a society, but to the agent who still holds her rational self to exist entire on its own in independence of the relation, this is unintelligible.[41]

What is crucial to our account here is that the explicit goal of self-actualizing reason is a self-identity that takes the form of a unity *reflected in itself*; it is an identity that is constituted only in and through the maintenance of differentiated units. Hegel notes this explicitly: 'The *object*, then, that is, for self-consciousness as it takes its pleasure, its essence, is the expansion of those simple essentialities of pure unity, of pure difference, and their relation.'[42] Hegel here articulates the point that we made in relation to observing reason: 'Unity, difference, and relation are categories each of which is nothing in and for itself, but only in relation to its opposite, and they cannot therefore be separated from one another.'[43] *We* can see that this notion that identity is not external to difference now characterizes the explicit goal of self-actualizing reason, but the extent to which the agent of destiny still feels the pain of the other's death to be a product of an alien necessity, not a product of her own action, is the extent to which she herself has not made this realization.

The remaining two forms of self-actualizing reason are further developments of this same basic tension. In 'The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit,' the agent of destiny explicitly posits the identity of her goal with the harmony of the social whole, insisting that we love one another, explicitly denouncing the goal of the fulfilment of a singular will in opposition to the will of others; 'The Law of the Heart' is thus the specific negation of that agent we studied in 'Pleasure and Necessity.'[44] The basic dynamic here is that the agent of destiny takes herself to be immediately an agent of universal love, but in trying to actualize the rational self-consciousness of all in universal love, she meets with opposition and ends up opposing her private vision to that of the whole, thus violating the ini-

tial project of universal love and, again, positing the self-identity of the singular agent in abstraction from the social whole to which it belongs as a committed member.[45]

Finally, in 'Virtue and the Way of the World,' the agent of destiny has realized that she cannot really be the 'agent' of destiny, since, as we have seen, the very function of the so-called agent is to-be-superseded and to become only a moment in the self-actualized rational self-consciousness.[46] The project of virtue, in other words, is the project of self-effacement, that is, of the sacrifice of one's identity to the larger whole. We can see already, however, that this project still makes the same essential logical error as the two preceding shapes do, but that it makes the error in reverse. Virtue still posits an identity that exists independently of difference, but this time it is not the singular self that is indifferent to other singulars and to the whole, but it is the universal that is indifferent to the singulars.

The notion of an identity that is reflected into itself is the notion of a systematic unity in which differences are integrated into an overarching unity, but in which the differences are still maintained as differences. To understand truly the social self-actualization of rational self-consciousness as such an identity would mean to recognize the essentiality of *both* the overarching totality *and* the participant members. We can articulate this in terms of the issues in 'Virtue and the Way of the World.'

What the knight of virtue recognizes is that she has certain capacities for enacting the true and the good – her rationality, or her identity as a member of the *universal* self – and that it is *these powers*, rather than her singular self-conscious selfhood that represent the rational self-consciousness that is to actualize itself.[47] The goal of the knight of virtue is to have these powers achieve their rightful place as the order of social reality and to have the rule of singular wills disappear.[48] We can see, however, that the very goal of the rule of these powers is fulfilled in, and only in, the situation in which these powers are put to use for the necessarily individuated objectives that singular agents pursue.[49] The goal of the knight of virtue can thus be fulfilled only in *action*, and in the action of agents who, while acting as members of a community, equally act on their own goals.[50] Thus it is the 'Way of the World' itself, that is, the actions of individuals who 'pervert' the powers in 'misusing' them for their own ends, which really fulfils the program of virtue.[51]

In each of these three dramas, then, we have seen the goal of self-actualizing reason to be rooted in an essential equivocation regarding the identity of this 'self,' and it amounts to a vacillation between rigidly iden-

tifying the self with the singular unit that participates in a larger system and rigidly identifying the systematic identity as the only self; we have seen, however, that the only self-identity that will adequately fulfil the demands of the logic of self-reflectedness is the notion of the self that, in the fulfilment of its individuated pursuits, equally realizes the objectives of the systematic identity in which it is implicated. With this notion of individual self-identity as simultaneously singular and universal, we have the basic concept of the 'Real Individual' of Chapter V, Section C, and it is to the dialectic of this individual that we now turn.

4. Reason and Responsibility

The real individual of Chapter V, Section C, 'Individuality which to itself is real in and for itself,'[52] is the agent who takes the enacting of her intrinsic intentions to be the actualizing of the universal good. As it is in Section A, 'Observing Reason,' Hegel's analysis here is essentially a *reductio* argument, and it is divided into three sections. First, we study the most immediate form in which the real individual identifies her action with the fulfilling of the universal and vacillates between identifying her real individuality with her private and with her public self. Second, we see this vacillation decided in favour of the public self, but here taken in the abstract sense of the formal structures of selfhood, which universally and necessarily are constitutive of all real individuals. Finally, we see the emptiness of this identity with the universal; for, as we have seen in previous analyses, the identity is formal and is abstracted from all self-differentiation, and consequently it is restricted to the same emptiness of tautology to which observing reason was reduced.

In 'The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or *die Sache selbst*,'[53] we study the individual who most directly recognizes the identity of the singular use of one's 'gifts' with the pursuit of the universal good. Here, each individual is conceived of as constituted by an original determinate nature that is intrinsically good, and doing the good amounts simply to the exhibition of this intrinsic nature.[54] Because of the identity of the singular with the universal, 'just being itself,' or 'doing its own thing' means working for the good, so in all its actions, the actions are already vindicated as enactments or fulfilments of *die Sache selbst*. Since there is no opposition between what one is and what one should be, no action is criticizable, and further, no essential distinctions can be made within the individual that would allow one to use one of the distinguished moments to criticize another; for if this were the case, then the singular would not

be *directly* harmonious with the universal but would be only *mediately iden-tifiable.*[55] It is this immediacy that will be a problem, since it does not allow that the enacting of a project, or expressing of an intention, can be in any way constitutive of that project or intention. The real individual *exhibits* her nature, but this exhibition does not reflect back on what is thus shown forth but is simply a spontaneous but superfluous overflow.

This problem appears in the dynamic of the real individual in that the inessentiality of the distinction between intention and its expression in action implies that she knows or possesses herself immediately, without the action being cognitively revelatory; thus, what she takes to be her intention and motive is, *ex hypothesi,* her intention and motive.[56] What this immediate transparency of the self to itself does, however, is introduce the ground for a distinction between (i) this self-transparency and (ii) the immediate identification between the singular and the universal on which this self-transparency is premised.

Through action, a public work is produced, and in this public realm individuals have an impact on each other. On the one hand, the very concept of real individuality is the concept of the responsibility of the singular to the universal, and the claim that *what one's acts are* are ways of being publicly responsible; yet the equally essential implication that private intention is primary introduces the distinction within the works of the singular between what public impact the works have and what the individual meant the impact to be, and the concept of the immediately real individual commits the singular self both to the distinction between the two and to their equiprimordiality. The 'deceit' of the title refers to the form the action of the singular takes as it vacillates between identifying with the public and the private interest, that is, with *die Sache selbst* and with *seine Sache.*[57] The point of this phenomenology of the spiritual animals is that this vacillation is *necessary* given the way the selfhood is defined; for the immediacy of the identification of singular and universal leads to the immediacy of the identification of the singular with itself and thus precludes that the action of exhibition be constitutive, thereby setting up an opposition between what the self is for others and what the self is for itself, while the premise of the immediate identification of the singular and the universal was the identity of being-for-self and being-for-another.[58] It is this dualism of self and activity that will animate the two subsequent analyses as well.

In 'Reason as Lawgiver,' a qualification is introduced into the identification of the singular self as a real individual: it is only *qua* universal that the self is a real individual.[59] This means that it is when the self is *not* act-

ing on *merely* private intention, but acts, rather, according to that law that is objective to all that she is a real individual. For the spiritual animal, it was a private intention that provided the object for her self-consciousness and set the objective for action; living under reason as a lawgiver means having rational law as the *necessary* object of one's self-consciousness, since it is the object characteristic of all self-consciousness *qua* self-consciousness.[60] Thus, both here and in the next moment, 'Reason as testing laws,' we have 'the category' as 'the categorical imperative'; in this first moment the category is thought of as generative of determinate laws, while in the next moment it is thought of as a criterion for the evaluation of would-be laws.

The category is generative of laws if it can specify a value – a determinate code of action – to which all self-consciousness is committed to conform simply by virtue of being self-conscious.[61] Here, then, the empirical ego has made itself *subject to* the *transformative* power of the transcendental ego, and it has as its objective its self-transformation into a fully rational shape. Two examples are developed to show that what initially seems to fulfil this role of being a prescriptive aspect of the real self is not really a determinate law at all, but is simply vacuous. The first example is 'tell the truth.'[62] This statement is *meant* to identify a determinate course of action and to put it forward as an objective that each self-consciousness must make its own singular objective. But because the initial imperative makes sense as an imperative to singular self-consciousness only if it is interpreted in relation to the actual situation of this self-consciousness, the imperative must be re-articulated in the light of this interpretive context as 'one should tell the truth as far as one knows it.' At this point, however, the unconditioned absoluteness of the imperative is lost, and the command is open to all the mediating interpretation that the contingencies of the singular situation puts forward, and the universal objective has been reduced to conditioning by private concerns; the only 'ought' that can now be expressed is that 'one ought to know (what, in general, the truth is which is to be told),' but this no longer has the pretence of dictating any determinate course of action, and the content that the supposedly self-determining universal law gave itself turns out to be no content at all. The second example, 'love thy neighbour as thyself,' again can be put forward as a universal law of self-consciousness, perhaps on the ground that to be self-conscious is to be committed to the value of self-consciousness, which means being committed to others as to oneself.[63] Here again, however, the mediation implicit in the content of 'love,' just like the mediation in the concept of 'telling the truth,' above, results in this command's

not being immediately intelligible but, rather, being intelligible only in relation to the determinate and contingent features of singular situations, yet again revealing that the action immediately dictated by the imperative is not a determinate content but only an empty concept in need of mediating interpretation. What these examples illustrate is that the conception of a universal law making commands that can be laid over experience and themselves are not already that upon which experience is based, can produce only empty commands, which need to be interpreted by the intrinsically differentiated actuality, rather than producing commands that can lead our interpretation of that actuality.[64] Like the reason of observation that was laid over phenomena, this law-giving reason likewise ends by producing empty concepts whose only claim to rationality is their conceptual self-identity, that is, the law is just tautology.[65]

We must note two things here. First, reason was pushed by the failure of the spiritual animals to recognize the necessity of the universal as a *self-legislator*, that is, insofar as the category – the transcendental ego – specifies determinate laws, *it is a unity that maintains its unity precisely in its self-differentiation*.[66] We have also seen, and this is the second point to note, that reason as here conceived proves sterile. In sum, then, reason has, by its own steam, been driven to the need to posit an identity that is self-differentiating, but its own actuality is inadequate to live up to its posited ideal. Reason's attempt to legislate is thus simultaneously a conceptual advance and an empirical failure.

The final attempt to salvage immediately self-identical reason as the ground of the universality of real individuals is the endeavour to use this simple standard of self-identity as a regulative principle to which laws are forced to conform, rather than as a legislative principle by which laws are generated.[67] Because the only principle of reason is tautology, or formal identity, however, law-testing reason cannot differentiate laws on the basis of their content, but indeed, this is what it would have to be able to test if it were to be useful.[68] Using the examples of a law for private property and a law against private property, Hegel shows that reasons can be given for advocating both laws, and that law-testing reason will have to recognize that both are admissable laws, since both are intelligible, that is, self-identical.[69] Thus, reason is not capable of testing laws.

Hegel concludes this section by arguing that it is precisely the notion of reason as something superimposed – that is, a self-identical law that is not the intrinsic life of the differences – that is the source of the failure here.[70] The demands that reason feels here when it posits the need for objectivity and universality are entirely justified, but its whole stance as

separate from actuality precludes it from recognizing that the only phe-nomenon that *would* satisfy its demands would be the law to which self-conscious actuality is *already* committed, that is, the law that really does characterize its very being as self-consciousness and thus does not need to be superimposed on experience.[71]

Throughout Section C, then, we have seen how the immediate concep-tion of reason fails at every turn to produce what it must produce, namely, a ground for identifying the singular self with the universal. In each case (spiritual animals, legislating, and regulating), the immediacy of the universal, and the immediacy of its intended identification with actuality, precluded any capacity for a penetration into the intrinsically self-mediated realm of activity and actuality, and in each case we have seen that actuality provided the real ground upon which the universal was a parasite, where the precise opposite was what reason posited.

Conclusion

Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy* offers a strong argument for the ontological independence of the singular self that is immediately identical with the universal, and this argument for the separability of self-contained self-consciousness from living embodiment has always remained the most compelling ground for an ontological dualism of self and body. In Chapter V, 'Reason,' we studied the dynamic of this self – the most immediate shape of the third moment of unhappy conscious-ness – that identifies a 'transcendental ego' and takes itself to be immedi-ately identical with this universal self. In Section A, 'Observing Reason,' we saw how this conception of selfhood implied a dualism of reason and nature, of inner and outer, of identity and difference, and we saw that observation animated by such a commitment to dualism was ultimately sterile and unable to live up to its own animating principle: the 'scientific imperative.' In observing reason, then, there is a contradiction between its concept and its actuality.

In Section B, the same reason, now considered as animating social practice, found itself unable to live up to its constitutive objective of win-ning the world over to rationality, but in this case it was plagued by the dualism of reason and social institutions, rather than reason and nature; here, rational self-consciousness *modified its identity* through committing itself to social institutions, but it was unable to recognize this change of identity, because it could not acknowledge that institutions could be con-stitutive of the actuality of reason.

Finally, in Section C, reason again faced a dualism, this time a dualism of reason and its expression. Here, reason found itself unable to recognize that the process of expressing an intention, that is, the process in and through which an immediate project or imperative comes to give itself actual content, could reflect back on the intention: reason's commitment to the *immediate self-identity* of the universal would not allow it to find the identity of the universal existing only as a self-reflected individual, which is a unit only as a *result* of a mediating process of actualization, or self-differentiating self-expression.

Thus the three mediating, intrinsically differentiated elements that have here been excluded from having a constitutive role in the self-identity of the rationally self-conscious self are *nature, institution,* and *expression.* We have seen, in each case, that it is the failure of reason to recognize the constitutive role of each of these moments that has led to its failure to fulfil its project; that is, we have seen that the real imperative facing the rational self-consciousness is to find its identity only in and through these moments. In going on, now, to pursue the theme of the body in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* it is precisely this imperative that will animate our study, since we will be seeing precisely how these three moments are constitutive of self-conscious selfhood. What we have learned by the failure of reason is that we must not operate on the dualism of identity and difference, which is the genus of all the dualisms we have encountered; we have learned that self-identity must be reflective and self-differentiating, and that therefore selfhood *must be embodied.* We shall go on to see what the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood is, and we shall see that this embodiment is precisely characterized by these three moments of *nature, institution,* and *expression,* or, as I shall call them, *phusis, hexis,* and *logos.* The following is the basic course our study will take.

The existent – the self – is a process, and the nature of a process is that it *cannot* be captured in a simple observable immediacy but must be *thought* as a unity of an embodying process. In trying to *identify* the nature of this embodiment, one must ultimately articulate the logical relation that defines body. The essential logical notion will be the notion of organization.

Initially, we shall find that the self, as a *living* self, is embodied by *nature,* or a supportive system of mediation, the automatic functioning of which is definitive of the existence of the self. Here, we shall see that the logic of organization will not allow a strict differentiation of the living member of a environment and the environment in which it lives, and

thus the living self will always be embodied by a natural body that itself exists only as a participant in a system of nature; the latter feature must therefore be acknowledged as essential to the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood.

Second, we shall see that with habitual development *a new form of life* emerges. For this new life, something must fill the logical role of body, and what is, from the point of view of this new life, the natural body – the *phusis* – is, from the point of view of the antecedent form of life, a system of habits, or *institutions*; this I shall call *hexis*. Thus the *nature* of this life form is the *culture* of the former.

Finally, we shall see that, in the *culmination* of the project of self-conscious selfhood (which is possible only in the context of the 'cultural' life just identified), *yet a further new form of life emerges.* Here, the *nature* that is the body of this living self is *expression*; that is, self-conscious selfhood is ultimately *the life of signs.* Thus we shall see that the project of self-conscious selfhood that begins with the dualistic program of reason is completed precisely through the overcoming of each of reason's three dualisms.

Section B

Embodiment

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3

The Condition of Self-Consciousness: The Body as the *Phusis, Hexis,* and *Logos* of the Self

Introduction

In our investigations so far, we have learned that an internal dynamic of the empirical and the transcendental ego is constitutive of self-conscious selfhood, and that, rather than forming an immediate unity, these moments and their relations form a *reflected* unity, that is, a unity that exists only in and as the self-unification of differences. The self-identity of the self-conscious self is thus always a self-differentiation, and I articulated this above by saying that the self must be embodied. It is this concept of self-differentiating self-identity, or embodied selfhood, that will provide an adequate ground for comprehending Hegel's analyses of self-consciousness, and it is to his analysis in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness' that we now turn. In particular, we must now consider 'Life,' the 'Struggle to the Death,' and 'Lordship and Bondage,' and we must see how self-hood in each scenario is a unity only in and through difference. We shall discover that the stories of these shapes of experience will imply a certain conception of the body, and it will be the chief goal of this chapter to articulate these implications: I shall argue that Hegel's account of self-consciousness implies a conception of embodiment that must be understood by way of three moments, which I shall label *phusis, hexis,* and *logos.*

From 'Life' we shall derive the concept of body as *phusis,* which will name that feature of the logic of bodiliness that is the non-reflective system of activities that accomplish an immediate relation of desire to its object. Here we shall see selfhood embodied by what is in principle unconscious. From the treatment of the 'Struggle to the Death' and 'Lordship and Bondage' in the section entitled 'Dependence and Independence of Self-Consciousness' and from the transition into the 'Free-

dom of Self-Consciousness' we shall derive the notion of the body as *hexis*; this will name that aspect of the logic of bodiliness that is the qualitative determinateness of the system of mediation of desire, and it will be this mediation understood *as* mediation or as 'institution.' Here we shall see selfhood embodied by what has become unconscious. Finally, from the transition of the 'Struggle to the Death' into 'Lordship and Bondage' we shall derive the concept of the body as *logos*; this will name that moment of the logic of bodiliness that is the semiotic implication of the mediated system of immediate actions. Here, we shall see selfhood embodied by what needs to become self-conscious. We can now consider each of these three logical determinations in detail.

1. Life and Desire: *Phusis*

Hegel begins Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' with the concepts of life and desire.[1] It is approximately true to say that the relationship between these three terms – life, desire, self-consciousness – is that life is desire in itself, and self-consciousness is desire for itself. I shall develop Hegel's analysis of the basic concept of desire[2] to see why life is desire in itself and to produce from this the concept of the organism. I shall proceed to Hegel's argument that the independence of the desirous living thing cannot be an independence that is divorced from an equally primordial dependence on the whole system of life in which it is essentially involved.

We must begin by understanding the nature of desire. Desire is the primitive root of self-consciousness, and it is that experience in which consciousness must simultaneously distinguish determinations from itself and deny that there is any such distinction.[3] *In contradistinction from* everything else, desire recognizes its self as the truth of being, but this very recognition demands that desire posit its self as the *only* reality. Desire's dynamic is to act to supersede the difference it posits, so it is the process of moving from the 'certainty' that nothing is distinguished from it to the 'truth' of this, that is, its act confirms itself; in desire, 'the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence [*ein Bestehen*] which, however, is only *appearance*, or a difference which, *in itself*, is no difference [*kein Sein hat*].'[4] For desire, otherness per se is a challenge to its self. Thus desire exists only as the superseding of difference: 'In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it.'[5] Note, then, the constitutive moments of this dynamic. First, there must be the recognition of otherness. Second, there must be a recognition of the primacy of

the self such that the otherness is now posited as to-be-overcome.[6] Finally, the opposition of these two positings must be actively overcome in the confirmation of the primacy of the self through the overcoming of the difference.[7] It is a logic of *necessarily* recognizing (immediately) an independent other and furthermore recognizing (in practice) the *non-*independence of this other: it is a constitutive demand that the otherness be acknowledged and that it be overcome.[8] We must go on from here to see two things. First, we must distinguish 'desire in itself' from 'desire for itself,' that is, life and self-consciousness proper. Second (and we shall see this in connection with the notion of life), we must see how the logic of desire is precisely the logic of organism.

First, let us distinguish mere life from self-consciousness in terms of the concept of desire: 'and this Concept sunders itself into the antithesis of self-consciousness and life: the former is the unity *for which* the infinite unity of the differences is; the latter, however, *is* only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time *for itself.*'[9] On the one hand, we have a self for which the distinction between itself and its other is explicit; this is self-consciousness proper. On the other hand, we have a self for which only the other and its determination as to-be-overcome is explicit; that is, it has only a 'pre-reflective' self-consciousness, or it is conscious of itself only to the extent that it is implicit in its object by virtue of the fact that its object is defined in relation to its self: this is life. *We* can recognize of life that its actions manifest the presupposing of the primacy of its own selfhood over the determination of the other, but only the other (and the other as a challenge) is recognized by life itself.

Life, then, will be that form of existing in which the activity of the unit manifests a logic of necessarily having to acknowledge the integrity of certain determinations of otherness, and of having to supersede that otherness by showing that the self is really the overriding unity, and it will be an action of a unit that manifests this logic to a philosophical observer but not to itself. With respect to nutrition, for example, we then can see how this logic is operative: the living being depends upon an other – a food source – which it must recognize; but it must also recognize that this other is to be overcome by it – that is, it must recognize it as 'food' – and it must go on, then, to supersede this other and to transform it into itself by consuming it. The living being does not ever need expressly to say 'I'; it is enough that its behaviour demonstrates that it posits an other and that it posits this other as for it.

Notice that this account of the logic of desire and life does not merely describe the relationship of the living organism to its food, as one might

immediately imagine; it also describes precisely the logic of the relationship between the organism and its organs. The organism is a 'form' in which the 'imitations' *participate*; that is, they are *members, Gliedern,* organs. *The* organism (notice that this is a unit) can be itself only by, first, *constitutively* or *systematically recognizing* the integrity of its members – its others – but further, by going on to supersede them by insisting on its own primacy, that is, by demonstrating that they only 'subsist' *within* it. These are precisely the logical moments of desire. Hegel himself makes this point explicit in his articulation of the logic of life:[10] '[Life] is this very flux as a self-identical independence which is itself an *enduring existence* [*Bestehen*], in which, therefore, they are present as distinct members and parts existing on their own account ... The *difference*, however, *qua* difference, of these members with respect to one another consists in general in no other *determinateness* than that of the moments of infinity or of the pure movement itself'[11] (emphasis in original). We can see, in fact, that the account of life in terms of 'organism' is actually more comprehensive than the account in terms of 'eating'; for the former subsumes the latter.[12] In nutrition, the 'other' that is the source upon which the self feeds is in truth precisely an organ in its living system; for the food source is an other with which it must constantly be engaged in the process of recognizing and superseding. What is *really* living, then, is neither the isolated 'self' nor the isolated 'other,' but the dynamic relationship between them. Let me elaborate.

The 'material' unit that one might be inclined immediately to identify with 'oneself' – what 'Reason' in Chapter V would call 'the body' or, in Hegel's terms, 'immediate actuality'[13] – really cannot exist on its own. We must give a functional definition of this unit, and this unit, when taken simply by itself, cannot perform its function; that is, it cannot be (itself). The living being is essentially alive, but it can be alive only in relation to something that it defines as not-it. If we consider a potted plant, for example, we shall be inclined to say that 'the plant,' which is a living being, is the thing with roots, stem, leaves, and so on; yet this is a mistake. This alone is not the plant, for this alone cannot live. The plant is this 'thing' only *in relation to* the rest of its surroundings (water, air, earth, heat), and these elements are *essential* to it. It is certainly true that there are essential ways in which the unit composed of stalk, leaf, and so on is different from the dirt, air, and so on that surround it, but this fact does not in any way vitiate the claim that they are essentially composed; rather, the truth is that each has essential qualitative features that interact, and in their absence there is no life. This, of course, can equally be

said of the stem and the leaves. No doubt it is true that the relationship of self to other is here one of consumption. Yet it is equally true that the maintenance of the plant depends on the other's not being fully consumed. In the long run, in fact, the potted plant cannot survive; it must be supplemented by fertilizer and so on because it is itself a unit that has been abstracted from the real living context in which it naturally exists. Likewise it is true that other organs within the living being consume the products of other organs: blood consumes air, other tissues consume elements of blood and so on. What we have here is a system of necessary and reciprocal exchanges in which the excess of one organ is consumed to maintain another, and so on. What is essential is the interaction of all features, and it is only this interactive totality that really exists independently. To abstract certain members from their necessary relations and treat them as self-subsistent is a simple logical error. Thus, the living thing is not one member of a nutritive relationship, but is the whole relationship of self to environment. We could go on to argue here that the living being most properly so called is really the ecosystem, or perhaps the whole system of nature,[14] but I want instead to go further into the notion of the organism and to consider the notion of 'body' that is involved here.

We have the notion of organism as an interactive totality, but we also need to notice that the unity of this totality is an *activity*; that is, the organic body is not a static whole, but is united only as a dynamic process and a process, precisely, of self-maintenance, that is, self-unification. Essentially, then, the organic body is the process of self-reproduction or, indeed, self-production.

Finally, the notion of organism is then essentially the notion of a self-maintaining system; it is the notion of an overriding project that gets carried out only by means of the interactive functioning of a number of lesser unities – organs – each defined as a qualitative unity with its own independent logic of organization and function. It is in and through these lesser unities performing their individual and self-defined projects that the larger purpose is achieved; it is a unitary activity of unifying lesser activities. The following are thus true of the organism. First, that out of which it is constructed is the set of lesser unities that are its organs, and it itself is these 'material conditions' organized according to a certain form (of activity), where it is equally true that they constitute the substance of the organism, and the organism provides the context that gives to each of them its essential character and ability to function.[15] Second, that by which the organism achieves its ends is the independent functioning of

the individual units and the consequent functioning of itself as a whole. The multiplicity of determinations in and through which the organism is organized thus provides both the material conditions for the organism and the means for its fulfilling its desires. Let us reconsider these relations with respect to the idea of embodiment.

If we take body to mean the thing as 'extended,' the material conditions of its existence, or the means of its self-fulfilment, we can see that there is no *independent* body, where independence is taken to mean a separately existing determinate being. For that which is living, its body is itself, but itself understood in terms of its multiplicity rather than in terms of its overriding unity.[16] We saw, above, that the means by which the organism fulfils its desires and the material conditions that allow its operation are precisely the very organs out of which it is constructed: they are its very substance. The difference between the organism and its organs is simply the organization: the organism is the organizing and the organs are the organized.[17] The organizing that accounts for the true (functional) unity of the organism is the overriding *project* that is worked out *in and through* the independent functioning of the organs *and of which they are not aware as such.* The organs as organized are precisely the way this project has to 'ex-tend' itself in order to carry itself out. Thus, the organism is 'the simple essence of Time [the project] which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of Space [the organized extension].'[18] Body, then, is the determinate differentiated system of interrelated 'organs' out of which, and by means of which, the organism – the individual[19] – is. Let us summarize.

The body is that through which, or by means of which, the self is able to fulfil its desires; the mediating body is what, on the one hand, separates it from its object (thereby defining its object) and, on the other hand, brings it into direct relation with that object. The body is that element in which it exists or the material out of which it is constructed; it is the self itself as determinate and internally qualitatively differentiated. Finally, it is that which achieves this constitution of the self and brings the self into relation with the object of its desire unwittingly, or without self-conscious choice; it is that which, by working out its own self-defined goals, carries forward the projects of the self on its own back. The body, then, *has a life of its own,* and it is precisely the many living organs that themselves have independent functions, constitutions, relations, and so on, that provide the very substance of the self. It is the *phusis* or the 'natural' side of the self. It is the way the self achieves itself without self-conscious self-control. Here we can supplement our analysis by consider-

ing a remark Hegel makes in his editorial introduction to the category of 'Life' in the *Science of Logic.*

Hegel is distinguishing between 'life' in relation to logic and 'life' in relation to philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit.[20] He characterizes life in relation to spirit: 'Life as such, then, is for spirit partly a *means*, and as such spirit opposes it to itself; partly spirit is a living individual and life is its body; and partly this unity of itself with its living corporeality is born from spirit itself to the *ideal*.'[21] Life is the *means* of spirit, and its *body*, and we must thus refer to the *living corporeality* of spirit. Life, means, and body all are, in relation to spirit, treated as equivalent. In this quotation from the *Science of Logic*, Hegel says that life itself is the body of spirit; our analysis of body as *phusis* allows us to understand this. The body is not a dead 'thing,' a *res extensa*; the body is a way of comportment – a way the self comports itself.[22] In the self-conscious being, there will always be a side of its action that counts as *phusis*, that is, body or mere life, and this will be the 'unconscious' side of its action, which must run itself 'naturally.'[23] We must not, then, let the noun 'body' fool us into bad metaphysics; we must remember that the root of this conception is more the adverbial 'bodily,' because, with respect to spirit, we must always retain the primacy of the verb, that is, the primacy of act.[24]

What this interpretation of the quotation from the *Science of Logic* also implies is that 'body' does not automatically name a particular sphere of phenomena, but that it names a *relation* within any spiritual activity. What is properly embodied is *action*, not some substantial self, and 'self' and 'body' are thus relational terms that must be defined relative to the activity, rather than being the foundational terms in relation to which an activity is described.[25] This is a crucial point for my subsequent analyses; for we shall see that the distinctively human action cannot be embodied by the simple natural body of animal life, nor can its action simply be referred to an isolated, single self. Human actions, *qua* human, will always be the action of a *we*, that is, a *social* self, and such actions will always be embodied by *institutions*; this institutional body I shall call *hexis*. This will become clearer in the next section, when we go on to consider the body as *hexis*, that is, as a *developed way of acting* (or a potential for such). Before addressing this issue directly, however, I shall articulate briefly Hegel's account of the development from where we left off with life to the beginning of the story of self-consciousness proper.

Life is essentially the 'genus-process,'[26] that is, just as the individual living organs work unwittingly to preserve the whole organism within which they subsist, so too are all living beings organs in the process of preserv-

ing their 'kind.' Aristotle linked the nutritive and the reproductive functions of soul, and Hegel argues for basically the same identification here.[27] In the sexual relationship, a relationship of individual fulfilment also serves to reproduce the kind; the family (or at least the natural unit that has as its spiritual equivalent the human family) is the real individual that, through its self-preservation, reproduces the kind.[28] But here we see why life simply as such cannot be the ultimate category of spirit and why we must move on to self-consciousness proper.

This living process of positing and overcoming an opposite does not have a history. Even though it is true, that is, even though *we* recognize, that the unity *achieved through* eating is a more sophisticated unity than that which preceded the recognition of food and its overcoming – higher because it can be understood only through recognizing this more sophisticated logical mediation implicit in it – *this is not so for the living being itself,* and it eternally repeats the same process of positing and overcoming because its sophistication as a form of behaving cannot incorporate in its behaviour a recognition of the advance made; that is, one state (fulfilment) merely substitutes for the other (lack) such that, for it, the lack is not preserved in the fulfilment as an overcome determination (even though it is thus preserved for us in our logical analysis). Life does not have the power of explicit comprehension of self-as-relation-of-self-and-other; it cannot say 'I' and withdraw from its whole absorption in its immediate relationships with what it directly posits as other and take this whole *relation* as its object, that is, as its other (thereby *explicitly* having itself as both self and other). Thus Hegel concludes that: 'Life consists ... in ... the self-developing whole *which dissolves its development* and in this movement simply preserves itself'[29] (my emphasis). The consequence of this is that life that remains merely 'natural,' that is, merely unconscious in its mediated immediacy, will always be functioning towards otherness at a level that is actually lower than the level that is constitutive of this its very functioning. This is because of the duality that constitutes life. On the one hand, life is indeed built upon qualitative differentiation, that is, its very being as a unity takes account of a constitutive otherness (that is, it exists according to the logic of organism articulated above). On the other hand, the form its operations take is a non-recognition of otherness; that is, unconscious life just runs on, infinitely reproducing itself, consuming its immediate environment without making progress in and through this relation to otherness. Life is not *for itself* what it is *in itself.* We need to make the move to self-consciousness proper if we want to see a shape of acting in which its behaviour – its actuality – accurately demonstrates all

the dimensions of its logical mediation: its concept. Life always needs an other to complete it, even to the point of having to be understood by a philosophical observer more sophisticated than itself.[30] We need to move to self-consciousness proper for that which is capable of being for-itself (being actually) what it is in-itself (conceptually); this will be a move to something that *preserves in its action the logic of its own development.*

We have already seen that self-conscious selfhood presupposes life, and that self-consciousness always has life as its body; indeed, self-consciousness requires not just its own immediate actuality, but rather the whole natural system to which its organism is constitutionally related.[31] As we move to self-consciousness, however, we move to a system of activity (a system that remains a type of life, but not *mere* life), which does *not* remain static in this natural embodiment but engages, rather, in a kind of 'body-building,' that is, a dynamic process of self-embodying. The move to self-consciousness will be the move to that which can develop *habits* and this in the context of a pursuit of self-possession.

2. Master and Slave: *Bildung* as *Hexis*

There are two important dimensions to the master-slave dialectic that are essential to our story of body.[32] First, we must see how the slave takes on for the master the role of *phusis*; that is, the slave serves as the master's body. Second, we need to see how the attitude of the slave is what makes possible the further development of *Geist* precisely through self-development (*Bildung*), that is, through the body as *hexis*.

In the last section we determined that, as *phusis*, my body is that which, on the one hand, holds me out of a simple absorption into the world by being a self-contained determinateness, but that, equally, it is what puts me in the world by being essentially defined by its relation to the world; in other words, the body itself was precisely defined by 'desire.' It is that access to the world upon which my *existence* as a self depends: it is my nature. As nature, too, it accomplishes its work for me without the need for me to enter into explicit reflection, thus, it is the *unconscious* mediation of my will to the world. Note that the slave now performs all these operations for the master.

The slave is a self-contained unit that, on the one hand, is uniquely tied to the will of the master and is not simply absorbed in nature; on the other hand, the slave is necessarily attached to nature such that the master can use this as the chain to bind her.[33] Equally, the existence of the master's self turns out to be dependent on the slave, and this is why the

relationship is ultimately unstable. Finally, the slave's carrying out of the master's orders does not involve any self-conscious reflection on the part of the master; the master need only issue the order and her desire is immediately satisfied through the efforts of the slave.

The essential difference between the body of 'Life' and this new body of the master is that in the former case there is an immediate identity between the living self and its body, whereas in the latter case the relation remains external. Again, this is why the shape is inadequate: the master's possession of the slave-body is not the self-development of that slave itself; that is, one might say, there remains a Cartesian-like dualism between the master-self and the slave-body.

What the relation between master and slave accomplishes, however, is that it puts the slave in a position to develop a 'master' consciousness *of her own*, and it gives the master a position to develop a 'slave' body *of her own.*[34] It is essentially the category of *Bildung* that explains these developments, and this is the significance of Hegel's analysis of that which the slave gets through her efforts.[35] Examining these issues will give us the conception of body as 'second nature' or *hexis.*[36]

Before analysing 'Lordship and Bondage' directly, however, let us first look at the transitional category of the 'Struggle to the Death,' where self-consciousness functions at the level of mere life;[37] this will allow us to see the progress from life to self-consciousness proper in terms of the ability to *incorporate* otherness through *developing* an independence through a *recognition* of dependence; we shall thus see the connection of self-consciousness proper with habit.

a. Self-Consciousness as Life: The 'Struggle to the Death'

In 'Life,' we considered the kind of self-centred behaviour that demonstrates the presupposition that its self is the independent centre of being. This was the self that posited difference only to annul it in the act of confirming its own primacy. In the 'Struggle to the Death,' Hegel considers a situation in which a being that is capable of recognizing another self tries to operate on the basis of this same logic.

For the living being, any objective determination of being can be a challenge, since it opposes its own claim to subsistence to that of the living self. The dynamic of life is to demonstrate through its consumption of this would-be other that in truth this subsistence of the other only *is* within the context of its [life's] letting it be: the other, that is, does not have being *on its own account.* When a self-conscious self operates on this

principle, however, and when the other the self recognizes is itself another such self, then this dynamic of consumption is frustrated; for the other self, like the first, is engaged in the process of demonstrating precisely that it *is* a self *on its own account*, and that everything other to it is really only a subordinate subsistence, subject to its will.[38] In the other self, then, the first self meets a mirror of its own determination to consume otherness. Thus, each self meets in the other a resistance to its own acts of domination, and a reciprocal attempt to dominate.

Such a situation can produce only a death-struggle, since each must prove itself to be the independent centre and prove the other to be dependent. It is a struggle in which, from our point of view, each risks all, since, for itself, each only is the effort at asserting primacy; in this both repeat at a new level the characteristic logic of simple life, namely, that it has two essential moments – the acknowledging of otherness and the supersession of that otherness – but its very dynamic demands that it recognize itself only in the second, that is, as the consumer who is precisely the negation or renunciation of its existence *qua* determinate. Each thus risks its life in the struggle, since neither acknowledges its own dependence on the determinate dimensions of its otherness.

We, of course, have already seen that the self is not another determinate being subsisting independently as opposed to its 'living corporeality'; rather, we know that, as an *organism*, the self can be only this 'materiality' itself, *as* an active, self-centred whole. Thus we know that in risking its life, it equally risks its selfhood; for we know that its selfhood is in fact dependent on the relation to otherness.[39] The conclusion of the contest in the death of one of the fighters reveals precisely this notion that the 'independent' self is dependent, and it reveals this in two ways.

First, as we have already anticipated, the death of one self reveals that that self really did need life in order to be. If we recall Hegel's remark, quoted above, that in the self-conscious individual life is the body, we can say that self-consciousness depends on its embodiment. This is no surprise, of course, since precisely the definition of body that we developed in relation to life was that out of which the living self is constructed, that by which it achieves its ends, and that upon whose 'unconscious' operation the self depends in order to exist. To think the self can survive the demise of its life is, to use Ryle's phrase, a 'category mistake.'[40] This, we might say, is what the dead self learns, or, rather, it is the 'being-in-itself' of the death of the one fighter that this death reveals to the philosophic observer.[41]

Second, the surviving self also is put in a position to learn something,

or, again, it is the 'in itself' of the victory, which the philosophic observer can recognize. The defeated self failed in its effort to confirm its certainty of its own primacy, but the victorious self is not for that reason successful in transforming its certainty into truth. What really challenged the self – that is, the particular challenge against which it entered into the struggle – was the assertion of primacy by the other self. But this assertion was never defeated. The insistence of the other self that it was self-determining was never overcome; all that was overcome was that self's possibility of carrying on with this insistence. The fact that that self is no longer insisting – no longer challenging – does not indicate that the challenge *as such* was overcome; it indicates only that the surviving self was able to bypass this particular incidence of the challenge. The challenge, in other words, has not been overcome in principle: it has been overcome only in fact, this time, just as in eating hunger is overcome only for now.

One might object here that this analysis simply reintroduces the dualism of selfhood and life that was just ruled out; that is, if the loss of life entails loss of self, then it cannot be right to say that the killing of the other does not overcome the challenge. Yet this objection fails to understand the dynamic of desire. It was not the other self *as such* that challenged the first self: it was *the first self's recognition* that was the challenge; the other's *life* was defeated, but, by the victorious self's own logic, life is not equatable with self-conscious selfhood, and it is from its perception of the latter that the first self felt challenged. The first self recognized the possibility of there being an *otherness-for-itself*, and this determination has not been overcome in itself. Precisely what is required for this to be overcome is for it to *overcome itself*. In recognizing the possibility of an object that has an 'internal' integrity, the self has recognized its dependence on its object. It is this respect for, or dependence on, otherness (where this otherness is precisely being-for-itself) that will be the subject of the subsequent developments of self-consciousnesss, (and, indeed, we shall not encounter the fullest working out of this demand until we come to study absolute knowing). Self-consciousness proper is what *can* make this development, whereas life simply as such is constitutionally incapable, because it cannot recognize the independence of its object.[42]

What is essential for the transition from this struggle to a more sophisticated form of relationship is that either or both of these selves make explicit what is already implicit in their behaviour. As it stands here, each self has already posited the other self as a self; that is, each has already recognized that within the sphere of its own otherness there is a determination that is not immediately subordinate to its will, and the necessary

mediation to producing such subordinating is the self-determination of that other. Thus, each has already *implicitly* acknowledged that it is not the independent centre and that, for its project to be carried out, it needs the support of the other. Progress is made when at least one of the selves explicitly acknowledges its dependence on the other.[43]

'Lordship and Bondage' presents the drama of a situation in which one of the selves has acknowledged its dependence on the other and has subordinated itself to the will of the other. One has agreed to enslave itself to the will of the other in order to preserve its own life. We shall have to go on in Section 3 concerning body as *logos* to consider what is involved in this transition, but for the moment I want only to look at the situation of mastery and servitude that is achieved and to consider its development to see how the body can develop, first externally (through the coercion and acquiescence of another), and second internally (through education). This will be the body as *Bildung* or *hexis*.

b. The Slave as Phusis-Body of the Master: External Hexis

In accepting slavery, the fighter who surrenders recognizes the will of the other as its own will, that is, the self subordinates its own claim to selfhood. This is of course a self-contradictory move, for the very fact that the subordination must be a *self*-subordination guarantees that the relationship is built on the premise that the slave *is* a self, and it is precisely this contradiction that will make this relationship of unequal recognition unstable. Before considering the dynamics of the relation, however, let us see just what is implied in the concept of mastery and slavery especially with respect to the relations of self and body.

In Section 1, we considered the body as *phusis*. Body here meant the developed system upon which the self depended for transforming its world; it was the unconscious system of mediation by which the will satisfied itself: it was precisely the means – the mediation – by which the self was brought into immediate contact with its object. If we now consider the role of the slave in relation to the master-self, we shall see that this definition of body precisely characterizes the slave's role.[44]

The slave makes herself the means by which the master's will is satisfied: the master only need make the order, and the object of her desire is brought to her *without any further effort on her part*. In terms of the master, then, the connection of her will with its object is immediate. There is, of course, mediation in the relation, but this is supplied by the *intermediating* action of the slave. Here, then, we have a relation of external mediation,

wherein the mediation is a third thing between the two extremes brought into relation. There will be reason later to compare this kind of mediation with *Bildung* understood as internal mediation, but for now it is enough to see that the slave is what mediates the will of the master to an immediate contact with the object of its desire. Like the body as *phusis*, the slave is the means of satisfying the will of the self (and recall, both master and slave recognize the master as the only self).

Second, the slave-as-body is both a developed system – it is not just any old piece of indifferent matter, but it is a qualitatively very specific kind of being with precise needs and precise abilities, and it is itself built up of lesser qualitative unities in an organic interrelation – and one that operates (from the point of view of the master-self) unconsciously.[45] Thus, the slave is precisely the developed system upon which the master-self depends for transforming its world; it is the unconscious system of mediation by which the master-will satisfies itself, which is our very definition of the *phusis*-body. The fact that the slave is a sophisticated unit and the fact that it operates without the input of the master's self-consciousness are indeed aspects of this relation that are essential to its breakdown; for precisely what develops is a situation in which the master depends for her developed system of living on a 'natural' system that she does not comprehend, and she is thus slave to her slave-body, just as the self in the 'Struggle to the Death' was slave to a living corporeality she did not comprehend. The last point brings us to the most crucial aspect of the analysis here: the question of how to deal with the one determination of body as *phusis* that I have not yet mentioned, namely, that the body be precisely that out of which the self is constructed such that the self just *is* the body as an active self-centred organism.

In fact, the body is so in this relationship, but before articulating how, it is important to note that there is also an important sense in which this is not the whole story, and it is this difference that marks the difference between the body as *slave (phusis)* and the body as *hexis*. With this anticipation of qualification in mind, then, let me explain how the body here is that out of which the self is constructed.

Selfhood so far has been understood in terms of desire, that is, in terms of the ability to relate to the world projectively or in terms of a structure of anticipation and fulfilment. If, then, we want to know what the master-self is, we must think of it, not as a determinate being – an inert substance – but as a way of desiring. *What* the master-self *is* is how it bears itself – how it comports itself – towards that which it takes as object: the self is a *way* of *behaving*.

When the self is understood in this way, it is clear that the 'extended thing' that engages in the behaviour of, for example, eating the grapes is *not* only the *immediate* actuality that is the 'natural' body of the master, but *also* the natural body of the slave, which walks from the master's table to the kitchen and returns with the bowl of grapes. The answer to the question 'what performs the eating of the grapes?' can be only 'the master *in relation to* the slave' (and this, of course, is just the same as saying 'the master,' since the master *can be master only* in relation to a slave). What eats, then, is *the relation*, but the relation *as centred in* the master-self; what does the work is likewise *the body of the relation*, but the body as activated through the slave. In other words, the very existence of the master-self *is* constructed out of the 'material' that is the slave's bodily preparations, and thus the master *is* dependent on the slave. We thus recognize here the reason for the demise of the relation, namely, that the very being of the master-self is not independent of the slave, while the master necessarily insists that she is. Let me say a little more about the collapse of this relation.

In the 'Struggle to the Death' we saw the need to recognize two sorts of dependence – the dependence on that otherness that is natural existence (the living body), and the dependence on that otherness that is otherness-for-itself, that is, the dependence on the recognition of other selves. The inadequate handling of these same two dimensions likewise plagues the master-slave relation; with respect to each dimension the master is caught between simultaneously having to assert and to deny its dependence.

With respect to recognition, the master-self wins the confirmation of her self-certainty by having the slave-self subordinate her own claims to selfhood and acknowledge the master as independent centre – this is how the 'Struggle to the Death' was overcome. But for the master to benefit from this recognition on the part of the slave, she [the master] must equally be recognizing the slave's self as that which is capable of subordinating itself, that is, as something self-determining; but to do this is not only to deny the slave's inferior status, but to acknowledge her [the master's] own dependence on the slave.[46] To be master, then, means *not* to acknowledge this recognition; but then the master is no better off than the simply natural animal, because she has *not* had her selfhood confirmed – that is, she is *not* master.

The same problem arises with respect to the dependence on natural existence, and this is my point about the body. The immediacy of the connection of the master's desire with its object really *is* a *mediated*

immediacy – the master's actions really are inexplicable (that is, incapable of being) without the intermediating efforts of the slave – but the master's whole project has been to ignore this point, that is, to let the slave take care of matters such that the master's attention is directed solely at its object. Precisely what this does is make the master dependent for her satisfaction on the support of the slave. Once again, then, the master must insist that she is independent because it is her will that gets carried out 'immediately,' and yet the truth is that her will is carried out only so long as the slave continues to align her [the slave's] will to the wishes of the master; thus, the immediate independence of the master's will is mediated by the independence of the will of the slave.[47]

Within the relation of master and slave, then, the slave really does act as the *phusis* of the master, most especially in the sense of 'having a life of its own,' which is unconscious to the master; that is, the principles of the operation of the slave's mediative activity are not explicit to the master's self-consciousness, and it is because the master-self *is* built out of the slave's actions that the resistance of the slave precipitates the demise of the master.

This notion that the master-self really is built out of the slave's life – that is, the notion that the life of the master really is a developed (*gebildet*) form of behaviour that could not be carried out by the master simply through the operations of her own 'natural' body – allows us now to call the body a *hexis*. By *hexis* I primarily want to indicate 'a developed determination,' that is, a qualitatively defined unit which is itself a sophisticated construction built out of lesser qualitative units. The slave-body of the master clearly fills this role, since it allows us now to view one of the constituent organs of the master's body as *another human being*, and the master-self's will *depends* on this other humanity within its body – it may even need this human to be specially educated in tilling fields, and so on – in order to function. Thus, the sophistication of the operations the master-self can engage in demands a body more developed than that which a mortician, for example, would recognize as the body.

Of course, the body as *phusis* already was, on this account, a *hexis*, since precisely our definition of organism was a qualitative organization of lesser qualitative organs. In fact, I do wish to insist on this notion of *hexis* within *phusis* – that is, it is *essential* that the body *always* be a *hexis* – but what I am arguing with respect to master and slave is that, by exploiting this particular logical feature of the concept of (any) body, we can especially understand the bodily transformations of these sections of the *Phenomenology*. Note, then, that the unique feature of *this hexis* is that it has

been produced through the self-conscious efforts of the individual(s) involved: it is the product of *choice*.

The body that the master-self uses may function for the master 'unconsciously,' but it did not come into existence in a way that is in itself unconscious, that is, natural. It came about only through the collective, that is, social or intersubjective, *choice* of the individuals involved.[48] The selves involved decided to engage in a practice of one giving orders and the other carrying them out, and it is through this choice of the relationship, which provides the 'germ' of their subsequent behaviour with all its developments, that the slave-body upon which the master comes to depend on comes to be. The *hexis-phusis* body of the master-self is a *habit*; that is, it is the developed product of a particular kind of self-consciously chosen practice that has provided the now-habituated self with an *immediate* access to the objects of its desire, that is more sophisticated than it was prior to the habituation, but that has provided this mediated access precisely though making itself *unconscious* to the habituated self and working out its own affairs independently of the self-conscious control of the self. In other words, just as a *phusis* was always a *hexis*, a *hexis* is only really a habit once it has become *phusis*. *Phusis*, then, is that which is (from the point of view of the self of which it is the *phusis*) *in principle unconscious*. *Hexis* is the name for the qualitative determinateness that, from the point of view of a lower system of acting, could be achieved only through a process of habituation, but that has properly become a *hexis* only when it has become *phusis*, that is, when it has made itself inconspicuous precisely at the moment it makes possible the more sophisticated functioning for which it is the *phusis*. *Phusis* is what is in-itself unconscious, and *hexis* is what has made itself unconscious.

I noted above, however, that there was a limitation to the sense in which the slave could be said to be an organ in the master-self's body and that this limitation had to do with a certain externality in the relationship. Let me articulate this point in order to lead into the more internal account of *hexis* in Part c, below.

The basic problem with the relation of master and slave is that it is based on two contradictory premises, namely, that there is only one self in the relationship and that there are two selves in the relationship. It is to the extent that the first premise is true that the slave's actions can be the *hexis*-body for the master. It is the necessary truth of the second premise (and the fact that it contradicts the first premise) that is the problem.

I described habit as that which is a product of self-conscious choice.

The master-slave relation is a product of a self-conscious choice: *a* self-conscious choice because both the individual selves involved choose to effect the same situation. The fact that it is a single choice, however, is contingent on the maintenance of common cause; that is, should the slave decide to revolt, the master-self no longer has the body it depended on.[49] Within the context of the single communal choosing, then, the continued maintenance of the unified self is necessary to the preservation of the *hexis*; the whole relation, however, is based on a refusal to acknowledge this fact; that is, the master-self recognizes itself not as an intersubjective self, but only as a discrete individual.[50] *This* self (that is, what the master-self is on its own account) does *not* possess (in Greek, *echein*, the root of *hexis*) its habit in a thoroughgoing way; it is something it has received from without, rather than something it has developed through itself; recall that I called the slave's mediation an external mediation precisely because that which takes itself to be the self expressly posits that which 'intermediates' in its relation to its object as *not-its-self*. This is why I have called it an "external" *hexis*. We can now go on to consider Hegel's account of how the slave consciousness makes possible the further development of spirit through *Bildung*, that is, 'education' or 'culture,' or what I shall here call 'internal' *hexis*.[51]

c. The Slave Developing Its Own Body: Internal Hexis

I want now to consider the end of the master-slave relation: not its breakdown, which I have already outlined, but how it is that it points beyond itself, that is, what it is that it creates that makes possible the further development of spirit.[52] Slavery produces a new situation for self-consciousness, namely, it installs a primitive form of the necessary conditions for the education of the enslaved self: it is precisely the slave's *Bildung* – *hexis* – that is the key to further progress. I have already articulated the basic logical components of the concept of body as *hexis* or 'habit.' I want now to show only the conditions that make for that full possession of the habit that is lacking for the master. To this end I shall consider the last three paragraphs of the 'Lordship and Bondage' section.[53]

There are three dimensions to the slave's existence that the master lacks. The slave fears the master as the (external) force of necessity that controls whether she lives or dies. She has more *determinate* relations to the master-self through her having to obey the *particular* orders that express the master's will.[54] She also has more determinate relations to what we can call the master's body, that is, to the natural, material world

with and upon which the slave must work in order to carry out these orders. All the determinate features of the slave's experienced other now are so many mirrors for the identity of the master, whereas to the merely living self they were so many challenges (and what we shall witness in the slave's *Bildung* is the making over of this otherness into a mirror for the slave's self), and the slave is forced to engage in determinate operations on this material expression of the master in order to mediate the master's desire to the objects of desire. In order to carry out these orders, finally, which is thus to communicate the master's will to the master's body, she has to *learn*; the slave has to become educated in how to transform the actual to the ideal, which means to transform a world that does not conform to the values and desires of what she recognizes as her self to a world that does so conform. To accomplish this she must learn both what orders entail and how reality is receptive to being handled. Accomplishing this education is *Bildung*. Let me elaborate.

First, the fear of the master – the recognized independent centre of the world – requires of the slave *respect* for the master: the slave must respect the master as centre (willing self) and as truth of the periphery (that is, as that *for whom* all determinations of being properly are). The slave is in the position of being unable to act on her own, since in so doing she asserts her own self-determination in opposition to the rule of the master, and by altering the determinations of the master's otherness she again threatens the certainty both have agreed to that it is the *master's* will that is the truth of the being of things.[55]

Second, the demand that the slave serve the master and carry out her orders requires of the slave that she violate both the boundaries set up through fear. She must both *act*, thereby positing herself as centre (that is, as self-determining, willing self), and she must *alter* (that is, imply that the master is not master by taking it upon *herself* to determine the true being of things).[56] The orders thus must be carried out in fear, that is, in the recognition that both the *will* and the *object* are *not* open to the arbitrary whim of the slave's self (as they are for 'Life') but that the demands both of *self* (will) and of *other* (world) impose a necessity on the slave's dealing with its world.[57] The orders *force* the slave to deal with the world, and the fear forces her to *respect* it.

These twin demands, that the slave deal with otherness (which means to recognize it) and that she respect it (which means to recognize it on *its* terms), force the slave to *learn*. Respecting the other is not just a decision that can be accomplished in an instant. Initially, the slave can adopt this respect only as a project. To respect the other means that one must study

it; whether or not one sees what it is in-itself depends on whether *it* recognizes the way it is being approached. Being a slave requires the self to enter into the project of learning the truth of things. Preserving oneself as a slave requires one actually *to develop* a knowledge of how to translate sophisticated demands into reality in the medium of an objective reality that itself makes sophisticated demands about how it can be treated.[58]

Thus to become the external *hexis*-body for the master, the slave must *on her own* develop the very same mediated relationships between desire and its object *in herself*.[59] Here, unlike what we saw in the master-self, the self that does the developing is the same as the self that chooses thus to develop. Thus, to become the external *hexis*-body for the master, the slave must, on her own, develop a corresponding *internal hexis*-body. Just as Hegel marked the transition from the second to the third form of unhappy consciousness with the image of the priest (Luther) as the individual who must mediate *internally* that for which he achieves an *external* mediation, so we see in the slave the *internal* relation of sophisticated desire to sophisticated object that makes possible an *external* relation of sophisticated desire to sophisticated object.[60]

We have now seen the body as *phusis* and as *hexis*, where *phusis* in what is in-itself unconscious, and *hexis* is what has been made unconscious. We can now turn to the last determination I shall articulate, namely, the body as *logos*, which will be that which demands to be made self-conscious. Again, this is a determination that could have been articulated from the start and is logically inseparable from the other two moments, but the transition from the 'Struggle to the Death' to 'Lordship and Bondage' makes this dimension of body particularly clear.

3. The Transition to Slavery: The Body as *Logos*

We have considered the body as nature and as 'culture,' that is, *incorporated history*. I want now to return to the transition from the 'Struggle to the Death' to 'Lordship and Bondage' to consider what I am proposing as the third essential determination of the body, namely, the body as expression. I shall consider the basic development into 'Lordship and Bondage' and consider possible ways the development could fail to come about, in order to show the essential roles of choice and communication. Although there is no simple experiential continuum between the 'Struggle to the Death' and 'Lordship and Bondage' – that is, it is not the case that the former necessarily leads to the latter, or that the latter is necessarily a direct development of the former – I shall present the transition as if this

were the case, in order to make the relations clear. Let us first consider the basic conditions that are necessary if this transition is to come about.

The relation of master and slave comes about when two conditions are met. First, one of the two selves struggling to the death must choose to recognize the other as the centre and simultaneously must acknowledge its dependence on its life. Second, the other fighter must choose to recognize this recognition and must accept the other's self-subordination. In the absence of these two acts, no change can take place. Let us further analyse the logical elements required in order to effect this change in relationship.[61]

Note, first, how this new relationship could fail to come about. To the extent that these individuals enter the fight bent on going to the death, the failure of either one to choose to accept the new relationship will make the transition impossible. No matter how much you choose to accept my surrender, if I am not willing to give up my resistance, the fight will not stop until one of us dies. Likewise, no matter how much I want to surrender, if you do not choose to accept my offer, we fight until death. The only way, then, for a master-slave relationship to emerge is for both to bend their wills from the original course of destroying the other and to choose to accept a situation of unequal recognition. Now consider what else is involved besides the bending of the wills.

First, it is not enough for me to will my choice: my choice must also be recognized by the other, since it is essential that *each* of us is aware of *both* our choices in order for this transition to take place. Second, it follows that what is essential to this establishing of a 'communal' consciousness of what 'we' choose, is the *communicating* of our choices through an *expressing* of our wills (and of our mutual recognitions) and through an *understanding* of these expressions. Let us consider the slave-to-be.

In order for her choice to be effective, the slave-to-be must express her decision to her opponent. The only means at her disposal are those over which her will has control, that is, her living body (and whatever other implements this body can utilize). Up to this point the self *lived through* its body, in the sense that its natural access to the world was taken for granted by it, that is, the mediation-to-the-world embodied in its *phusis* was overlooked by it in favour of the immediate relation to the object of desire that this mediation made possible. Now, however, the self must change the status of its body from unconscious-means-for-satisfaction-of-the-will to self-conscious-means-for-expression-of-the-will.[62] It is only the intuitable (*aisthetikos*) dimension of its life that is accessible to the other, so it must now turn the essence of its body into gesture.[63]

On the other side, the master-to-be can become master only through a recognition of the acquiescence of the slave. This requires, then, an understanding of the other's will, and the only access she has to this other is the sensible dimension of that other's existence, which means she must be able to recognize the body of the other *as* gesturing, and she must understand what the gesture expresses. Let me draw your attention to the acts of the master.

To become a master means to interpret, which means to ask and to answer two fundamental questions.[64] The first is to ask if there is a gesture present and the second is to ask what the gesture indicates. Answering the first question involves recognizing the other's body *as* a gesture, which means positing a unit, that is, determining that a certain *extent* of the other's body is to be treated as a single expressive totality.[65] Answering the second question involves seeing this whole totality as expressing a single meaning, which means seeing the total extent as embodying a unified *intent*. Interpretation, then, involves the two cognitive operations of *totalization* and *unification*, that is, the positing of a determinate extent as a signifier and the positing of a determinate intent as a signified.[66] Reading an expression thus demands first that one assume that there is something to be read, and second that one assume that this expression is the presentation of a unified meaning.

The criterion for truth in this reading is success, that is, whether or not communication really happens is to be evaluated 'behaviouristically'; for neither an unrecognized expression nor a misread body will stop the struggle to the death. What this means, then, is that both expressing and interpreting – writing and reading – are open-ended projects in which one can never be assured that one has communicated oneself or understood the other except to the extent that one's projection of consequences is borne out by the behaviour one encounters. Let me use this 'behaviouristic' account to consider something similar to Hegel's 'cunning of reason,' that is, the notion that what really matters is carried on 'behind the back' of the singular self-consciousness.[67]

We can imagine a situation in which the slave-to-be is not gesturing, but the master-to-be either guesses from her actions that the slave-to-be would surrender, or just offers surrender to the slave as a possibility, supposing that the slave-to-be might be prepared to surrender *if asked.* Here the slave must still *communicate* her acceptance of its slavery when asked; that is, the master-to-be may *ask* in the absence of any prompting gesture, but the possibility of her adopting a new attitude in relation the the slave (that is, the attitude of lordship) still requires that *the actions of the slave*

confirm this possibility. In other words, *within the context of asking the question of whether the slave accepts her slavery,* the actions are expressive and decisive *whether or not* the slave self-consciously intends to be gesturing[68]; in this situation the slave's attitude *expresses itself* through its *aisthetikos* dimension of action.

The third essential dimension of body, then, is that it is that which *expresses* the self: body is thus *logos.* In the context of the 'Struggle to the Death,' we considered how the body can be *self-consciously* used as a means of expression, but also we have noted that precisely what its being sensible – its being for-another – means is that it is *always* expressing the self, or rather, it is always ready to express the self if there is someone asking the question of what the self is (which is of course precisely what we do in our phenomenological analysis: we read what is expressed in the sensible behaviour of *Geist*). The 'Struggle to the Death' again merely makes thematic a dimension of body that is always present. As *hexis* and *phusis*, then, body, with its constitutive relation to otherness, its constitutive being-for-another, is thus also always *logos.*

Conclusion

I have used the shapes of consciousness presented in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' to develop an account of the body as *phusis, hexis,* and *logos.* I have used a different scenario to focus on each of these determinations, not because any of these determinations is ever absent, but because each of these dramas, respectively, provides a particularly direct approach to one aspect, especially in relation to the embodiment of the *self-conscious* self. *Any* body is *always* all three determinations,[69] and why this is so should be clear: all are different aspects of the same logical role. The body, we can thus conclude, while being precisely that out of which my selfhood, my independence from the world, is constructed, is that developed system (*hexis*) that puts me *in* the world without my explicit self-conscious direction (*phusis*), but equally, in putting me in the world, it makes me open to others (*logos*). Let me offer a tentative, summary definition, then, of the role of body, based on this analysis in terms of *phusis, hexis* and *logos.* The body lets me be apart from the world, but it also puts me in the world, and it brings the world under my control in exactly the move by which it puts me under the power of others, both in that it reveals me, and in that, by virtue of being that out of which I am constructed, it is that through which I am vulnerable.

While we may thus have uncovered the real *logic* of body in Hegel's

phenomenology of the 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness,' the nature of self-conscious selfhood that we disclosed in the 'Unhappy Consciousness' forces us to move beyond the isolated shapes of self-consciousness considered in in this section if we are to find that *real self* that is embodied. The singular human self-consciousness does indeed have a distinctive *phusikos* body, that is, a set of material conditions that have a characteristic position within the whole world of mere nature,[70] and that remain to a large degree impenetrable to self-consciousness; since the functions of human life require a specific qualitative determination (a specific *hexis*[71]) to this *phusis*, we can identify this body that functions within the world of mere nature as the *conditio materialis sine qua non* of human life.[72] But although the logical core of our analysis came from a study of nature, we have already seen the need to go beyond nature into the realms of habit and gesture if we are to understand the body of the self-conscious self. The unhappy consciousness – the completed form of self-consciousness – recognizes itself as an empirical self *subject to* a real self, and in our account of the body as *hexis* we have seen how a singular self can become a constitutive moment of a more comprehensive, institutionally based communal self; this means that, although this 'natural' body is a *necessary* condition for human life, it is not sufficient, and we must now move on to consider this real self in Hegel's account of the logic of communal relations in Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' and to uncover that 'second nature' that is the body of this spirit properly so called. We have disclosed the three constitutive moments of embodiment, but so far the first, *phusis* or nature, has dominated; now we must reconsider the logic of embodiment within the overarching logic of *hexis* or culture.

4

The *Zôion Politikon*: The Body as the Institutions of Society

Introduction

Our progress so far has been as follows. We began, in Chapter 1, with 'Stoicism,' that is, with the selfhood of the apparently isolated ego, a starting point with which we all can identify. In our analysis of such selfhood, we were driven to the 'Unhappy Consciousness'; that is, we were forced to recognize a distinction between the self as it immediately appears to itself and the self as it really is. This distinction between the real and the apparent self meant that the self-conscious self is really self-conscious – that is, it knows its real self, or again, more important, *it knows the real truth of its experience* – only when it identifies itself (its commitments, its will) with this transcendental ego that provides the real animating principle of its experience and is the source of its experience of necessity. Thus, self-consciousness is complete, and it finds its truth, only through 'conversion,' that is, through *bringing itself into identity with its reality*. We then considered 'Reason'; that is, the claim that, granted this distinction of real and apparent, the self that is immediately accessible to self-reflection can still be recognized as the real self, provided it is viewed in terms of the universal and necessary features that it shares with all other selves.

But whereas reason *aims* at *finding* the transcendental ego with which the empirical ego is *immediately* identical, it *produces* only the immediate aspect of the empirical ego's *reflective*, that is, *mediated* self-identity. Reason, in other words, itself is premised on a need for 'conversion.' For what reason requires is that the immediate self bring its theory, its practice, and, ultimately, its very self into conformity with the universal and necessary standards that define the rational standpoint; but this constitutive mediation upon which the achieved selfhood is premised is denied by

reason, and it was the gradual coming to experience of this contradiction that we watched played out in Chapter 2, above. We watched the development of this standpoint to the point at which its own dynamic required the recognition of two things: first, we saw in reason's own notion of rational self-determination that reason itself is a self-identity only through otherness; second, the failure of rational duty to live up to its own definition as prescriptive demanded the recognition that the real self – the law – be not *explicitly* possessed *immediately* by the apparent self, but that the immediately 'possessed' real self sought by reason be really the *implicit* dimension of the self, namely, the *lived* law of the ethical substance to which it belongs, which it has internalized in making itself a member of this community.[1] In Chapter 3, we followed up the first of these recognitions, and the results of our study in that chapter will allow us now to follow up the second recognition.

The recognition that we must operate with a conception of a self-identity that is achieved only through difference allowed us to consider the shapes of self-consciousness that are logically antecedent to reason, in order to uncover the logical dimensions of the relationship of the self-conscious self to that otherness in and through which it is: its body. We left the analysis of Hegel's 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness' with two important conceptions: one about the self and one about the body of that self. Regarding the latter, we determined the body to be the *phusis, hexis,* and *logos* of the self. *Phusis* meant the body understood as a *system* of *activity* that functions automatically, that is, unself-consciously, to provide a medium within which the will can satisfy itself. *Hexis* simply meant the fact that such a system is *qualitatively determinate,* that is, as an active system it cannot be merely qualitatively indifferent 'matter,' but must be characterized by internal relations, or must be, again, a *system* in which *formal* dimensions are constitutive of these 'material conditions' of 'will-ful' activity. It is these two determinations, *phusis* and *hexis,* which will be the crucial determinations for the project of this chapter.

What we learned about the self in our analyses of the 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness' is that the 'converting' self, that is, the self that can *be* explicitly self-conscious (can say 'I'), *can exist only in an intersubjective context;* that is, the essentiality of recognition to the constitution of selfhood indicates that one can be a self only in a society. In the master-slave relation we looked at a system of unequal recognition, and we noted the implicit contradiction of such a situation, allowing us to conclude that recognition and self-consciousness can attain

a logically stable form only in a system of equal recognition. Our analysis of self-conscious selfhood has shown us that this self exists only as a social system, and that this self is precisely embodied by a *hexis*, here understood as that qualitatively determinate system that is *made* by the self (that is, 'habit') and made *jointly* by the members of community; in other words, the properly human or rather, self-conscious, self can properly come into being only when it has developed for itself a *hexis*-body that is a social system of institutionalized equality of recognition or 'right' *(Recht)*. It is this notion that the very *phusis* of self-conscious selfhood must be such a *hexis* that allows us to take up the second point we recognized through our analysis of reason: the notion that the real self is the laws that the self-conscious reasoner is necessarily *already* committed to, and, indeed, already obeying. This pursuit of the proper *phusis* of self-conscious self-hood is our reason for now turning to Hegel's Chapter VI, '*Geist*,'[2] and to the dynamic articulated there of systems of right, that is, of attempts to institute a system of equal recognition. Let me elaborate on this point that *Geist* emerges both as the continuation of the story of the transcendental ego (taking the torch from reason) and as the continuation of our phenomenology of the body of the self-conscious self.

The self we are interested in studying is our own self, that is, the being that can 'convert' or say 'I.' Such selfhood, we have argued, is necessarily social. In other words, the 'material conditions' that allow such a self to exist are not the same as the 'material conditions' that allow a merely 'living' self to exist. *A properly human will can exist only if there is already functioning for it an un-self-conscious system of activity that provides that presupposed system of equal recognition* (and also life support), *that allows it to enact its desires, and this system is a social system of right (Recht).*[3] *Necessarily*, then, we must recognize the human body, that is, the body of the self-conscious self, as fundamentally different from the merely natural body in that, just as the human self is necessarily social, *so is its body.* The human self *cannot exist as itself* in the absence of the material support of a social system, and the essential qualitative or formal dimension that is the definitive organization of this system is *not* that it provides life-support (although this must equally necessarily be present), but is its 'constitution,' that is, the constitutive principle of recognition according to which it organizes social relations. *The nature (phusis) of the human self* is the social system in which it lives and through which it is constituted.[4] Let me anticipate what our analysis will reveal.

The argument of Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' can be construed as answering a question posed by Chapter V, Section C, 'Real Individuality': given that,

in Chapter V, Section C, the 'I' recognizes that it exists in community with others, the question is 'what form should the relationship take?' – that is, what is the adequate way to comprehend the relation of the singular self to others – and in the three sections of Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' the three possible ways are developed. Chapter VI is a study in 'Philosophy of Right (*Recht*)'; it is essentially an examination of the dynamics of the development of the concept of 'sociality,' or the concept that the individual self-conscious agent exists only in the context of social relations and institutions: the human is, as Aristotle says in his *Politics*, a 'political animal,' a *zôion politikon*.[5] The three main sections are 'Ethicality' (*Sittlichkeit*), 'Culture' (*Bildung*), and 'Morality' (*Moralität*). The movement within the analyses of *Sittlichkeit* and *Bildung* mirrors the social analyses of Plato's *Republic*, Book VIII, moving from the phenomenology of the city of natural place (*Sittlichkeit*) to the phenomenology of the cities of honour and wealth (*Bildung*, Section A, 'Culture and Its Realm of Actuality') to the phenomenology of the cities of abstract democracy and tyranny (*Bildung*, Section C, 'Absolute Freedom and Terror'); this movement is shown to be enacted also in western culture, from the society of Ancient Greece to the French Revolution. The phenomenology of *Moralität* then moves from the world of Kantian morality to the morality of Luther at the Diet of Worms and of Socrates in Plato's *Apology*. Parallelling this dialectical phenomenology of the forms of society as forms of self-consciousness, my analysis in this chapter will determine, in the context of the conception of body developed in my previous chapter, what form the institutions of society must take if self-consciousness is to be adequately embodied.

First, Sections A and B will be considered, especially in connection with the two determinations, *phusis* and *hexis*. We shall see here that *Sittlichkeit*, the 'ethical' or customary society, is the society that gives one-sided institutional primacy to the moment of *phusis* and that *Bildung*, the world of 'culture,' is the society that gives one-sided institutional primacy to the moment of *hexis*. Since we have already seen that, for self-conscious selfhood, its very *phusis* is *hexis*, the one-sided recognition of either one of these moments at the expense of the other will have to be unsuccessful. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of conscientious forgiveness, which is the last moment in Hegel's phenomenology of *Moralität*, the 'moral' stance: it is here that we shall see the concept of the adequately embodied self-consciousness emerge. What we shall learn is that this adequate embodiment is precisely the institutional embodiment that recognizes that the self-conscious self is embodied in an *ethos* (custom); that is,

that its *phusis* is *hexis*. In the very move in which this recognition is made, however, we shall see that the transition has already been made to the recognition of the primacy of *logos* for the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood. Let us proceed to the argument.

1. *Sittlichkeit*: Second-Nature as Nature

In our analysis of Hegel's account of self-consciousness we saw that the very nature of self-consciousness is to overcome its naturalness. We there considered the definition of nature as that which does not preserve its own development, or that which does *not* constitute its self-identity precisely in and through its self-transcendence. That which is only *as* a self-transcending is the self proper. In the form of human social existence that Hegel calls *Sittlichkeit* (ethicality) we consider the logic of a social organization that implicitly thinks of itself as a *natural* unit; that is, we see a society that is defined by its aim to exclude self-consciousness proper from its 'self.' In watching the dynamic of this concept, however, we see that, precisely because it is *ethical*, not *natural* – that is, because it is a *spiritual* product – it is defined by that negativity, that transcending, that *overcomes* a natural immediacy.[6] This is a society that *does* depend on self-consciousness, and its dynamic presents this conflict in its constitutive principles – this disparity between the self-definition, the ideality, it tries to embody and the actuality of its existence – as the self-destruction of this society of pure custom and duty and its transformation into its opposite, a society of pure rights.[7]

a. The Dialectic of the Social Self as Sitte (Custom, Ethos)

The phenomenon of *Sittlichkeit* presents us with a society in which the members are to identify immediately with the social substance. Its thesis, so to speak, with respect to the question of defining the selfhood of the singular self-consciousness is that there is no such self: there is only society, and one is not a 'self' except through identification with the model universally defined by custom. 'I' am nothing – I have no substantiality or subsistence – except insofar as I am a member of the city, the *polis* (according to the language of the ancient Greek literature from which Hegel draws his illustration).[8] Yet even here, my singular selfhood is not constitutive of the being of the *polis*: *it* is, and I am only insofar as I can identify my 'self' with it. We are, in other words, still involved in the unhappy consciousness, and its distinction between real and apparent selfhood.

The basic thrust, recall, of the first forms of unhappy consciousness was the abandonment of 'private subjectivity' (being-for-self). In the third form of the unhappy consciousness, which we watched develop throughout 'Reason,' and which continues in '*Geist*' and to the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we see, however, an attempt to recover the singular self as an absolute value, but it is a recovery that does not simply reinstate the idiosyncratic, but rather saves it through elevating it. In 'Reason' we attempted to do this by seeing, in the powers of ratiocination, an immediate identity of the singular self with the absolute; now, in '*Geist*,' we shall attempt to do this by identifying the singular self with 'humanity' or the good of society. Just as the first form of reason, observation, tried to identify immediately with its substance/object and to ignore its self (its self-centredness), so do we see in *Sittlichkeit* the attempt to do this politically, that is, the attempt to identify the self directly with the social substance without accounting for the constitutive role of the being-for-self of the singular.[9] Thus, in terms of the third form of the unhappy consciousness, *Sittlichkeit* offers my salvation only insofar as it offers our salvation, but the converse is not true. Like a natural unit, 'the ethical substance' (*die sittliche Substanz*) does not take account in its subsequent 'incarnations' of the constitutive role of what was sacrificed to its 'development.'

This parallel of *Sittlichkeit* to nature can be drawn out further. Just as a natural unit functions without self-conscious direction,[10] so is the 'ethical substance' expected to work: the attitude of its members (to the extent that the question is ever asked, and it is not asked[11]) is that the social system is simply 'destined' to work, or to fail, as the case may be.[12] Here again, the role of a 'planning' self-consciousness that would direct the progress of the city is seen as neither necessary nor potentially efficacious. 'It is not up to humans to determine these things' would be a suitable statement here.

There is a final parallel to the natural unit to be made here. In the natural unit every constituent has a double duty. It must be 'loyal' to itself, that is, to the integrity of its 'self' as an organ, and it must be loyal to the overarching totality, that is, to the integrity of its 'self' as the organism to which it belongs. The same double duty is reflected in the 'ethical substance,' or what we could call the 'political organism.'[13] Everyone belongs to the overarching unity of the social community – the 'universal' or the state as such[14] – and everyone also belongs to a particular social 'species' – her tribe, family, and so on.[15] Although this logic of the ethical situation can come up anywhere in human relations, Hegel takes as exemplary its enactment as a historical stage of the development of western civilization

in the Greek city-state system prior to the Peloponnesian War, or, rather, he considers the way this society portrays itself to itself (its self-destruction and its replacement by 'legal status' will take us through the subsequent stages of the ancient world). In this society we see this double duty operative on two levels. We first see this dual duty in the fact that every member of the society belongs to a family to which she is bound,[16] and equally she is a member of a larger political community to which she is bound – the *polis*;[17] thus each has a duty to the family and a duty to the state. We also see this division at the level of the state. As a political individual, the Greek simultaneously owes allegiance to a specific *polis* and to Hellas.[18] As in the organism, then, the qualitative unity of the organism (Hellas) is built of units that themselves are organic *hexeis* (*poleis*).

Let me summarize this concept of 'ethicality.' *Sittlichkeit* is *phusis* in that (i) it excludes from its 'selfhood' any constitutive recognition of what has sacrificed itself to its preservation, (ii) it is to function without self-conscious direction, according to 'destiny,' and (iii) it follows a logic of the organism with its duality of duties. Let us now consider how this situation proves to be inadequate as a system of spirit.

What the phenomenology of ethical life discloses is the presence of self-consciousness in a constitutive role within the ethical community. The self appears in two principal ways. We see it first in connection with the distinction between divine and human law.

Both of the 'systems' to which the individual owes allegiance – the family and the state – appear within the experience of the community members as laws; what we analyse as the institution of the family makes its appearance as 'divine law,' and the institution of the state is embodied in 'human law.' To be a member of the ethical community is *immediately* to show allegiance to these two systems of law; here we see the individuated shape of the singular self-consciousness that truly responds to duty in the way demanded in the treatment of 'Reason as Law-Testing' at the end of Chapter V, Section C.[19]

To say that the laws appear *as law,* means that they do not appear as independent things standing over against the subject, for to appear thus is precisely *not* to appear as law, but to appear as something open to one's judgment, rather than as a bind on judgment.[20] They must be, rather, 'lived imperatives,' which provide, so to speak, the a priori ground of experience. That is, they do not function only within the reflective consciousness of the agent, but rather they constitute the pre-reflective judgment of the agent.[21] Thus, law does not here appear to the individual as something about which she must make a choice: the individual sees it as

necessary that she behave in a certain way, and the necessity of this has an obviousness or immediacy that makes it appear simply as 'the way things are,' not at all as the decision it (epistemo-logically) is. Here, duty means to act according to (what we call) the *custom (Sitte, ethos)*,[22] and the immediate knowledge by means of these laws and the propensity to act in accordance with them is the *character (hexis)* of the individual.[23] The ethical situation produces two basic character types that are of ethical importance, and they map onto the natural division of the sexes; the women are caretakers of the divine law, the men of the human law.[24] Through this 'character' each singular self becomes a 'type' or *species* of citizen, and it is as thus a representative of the law, not as this singular self, that the individual counts as a member of the community.[25] To the members of the ethical community, then, it seems that the roles of all the members are destined by nature to be as they are, whether that role is to look after divine things or to look out for the human laws of the community. It is with respect to the latter role, that is, the explicit duties of legislative governing, that we see the first of the two appearances of self-consciousness in the ethical community.

Hegel argues that the 'human law,' which is the self-consciously legislated organization of the overarching unity of the state, is, in fact, the being-for-self of the community.[26] The organized community,[27] in other words, comes about only through work on the part of the citizens;[28] thus we must see the promulgation of law as an activity that is intrinsically related to self-consciousness. Even if the story can be told of many of the laws carried forth in tradition that they are products of the gods, decisions about ostracism, the conduct of warfare, criminal prosecution, and so on must be recognized as decisions made by singular agents on behalf of the community; these laws do not just 'appear' immediately (that is, appear as the very structure of being) but must be recognized to have come into being only through the mediating role of explicit choice.[29] In the human law, then, we must recognize the community's self-reflection.[30]

We can now turn to consider the second necessary presence of self-consciousness in the ethical community. This presence does not attach specifically to one law or the other, but attaches to the notion of law in general. Above, we noted that the self counted only by virtue of representing the law. But whereas the singular thus depended on the law, the law did not depend on the singular, or, at least, it did not recognize this dependence.[31] We can see, however, that the dependence is in fact reciprocal, and that both laws need the singular members of the community to act on behalf of each.[32]

The immanent critique of the conception of the independence of law that the ethical substance enacts upon itself is essentially the argument made explicit by Hobbes in *Leviathan,* namely, the argument from the *initiative* of the singular self:[33] even if *within the community* the singular functions only as an organ of the whole, *the community itself exists only through this act,* and the representative act of the 'organ' – the act of that self that obeys and perpetuates the law – must be self-activated. An act may be performed, but for it to be said that this is my action, *I* must have brought myself to action; if I am pushed, then another has acted.[34] To put this differently, we can speak of the initiative of the singular self as a condition *sine qua non* of the actual existence of the law: without someone to *recognize* it, to recognize it *as law* and thus to feel compelled to *enact* it, the law is not.[35] Thus, rather than being expendable, the singular self – and the singular *as singular,* that is, as *this* self (since to be a self means *necessarily* to be a 'this' self), not just as the law that would be the particularities *as divorced from* the singularity – is essential to the law. The singular self as singular is thus just as essential to the community as the universal laws it enacts, and it will thus be a doctrine of rights to complement a doctrine of duties that the subsequent dynamic of society will have to develop.[36] The recognition of the essentiality of the self, however, first surfaces in the collapse of the ethical situation and in its replacement by a society that institutionalizes the recognition of singularity of selves. Having seen the two ways in which the essential presence of the self is given inadequate recognition within the concept of the ethical community, let us now consider something of the breakdown and transformation that this social system undergoes.

Along with the tacit assumption that the society is 'natural' is the assumption that the constituent elements can operate together harmoniously.[37] It is no doubt true that an ethical situation can continue to function: like any other complete structure (*Gestalt*) in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* there is nothing to push this shape of experience into the next; rather, we retrospectively understand a change that *is* phenomenal in such a fashion as to comprehend how the subsequent developments answer questions posed by the former situations. As in the case of the 'Struggle to the Death,' then, we have here a situation in which we can see a contradiction between the actual logic implicit in the functioning of a certain experience of conscious agents and the logic it proposes for itself as manifest in the institutions it recognizes as governing itself. The breakdown of this situation, which does bring about a 'spiritual' progress (and has its historical analogue in the transformation of a world of city-

states to a world of empire through the Peloponnesian War and the various empires of Sparta, Macedonia, and ultimately Rome),[38] occurs when the two systems of law that co-govern the totality of the ethical situation come into conflict.[39]

Each member of the ethical community is bound to both laws, and, further, the laws themselves recognize the authority of each other.[40] The premise of the ethical situation is that these two are harmonious, and the emergence of a disharmony between them is not containable within the ethical world. Above, we saw that, in order for the law to be carried out, singular selves were required to take responsibility for enacting the law, and this means the individual must identify herself with the law. Therefore, to be a dutiful member of the community means to make the claim that 'my will is truth.' Now no doubt *we* already see here the contradiction indicated above, that the singular self must be simultaneously recognized and ignored[41] – that is, this same act is both the necessary and lawful act of representing the law and the hateful crime of *hubris* – and there is no way in principle to separate these two 'aspects' of the act.[42] This contradiction destroys the society, however, when the selves acting as representative of law do not agree on a course of action.[43] Here again, we see the contradiction of the need for a planning self and the denial of this need in the assumption that things just happen naturally. It is in a case of conflict *where a decision must be made* that the harmonious system of ethical life has *already* broken down and where it cannot guide the action of individuals.[44] In this situation we see that it is *up to individuals* to make decisions, and, in truth, the laws are *that upon which the individual passes judgment*, rather than that which judges the individual.[45] Here we have the standpoint of the primacy of the singular self that is reflected in Aristophanic comedy, Socratic inquiry, Stoic withdrawal, and the imperial regime of 'legal status.'[46]

In our study here of the 'real self' of spirit, we pass through logical stages that closely resemble the developments in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness.' Whereas the ethical substance *portrays itself* as natural, we can see that the ethical situation we have just been considering is essentially a relation of master and slave where the 'social self' has all the singular selves that constitute it as its slaves;[47] in fact, we see here a truer rendering of slavery, since in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' it was easier to maintain the illusion that the master and the slave were ontologically separate entities, whereas here it is much clearer (to us, not to the citizens) that the society as a singular self itself is *constructed only out of* its members, that is, it is a whole as an organized totality of its parts, not an

individual separate from its supporters.[48] The situation of legal status corresponds closely to the logic of stoicism and scepticism; it is a world governed by the institutional recognition that the world of nature and the world of culture is to-be-judged by a singular ruling self.[49] The principle of the empire is the notion of the indifferent self and its many properties and the notion that it is this formal selfhood that can say 'mine' (assent) and 'not mine' (denial) that is to be recognized as being of value;[50] the 'substantiality' of the former shape of the ethical world now remains only as something 'for' the private selves.[51] This new regime has the consequence of 'levelling out' those differences of character that were of institutional import in the former situation; for it is no longer institutionally supposed that one is *naturally given* one's social 'lot.'[52] Thus, the world of legal status provides a uniform universality to the world of law. This complete inversion of the ethical world provides the basis for the emergence of the second essential form in our phenomenology of the dynamic of the concept of *Recht*. We shall turn from the world of social *phusis* to the world of social *hexis*, but first, we must consider some of the implications of this first dialectic of *Recht* for our phenomenology of the body.

b. The Institutions of Sittlichkeit as the Human Body

In Chapter 3 we determined that *hexis* named an essential logical moment of the body. *Hexis* names the qualitative determinateness of the material conditions; it indicates, in other words, that the body is not *res extensa*, or pure matter, but is always, rather, a *formed* matter. In relation to the body of natural life, this appears in the notion of the organ; for we see here that the overall bodily organization that provides its functional unity is not a unity that is indifferent to what it organizes, but rather, it presupposes determinate characteristics within its members. The body is thus a formed matter that is a forming of what themselves are formed matters. Our analysis of *hexis*, however, was not simply conducted in relation to natural life, but was developed in relation to the life of self-consciousness, and in this context we discovered that the formative principle that provides the *hexis* – the qualitative determinateness – of self-conscious existence is a *social institution* or a law. Further, we discovered that this *hexis* of self-conscious life was necessarily a *habit*, that is, a qualitative determinateness, the possession of which presupposes a moment of choice or initiative.

We also argued in Chapter 3 that an essential logical moment of the concept of body is *phusis*. *Phusis* names that which, by the smooth func-

tioning of its system, allows an overarching project to be enacted; it is the un-self-conscious mediative process that allows for an immediate relation of an overarching will to its object. In saying that a social existence provides the body of self-consciousness, we thus note both that law (as *hexis*) provides the principle of the qualitative determinateness, and that this law-governed system (as *phusis*) functions immediately and un-self-consciously within the life of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus will always be founded in a *habitual system of legal relations*; the very nature (*phusis*) of self-conscious existence is this being-accustomed: *Sittlichkeit.*[53]

Thus, whereas the nature of mere nature is *phusis* – that is, the very concept of nature is 'to-be-unconscious' – the nature of self-consciousness is *hexis*, that is, the concept of self-consciousness (recognition) requires an act of *becoming unconscious*, and what becomes unconscious is a law of social relations. Our phenomenology of the human body is thus led to study systems of social relations; that is, we must watch the immanent development of the *hexeis* – the 'habits' – that provide the *phusis* for self-conscious existence. We have seen that a system of legal institutions forms the body of self-consciousness, but we also have to ask which legal institutions found the adequate *hexis* of the self-conscious self. This has led us to Hegel's Chapter VI, '*Geist.*'

Our analysis of that particular system of right that Hegel calls *Sittlichkeit* has proved it to be inadequate to the task. This is because the very principle of this *hexis* is the *exclusion* of the moment of singularity, which is the moment of choice or initiative that we have seen to be constitutive of self-consciousness and, indeed, of the *body* of self-consciousness. It is worth characterizing again the downfall of this 'ethical substance,' and to do it in relation to the logic of master and slave, the parallel to which has already been noted. To do so, however, we must draw out one more aspect of the concept of body we studied in Chapter 3, above.

In characterizing body as the *phusis, hexis,* and *logos of the self,* we argued that both self and body are relative terms, relative to each other (the body, essentially, amounting to that upon which the self depends, and the self amounting, essentially, to what defines the body), and that these two terms themselves are abstract moments of the primary reality that is an activity. One aspect of this notion of the relativity of body and self (which we developed in Chapter 3 in connection with the moment of *phusis*) is the determination of the body as that *of which* the self is the unification or definition; this is the notion of the body as the material conditions or, more accurately, the constitutive materiality, of the self. The self, then, is properly recognized when it is seen as that which names the unity of what

is enacted in and through the body. What this means in relation to self-conscious life is that *it is always a 'we'* that is the proper self of self-consciousness, since the unified activity for which the social body of self-consciousness is the constitutive materiality is always a social action. We can develop this notion somewhat in relation to our analysis of Antigone.

When we considered Antigone and the ethical world in which she lives, we noted two important things. We noted that the 'self' of Antigone – or the member of the ethical community in general – that has ethical relevance is her *character* (which translates the Greek *hexis* as it is used, for example, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*). Her character is that *developed* (*gebildet*) selfhood that molds its actions to the dictates of law. If we are to understand what her self is, then, we must recognize the constitutive role the law plays in this selfhood. The self is the independent centre, and the law determines *how* she is this independent centre. The law also functions as Antigone's *phusis*, that is, that level of operations that provides the self with a structured access to reality, but performs this mediative operation without self-conscious recognition. Viewing her social world in terms of the law is not a reflective endeavour in which she first has a world and then evaluates it by comparing it with some law that she explicitly considers; rather, her very having of the world is *already* structured in terms of the law. The law is an *immediate* possession (the root of *hexis* is *echein*, 'to have') in the sense that it is directly constitutive of her seeing and provides the background situation within which her relation to things takes place and is not some third thing intermediating between an already constituted subject and an already constituted object. Thus we can say of the member of a community that that self is a member precisely to the extent that it has 'built its self up' by internalizing – that is, by making constitutive of its very selfhood – the laws of the community to the point that this *hexis* is the very *phusis* of its self-conscious existence. What we see here, then, is that if we want to answer the questions 'Who is here acting?' or 'Who buried this body?' we can adequately answer only by identifying a self that is not just an isolated and idiosyncratic ego, but is a singular 'apparent' self that has a constitutive relation to a 'founding' selfhood that provides those basic structures of judgment that provide both a meaningful apparent world for the apparent self and, by the same token, provide the apparent self. The 'real' self in this relation is that self that is defined by the structures of the human community to which it belongs.[54]

Thus, in self-conscious life there will always be, concomitant with the emergence of a singular self-conscious agent, a 'we,' that is, a social self of which the singular self is only a constitutive *moment*. We saw abstractly in

our analysis of the unhappy consciousness that self-conscious selfhood is always constituted by a dynamic interaction of a transcendental and an empirical ego, or of a real and an apparent self, and here we see that the real self is in fact the 'we,' and the apparent self the singular 'I.' In self-conscious life, then, we must recognize primarily a *social* self with a *social* body; it is thus literally true to call self-consciousness a *zôion politikon* with a body-politic.

Self-conscious life, we have determined, is always embodied in a system of right, and our question is what counts as the adequate body, the adequate system of right. The essential legal institution in this *hexis* will be the principle that determines the relation of the transcendental ego to the empirical ego, the real self to the apparent self, the singular 'I' to the universal 'we.' We have already seen that the breakdown of the ethical substance is precisely rooted in the deficiency of its body of laws in precisely this respect; for the ethical substance is institutionally founded on a relation between the real self and the apparent self that is a relation of master to slave; it is a society in which the equal recogniton that its laws institute *between empirical egos* is not matched by an equal recognition *between the empirical and the transcendental ego.* Here, the social self demands the recognition of the singular selves, since it needs these singular agents, and their moment of initiative, to enact the laws and to let them exist *as* laws, but this social self does not in turn recognize the singular selves; that is, the 'we' of mere ethicality is not embodied through an institutional recognition of the necessity of the singularity. We saw above that the ethical substance is human community constituted as a merely *natural* unit, and its self-destruction is therefore logically comparable to what we witnessed in relation to those forms of singular selfhood that pose as natural units, namely, the 'Struggle to the Death' and 'Lordship and Bondage.'

While it is thus true that 'ethicality' (*Sittlichkeit*) will always characterize the nature of self-conscious existence, an ethicality that posits such mere ethicality *as human existence tout court* cannot be the adequate ethicality of human existence. Self-conscious life is necessarily always founded in unconscious habit, but the habit that advocates unconsciousness cannot embody self-conscious life; for it, indeed, contradicts its own concept of habit by denying the moment of free choice upon which it is founded. As we turn now to 'culture' (*Bildung*), we shall see an attempt to institutionalize this choice, but an attempt that does this one-sidedly. Whereas *Sittlichkeit* chooses habit while denying choice, *Bildung* is habituated to choice while denying habit. It is not until we conclude our study of systems of right in the analysis of conscientious forgiveness that we shall see

an adequate system that recognizes the essentiality of both choice and habit, and at this point we shall make the transition to 'Absolute Knowing' by finding the proper habit to be, not the habit of *phusis* (*Sittlichkeit*) or the habit of *hexis* (*Bildung*), but the habit of *logos*, that is to say, the habit of calling for self-consciousness. First, then, we consider *Bildung*.

2. *Bildung*: Nature as the Denial of Nature

The whole account in Chapter VI of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, '*Geist*,' concerns the universal self, or the self in its universality. *Sittlichkeit* posited an immediate compatibility[55] of the universality of the self embodied in the state with the particularity of the self embodied in blood kinship, while excluding the singularity of the self from institutional recognition;[56] this culminates in 'Legal Status' in the collapse of the universal into the pure primacy of singular negativity, because of the prior absence of institutional recognition of the rights of singularity. *Bildung*, the world of 'culture,' makes an opposite mistake with respect to the universal.

Bildung posits a direct identification of the universal with the singular, while excluding the particularities of individual life; this again culminates, in 'Absolute Freedom and Terror,' in the collapse of the universal into the pure power of destructive negativity, this time because of the taint of particularity which necessarily infects all singulars.[57] Like the world of *Sittlichkeit*, the world of *Bildung* is a self-contradictory form of society.

Chapter VI, Sections A and B, then, show us the self-destruction of political forms – stages in the dynamic of philosophy of right – that propose either immediate identifications or immediate exclusions among the various moments of the concept: in both cases (i) $U = P$, not S, or (ii) $U = S$, not P, the universal itself – society – is destroyed.[58]

a. The Society of the Gebildet (Cultured) Self

What is this world of *Bildung* we are now considering? It is the opposite of the world of *Sittlichkeit*. *Sittlichkeit* was a world of pure complacency in which the members of the society took the world-as-it-is to be natural and proper. *Bildung* is the world of those people who are purely revolutionary and who deny to their present world any propriety of form; for it is the world with the institutional recognition of the essentiality of development.[59] This takes two basic forms, one 'optimistic,' and one 'pessimistic.'

To speak in terms of the historical analogue to the world of *Bildung*, we

can call the first form the medieval form. This form, both in its emergence and in its structure, parallels the unhappy consciousness. The world of 'Legal Status,' Rome, recognized the power of the singular self to transcend its facticity; that is to say, it recognized the power of choice as the primary truth of human life. This situation turned out to be its own worst enemy, however, since what it ended up proving was precisely that everything substantial is open to the destructive negative power of the singular will. Since, as we know, the self is just the self-animation of its own substantial determinations – its *phusis, hexis,* and *logos* – what we really see here is the absolute vulnerability of all selves to the will of the stronger singular. The lord of this world is thus she who harnesses the pure power of death: the emperor who is chosen by the army.[60] In truth, the army, the pure negative power of death, is the true lord. In terms of the logic of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' this is the transition of stoic to sceptic. The move to unhappy consciousness is that in which the stoic, who formerly took herself and her legal right as her ultimate value, recognizes that in principle this actual selfhood is always at the mercy of the 'real' self, the absolute negative, God.[61] The world of *Bildung* first emerges when the citizens of the Roman Empire *themselves renounce* the ultimacy of their own worldly value as legal persons and insist, instead, on the relation of their actual selves to their *real* essence – the world beyond, which is the creator of, judger of, separate being from, or, in short, negator of this world – as the primary value[62]; *Bildung* is the world in which this attitude is institutionalized.

This first form,[63] then, will be the one in which the self renounces 'this world,' which is its nature;[64] that is, it renounces the particularities of determination of its self[65] (its 'whatness') in order to unite its pure 'mineness' with God: it unites with God in its pure *esse,* in its singular act of being. We can see this in two forms, or, rather, in a multitude of forms within which one stands out from all the rest. *Any* and *all* of us can be saved in this way, regardless of our particular stations in life, since it is the turning of the will – conversion – which matters, not what we are actually.[66] There are thus many forms of individual, but all are equally valuable in God's eyes,[67] provided the singular self *in its singularity* converts, that is, renounces the primacy of this world in favour of this salvation.[68] The single form that stands out as best exemplifying this attitude is the monk, who actually tries to withdraw from the natural world as far as possible. We can see, however, that this asceticism is not the main form of this Catholicism;[69] rather, this worldview simply insists on the rigorous separation of the two worlds, and the unity *in one's singular selfhood* with

the pure world, while recognizing the necessity of one's remaining embroiled in actuality 'in this life.' According to this worldview, then, all natural ways of life are compatible with the faithful life[70]: each of us has a different role in the great chain of being, and each of us must witness as each is able.[71] Now some of us, on this model, will fulfil our stations by being intellectuals – theologians – but while this use of reason to defend faith is a legitimate enterprise and compatible with faith, it must not be seen as the ground of faith.[72] This account of the necessary tolerance for reason within faith will give us an entrance into the second form of *Bildung*.[73]

I shall call this second form by Hegel's name 'enlightenment' (*Aufklärung*). Like the first form, which I have called the medieval form, or the world of faith, this too is a form of spirit in alienation, that is, a system of society that acknowledges a distinction between the true or real self – the essence – and the mundane actuality of immediate existence.[74] Like faith, enlightenment is the institutionalization of an imperative to 'convert,' and, again, it is a demand that the *singular self* renounce the primacy of the particularities of its conscious existence in favour of identifying its selfhood with the real and universal self.[75] For enlightenment, however, this true self is not sought in a world that is simply beyond this one as one determinate being is infinitely outside another; for enlightenment, this other world can be attained here and now, because this universal and real self is reason.[76] Enlightenment thus turns out to be the enemy that was already present in the camp of faith, since the right of reason to insist on its own legitimacy was implicit in the Catholicism outlined above. Enlightenment is the institutionalization of the standpoint we considered at an individuated level in Chapter V, 'Reason'[77]; it is the 'Protestant' world that insists that the reconciliation of the actual self with the pure self happens within the individual and, according to enlightenment, by the spontaneous action (the 'conversion') *of the singular self itself*.[78]

As in the world of legal status, then, we see here in both the forms of the world of *Bildung* a doctrine of rights; the difference here, however, is that it is not the *immediate* self that has absolute right, as was the case in Rome, but it is rather the *developed* or *converted* self that has rights (although we must note also that the developed determination of the self that counts here is not all the particularities of the self's existence, but only the determination of 'having [been] converted'). We see already, then, a contradiction between the principle of exclusion of particularity that manifestly animates this worldview and this necessary dependence on particularity that is latent in its program. To see how this conceptual

problem works itself out we shall have to consider in outline the actual developments within these two forms of *Bildung*.

Bildung is the world of self-alienated spirit, and its basic premise is the separation of existence into two worlds, which our argument allows us to call the world of pure consciousness and the world of actuality.[79] What the dialectic within *Bildung* reveals is that each of these separated worlds in itself is the other, and we see the world of actuality turn out to be the world of thought, and the world of thought turn out to be the world of actuality. We shall see, then, the world of politics become a world of individual judgment, and we shall see the world of 'cognitive' pursuits become a world of politics. The latter will be the culmination of the *ideal* separation of thought and actuality in revolution and terror; the former, to which we turn now, will be the transition of the noble consciousness, which is the life of social duty, to the contemptuous consciousness, which denies to the actual world any primacy for setting values and recognizes in its own alienated selfhood the pure power of rational judgment that is the ground of value.

As a member of the world of *Bildung*, the individual wants to attach her singularity – her initiative – to the universal, not to her private particularity.[80] We begin this sphere, then, with the tension between private interest and 'the good,'[81] which in this context means divine and public service. Since we are considering the social and political dimension here, it is private and public issues that interest us, although the same point can be made with respect to the monk and divine service.[82] The 'noble consciousness' (*das edelmütige Bewußtsein*) wants to devote herself to public service, not taint her purity with the pursuit of the private interest of her actual, particular self.[83] Let us consider this character in more detail.

Hegel argues that what characterizes the 'cognitive structures' of the participant in the world of *Bildung* is the absolute separation of the concepts of good and bad;[84] hence the 'revolutionary' character of *Bildung*, that is, 'turn to the good, flee the bad.' The good is identified with the universal, the bad with the merely idiosyncratic, that is, the particular interests that attach to the self as separated from the universal; for the 'converted' consciousness, the good will be what is in accord with its true self, whereas the bad will be what is at odds, and thus the good will be that in which it can find a likeness to itself, and the bad will be that which it finds disparate.[85] We already know from our analysis of Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' that these various determinations are not separable, that is, that the singularity of selfhood, as an independent centre, itself is a universal, as the act of unifying a determinate multiplicity – a particular-

ity; this last is precisely the *hexis* – the body – of the self. Thus we know that these three moments of the Concept – universal, particular, and singular – cannot be substantially separated but are only moments within an active unity. It follows, then, that what manifestly supports one moment will also latently support the others.[86] To that consciousness that functions within a world of *Bildung*, however, this is not known, and it tries to hold these moments, and the institutions that support them, apart. The noble consciousness is that consciousness that identifies only those moments within social institutions that it can call 'good'; that is, it notices in society only a likeness to itself and is thus the wholly conservative defender of the status quo within this world premised on revolution.[87]

The two dimensions of society that are of interest here are (i) the state power, insofar as it is the abiding universal unity of the society – its identity – to which the individual sacrifices herself; and (ii) wealth, insofar as it is the self-sacrificing medium that serves itself up to the consumption of the individual members in their efforts to maintain their existence as discrete individuals.[88] We must see the inseparability of these two sides – that is, we must see that neither the state nor the individual can exist without the other – and we must see, therefore, that each moment serves both the interest of the universal and the interest of the singular as a particular existence alienated from the state.[89] In Chapter VI, Section A, '*Sittlichkeit*,' only the universal (in Greece) or the singular (in Rome) was recognized, and thus we had either a society of pure duty or a society of pure rights. In *Bildung* the recognition of the necessity of both these moments has been institutionalized, so we have shapes of consciousness that must acknowledge a 'duty to' or the 'rights of' both moments (thus the issue of likeness to both moments of the self as defined by the unhappy consciousness). In the noble consciousness we find a loyalty to the two institutions, which allows us to characterize it as, so to speak, on the side of 'duty' within the world that recognizes both duty and rights, while we shall see that the contemptuous consciousness is, so to speak, on the side of 'rights' within the world that recognizes both.

The noble consciousness is the consciousness that notices only what it calls the good in each moment: state power is good as the universal and abiding substance and ground of human existence; wealth is good as the universal provider that lets the self be as a self.[90] The converted consciousness, recall, wants to identify its singular self with the universal while abandoning its existence as an alienated particularity, and thus it sees in the two dimensions the source of the universal and the source of its self.

Diametrically opposed to this noble defender of the community is the 'contemptuous consciousness' (*das niederträchtige Bewußtsein*[91]), which passes what we must recognize as the equally legitimate judgment that each of these moments of society is bad; that is, each is dissimilar to the converted self.[92] State power is bad, since it oppresses the self and demands of the self that it sacrifice itself, that is, that it obliterate its initiative; wealth is bad because it feeds the particularity of the self; that is, it is that which, when used, is used only by *this* self in a manner that *necessarily excludes* all others – it supports that moment in which the self puts itself above all else.[93] This judgment of contempt, which is just as one-sided as that of the noble consciousness, is the purely revolutionary contempt for an actuality upon which the self itself depends and knows it depends.[94]

What we in fact see in the phenomenology of the noble consciousness[95] is that it itself turns into the very thing it defines as its opposite as it comes to discover through experience the inseparability of the moments of the notion, such that vested, that is, particular, interest can never be separated from either the universal or the singular. For the noble consciousness who is the honest servant of the social substance, the contemptuous consciousness can be only an enemy, a subversive, a troublemaker; we can see, however, that the contemptuous consciousness is just as 'pure' and loyal as the noble one, but it is in fact more thoroughly self-conscious.[96] We see this in two ways. First, we see it in that our understanding of the relations of the three moments of the Concept forces us to recognize from the start the equal legitimacy of the condemnation and the defence of each of the two moments of the state, and yet we see in the contemptuous consciousness (which acknowledges its own dependence on the institutions it criticizes) the moment of self-condemnation, which, as it were, completes its judgment and is not parallelled in the judgment of the noble knight.[97] Second, the working out of the dialectic is such that the noble consciousness must ultimately come to judge itself as the contemptuous consciousness, both in deed and in word.[98] The consciousness, then, that is the product of the loyal and 'converted' approach to the social substance within the world of *Bildung* is precisely that 'perverted' consciousness that is the wit, that is, the individual for whom the truth is merely a matter of judgment, that is, for whom actuality has been dissolved into a moment of thought.[99] Thus, what the relations within that half of the divided world that is 'actuality' demonstrate is that *in itself* actuality is thought. We shall see that the reverse judgment, that thought is actuality, is the conclusion of the dynamic of the other half of the divided world, that is, the world of pure consciousness or thought.

Before considering this second dynamic, I must say something about the structure of this part of the chapter, and about the developments within the sections that follow the section called 'Culture and Its Realm of Actuality,' which I have just analysed. The overall section called '*Bildung*' itself is divided into three parts.

In the first part, Section I, 'The World of Self-Alienated Spirit,' the constitution of, and the rationale for the collapse of, the world I have called the world of faith is investigated, and the study moves from the medieval world as I characterized it above to the verge of the French Revolution. This analysis itself has two parts: first, in 'Culture and its Realm of Actuality,' the breakdown within actuality, as I just presented it, is analysed, and second, in 'Faith and Pure Insight,' the relations within this world at the level of 'thought' or 'theory' are considered.[100] Here we see the articulation of why it is in principle that the attitude of faith, for reasons internal to itself, must ultimately succumb to the attack of reason or insight, and this, too, I outlined above in my opening discussion of *Bildung*.

In Section II, 'The Enlightenment,' the world of Enlightenment, that is, the concept of and dynamic within the social world that is animated by the 'revolutionary' spirit of rational 'conversion' is investigated; essentially the same material is covered as in Section I, 'The World of Self-Alienated Spirit,' but viewed now from the perspective achieved only at the end of the development of Section I, Part A, 'Culture and its Realm of Actuality'; thus, it is true that Section II 'follows' Section I, but it follows in the sense that in Section I the 'ladder' to understanding Section II is provided, not in the sense that the events of section II are temporally subsequent to those of Section I.

In 'Faith and Pure Insight' (Section I, Part B) we saw why, in principle, reason had to appear as the overpowerer of faith. In 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition' (Section II, Part A) we now see this relation acted out, and we consider the dynamics of the struggle of enlightenment with 'superstition' (*Aberglauben*). In 'The Truth of Enlightenment' (Section II, Part B) the discovery, by enlightenment, of the same conflict within itself is documented, and we see that the real essence of, and unity to, enlightenment is provided by its commitment to the ultimacy of the category of utility.[101]

We also see, in the culmination of the victory of the enlightenment consciousness as the pure form of the self-consciousness of the world of *Bildung*, the need for thought to become actual and for the ideal kingdom to become the real kingdom in an actual revolution that overthrows the institutions of particularity within the actual world, thereby simulta-

neously realizing the ideal and making the real the ideal; it is the story of this revolution that is presented in Section III, 'Absolute Freedom and Terror.' Because it is the 'body-politic' with which I am concerned, and because much of the analysis in these sections covers from a different angle shapes of consciousness which we have already analysed abstractly in Chapter V, 'Reason,' I shall now turn directly to 'Absolute Freedom and Terror' (Section III), where the consciousness of the wit at which we arrived at the end of 'Culture and Its Realm of Actuality' now takes on an institutional form as the revolution itself.

In seeing that nobility in itself is really wit, we have, in principle, the main inversion within the world of *Bildung*. All I want to address in discussing revolution and terror is how this consciousness of pure revolution is manifest as a political institution. Since I noted from the start that the world of *Bildung* was the world of revolution, it should come as no surprise to see that the only real institution of this world is the revolution itself; that is, this is the world in which institutions exist *to be overcome*.[102]

Because the contemptuous consciousness (that is, the completed form of loyalty) sees in the institutions of power and wealth only the defence of particular privileges and interests *against* the universal, it, as loyal to this universal, must work to overthrow these institutions, which it does in a social revolution.[103] The inadequacy of its principles, however, turns on itself (as was anticipated in the love/hate relation the contemptuous consciousness had with the institution of wealth upon which its own existence depended, and in the wit's self-denunciation); for in aiming to negate all particular interests, it must equally negate the universal and the singular.[104]

That very singularity of selfhood that provides the initiative in all human action (and the institutionalization of which was the ultimate product of the ethical world despite its initial institutional efforts to deny it) is, as we saw in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' both a certainty of and a demand for a status as independent centre, and this point cannot be 'overcome,' since even the overcoming (as we saw in the 'Lordship and Bondage' section) must be a *self*-subordination. To be a self, then, *universally and necessarily* means to insist on one's alienation from others, that is, not to *be able* simply to identify oneself with the rest of humanity. Consequently, just by virtue of existing as a self, every self is an enemy of the revolution, since every self is a set of vested interests that *cannot* fulfil themselves without in some measure denying to others the right to fulfil their own needs; the food I eat, for example, cannot be eaten by another (and ultimately more important than this physiological need will be the

need of each individual for its exclusive particularity to be granted centrality in its interpersonal dealings).[105] Thus the very principle of the revolution – which was to be the advocacy of that negativity which is selfhood – is the annihilation of selfhood.[106] Pure terror is thus the ultimate result of the world of *Bildung*, that is, of the world that tries to overcome *immediately* the particularities of actual existence by denying their constitutive role in selfhood and attempting to pass to another determinate realm in which the singular self is in direct communication with the universal.[107]

We now can turn to the question of body and consider the capacity of a founding *Sittlichkeit* (which, recall is the *hexis-(habit)-as-phusis* of self-conscious life) governed by these institutions of *Bildung* to embody self-conscious life.

b. Human Embodiment as the Institution of Conversion

In our analysis of Chapter VI, Section A, '*Sittlichkeit*,' we determined that *Sittlichkeit* names the essential form of the body of self-conscious selfhood, that is, self-consciousness is always fundamentally an activity of a social substance, and a social substance that functions un-self-consciously. We also determined that the defining character of any *Sittlichkeit* is the principle according to which it institutionalizes the relation of transcendental and empirical ego, that is, the relation of the 'we' to the singular 'I.' In Section A we considered that *Sittlichkeit* that posits *Sittlichkeit as such* as the adequate form of self-conscious selfhood, and this proved to be inadequate because the governing principle of this founding embodiment was the exclusion of the moment of singular self-consciousness, that is, the suppression of free choice. In Chapter VI, Section B, '*Bildung*,' we considered a founding *Sittlichkeit* that is organized by the principle of the elevation of choice *through the exclusion* of institutionality, and we saw the intrinsically motivated demise of this system. What this means at the level of body is that, again, self-conscious selfhood cannot be embodied in a *Sittlichkeit* that divorces habit and choice; what that *Sittlichkeit* called *Bildung* amounts to is precisely a denial of the body itself.[108]

Bildung is an advance over simple *Sittlichkeit*, because it rightly recognizes the primacy of freedom, that is to say, the primacy of self-consciousness. What *Bildung* lacks, however, is an understanding of what self-consciousness is. In our own analysis of the logic of selfhood as it developed from its first free expression in stoicism to that culmination of immediate realization of the third form of unhappy consciousness, which is reason, we saw the very same conception of the primacy of a self-

consciousness conceived on a model of an identity exclusive of difference, a selfhood exclusive of bodily particularity. It was through the immanent dynamic of this very form of selfhood, however, that the capacity for an adequate comprehension emerged (specifically though the law-giving and law-testing of the real individual). *Bildung* likewise institutionally 'conceives' of self-conscious selfhood in this abstract fashion, but again, it provides the *appropriate situation* for the advance to the adequate conception.[109] Here we see the real force of calling this dialectic '*Bildung.*'

Precisely what *Bildung* institutionally denies is the necessity of habit (*hexis*) to self-consciousness; precisely what it actually achieves is the generation of the appropriate 'material conditions' – the appropriate *hexis* (habit) – for the adequate institutional conception of self-conscious selfhood. For while it is true that the system of *Bildung* advocates the primacy of choice *in abstraction* from body, *it is only this cultivated power of choice that can adequately comprehend embodied self-conscious selfhood.* In order *adequately* to be embodied, self-consciousness needs a *Sittlichkeit* that recognizes, that is, sanctions, its nature *as* self-conciousness, that is, as free, as self-determining; in order to achieve this embodiment, the self must already *recognize itself as* self-conscious, that is, it must be cultivated to acknowledge its own freedom, and, indeed, its responsibility. Thus, in producing a self-conscious self that can see its self as free only in its responsibility to that universal self with which it must identify, *Bildung* creates a situation *out of which* it is possible to organize an adequately embodied self-consciousness. It is in the notion of conscientious forgiveness that the adequate embodiment and, hence, the adequate form of self-conscious selfhood are achieved, and it is the 'material conditions' made available through the world of *Bildung* that provide the suitable 'formed matter' to be organized into the *hexis* that will be the body of conscience, or, rather, *the institution of choice* in *Bildung* provides the formal principle of method or motivation for reappropriating the materiality which is provided by *the institution of habit* in *Sittlichkeit.*

3. Conscience and *Ethos*

In Chapter VI, Section A, '*Sittlichkeit,*' we saw a system of *Recht* – a determinate system for equal recognition – that excluded singularity; in Chapter VI, Section B, '*Bildung,*' we saw a universal system for equal recognition that excluded particularity. In the analysis of conscience, which is the culmination of Chapter VI, Section C, '*Moralität,*' we consider systems of recognition that begin from the singular self that develops the universal

from out of itself and that culminate in the relation of conscience that can tolerate both the singularity and the particularity of the individual by recognizing them as being of universal value; here the 'absolution' of the unhappy consciousness finally finds its proper form, since it is not just the abstract individual who is absolved, but the individual in all her determinateness. The key to conscience is its tacit recognition of itself as what I above called a *zôion politikon*, and this concept will be developed here in connection with the crucial issue of the relation between conscience and *Sittlichkeit*, that is, the relation between conscience and its social embodiment. In particular, we shall see that, implied in the characteristic activity of conscientious forgiveness is the distinctive relation of the self to its *Sittlichkeit* according to which it (the self) treats *Sittlichkeit* precisely as the being-for-another, the expression, the *logos*, of the self. It is when the body as social-*hexis* thus achieves the form of *logos* (where it took the form of *phusis* in relation to the society of simple *Sittlichkeit*, and of *hexis* in relation to the society of *Bildung*) that the logical story of the body as *hexis* is complete, and we can make the transition to the final shape of body as *logos* proper. Rather than develop the whole dynamic of *Moralität* (which, in its preliminary moments, repeats the logical errors of denigrating one of the logical moments), we can move directly to the concept of conscience and see how it fulfils the demands that the logic of self-consciousness and its development through *Sittlichkeit* and *Bildung* has bequeathed to us. What we must study is the characteristic act that animates conscientious forgiveness; we shall see that this act amounts to asking a unifying question. First, we must describe the shape of conscience.

a. The Conscientious Self

Unlike simple morality,[110] which posits a formal ground such as Kant's categorical imperative for determining abstract universal principles for behaviour that attain their validation precisely through *not* being intrinsically related to *this* situation – conscience recognizes the primacy of *this* situation, and it recognizes this in three ways. It recognizes the need to respond *to* a given situation – that is, its duty is a *particular* duty pertaining to *this* situation;[111] it recognizes the need to respond *in terms of its given powers to determine goals* – that is, the *universal* context of 'what ought to be' can be, for it, only the values to which it *finds* itself committed;[112] finally, in relation to both these issues it recognizes the need for *itself* to respond – that is, it finds *itself* responsible for the moment of *singular* initiative.[113] The conscientious self must respond *here and now*,[114] and it must respond

with what it has here and now, both in terms of values and in terms of powers. The Kantian morality still is rooted in something like reason or the world of *Bildung* in that it posits a self-contained singular self that is abstracted from the particularities of its existence. Conscience, however, while it is animated by the same root commitment to responsible existence that simple morality is, knows it must always act in a particularized (that is, an embodied) fashion.[115]

The basic phenomenon of this conscientiousness is displayed by Martin Luther's declaration at the Diet of Worms that 'Here I stand, I can do no other,' and it is the recognition of the ultimacy of the justification, 'I *had* to act that way because my conscience demanded it,' which means, again, 'according to (the limits of) my understanding, both with respect to what is the case, and what should be the case, this is how I had to see the situation, and this is how I had to act.' It is this claim of lived *necessity* with respect to both object and method that gives this claim of conscience its ultimacy; insofar as these judgments are necessary, they achieve for conscientious subjectivity the equivalent of Kantian objectivity. Whereas the basic phenomenon of such a lived necessity is what has characterized all the forms of *Geist* we have considered (indeed, it is our very definition of *Sittlichkeit* as *phusis*), conscience is that form of self-conscious selfhood that *posits* the ultimacy of this justification. Conscience posits the need to act morally, and thereby it is the *Aufhebung* of the demand of *Bildung* that singularity become universal or that subjectivity become objective; but it is equally the *Aufhebung* of *Sittlichkeit* in that it recognizes that the objectivity of subjectivity is achieved when its singular judgment is animated by the *concrete* necessity of *ethos* rather than the abstract and merely formal necessity of simple reason.

It might initially seem that, since conscience is committed to the ultimacy of the *claim* of conscientiousness, one can be conscientious simply by saying so; or, again, this might seem like a reversion to a Kantian-style morality according to which only intentions matter. Neither of these routes, however, is adequate to the demands of conscience. Indeed, the conscientious 'intentions' that count as justification are those that *compel* the agent to act. Truly conscientious behaviour is that that is animated by the commitment to act to the limits of one's ability; it means exerting one's uttermost efforts to construe properly one's situation and to construe the method with which to approach it. Yet here again there may seem to be a problem.

There is yet a third way that the attitude of conscience might seem to subvert its own goal and generate inactivity: this would be a situation in

which one tries to isolate oneself from the sphere of social action on the ground that, since one cannot know the consequences of one's actions, or how one's actions will affect others one will always be imposing one's particular will on others and thereby trespassing on, or working against, the universal. This is the attitude that conscientiously condemns all other agents as violators of the rights of others. Here again, however, this is not an attitude that adequately represents the logical demands of the standpoint of conscience. This 'isolationist' attitude fails to recognize that its stance of immobility is a social action with social consequences just as much as is any other; that is, its purported goal of not trespassing by not acting is an unrealizable goal. The institution of conscience, then, is the *phusis-hexis* that contains the recognition that, indeed, there is, on the one hand, no guarantee of successfully carrying out one's intentions, but there is, on the other hand, a guarantee of the inescapability of the imperative to act, which implies the guarantee that *one must necessarily trespass upon others,* because *one is always already a social self.* Indeed, the very recognition of others *as others* is already the inclusion of them into one's field of judgment and existence. Conscience, then, is animated by a logic that posits the inability to isolate singular self-conscious selves from each other.[116]

Conscience, in knowing that it has to trespass, has recognized recognition – that is, it has itself come to an operative understanding of the conception of embodied selfhood that we have been developing in that it knows that the only self that is is a social self; conscience acts, in other words, on the tacit recognition that 'those others are not outside me – they are me.'[117] This thus imposes a demand on conscience to act within the parameters of its given situation, not because it is wrong to go outside (which was, recall, the posited objective for the 'revolting' or 'converting' self of both faith and enlightenment) but because it is impossible. Let me clarify these points.

Our argument about the nature of the self and its body has led us to recognize that 'the self' is just the totality of its own material conditions held together *as* a unity (an integrated totality) *by* a unified activity of willing. The material condition – the body – of the human self, we have now concluded, is necessarily the social substance: not just the 'matter' of this, but the formed matter, that is, the substance *as* made qualitatively determinate by the constitutive principles of intersubjective relations and their concrete enactment. Thus the singular self can neither be excluded from the social substance (as in *Sittlichkeit*) nor be withdrawn from it (as in *Bildung*), but it must be recognized *as that very social substance itself* in its very act of becoming *für sich* – explicitly self-positing – in a singular (or rather,

we must say at this point, individual) act of willing.[118] Society, therefore, must be understood as a system of monads, where there are no 'external relations' precisely because all those things that could naïvely be said to be 'outside' the self now are recognized to be already internal to the self. This was already implied in the doctrine of recognition and in the notion of a social system of *Recht*; for what they reveal is the necessity, to the spiritual self, that it recognize 'others' as *its very own self.* Conscience in its final form[119] is that form of experience that has, as the implicit logic that must be invoked in order to explain its behaviour, the recognition of this very doctrine of the self and its embodiment in social relations.

Conscience knows it must act in this world. It does not act randomly, but must do its best to act as it ought; what determines whether or not it has done so is whether or not it has tried to know what to do to the best of its ability. Further, given that each self is already internally related to all others, it is not possible to act without acting violently (and we already saw this from another angle when we saw the impossibility of not acting on particular interests when we considered the transformation of absolute freedom into terror).[120] Thus, again, conscience knows it must force its will upon others and, *to the extent that it is actually animated by the notion of ultimacy of conscience,* it equally must *forgive* others when *others necessarily do the same*;[121] as forgiveness, it must accept the actions of others according to the same standards as it uses in its own activity. Conscience itself must recognize the very thing our phenomenology of the world of *Bildung* recognized through the dialectic of the terror, namely, that social integration always comes hand in hand with interpersonal exclusion and violence, which is rooted in the constitutive necessity of the moment of particularity to all self-conscious selfhood. In recognizing that, as forgiveness, one is committed to endorsing that which the other is committed to endorsing, one has tacitly recognized that one's real self is constituted by the others. What conscientiously forgiving behaviour tacitly recognizes, then, is that the self is not in simple and immediate possession of itself, but rather, that it *finds out* who it is through encountering itself as the social world of its otherness.[122] Thus conscience recognizes the intersubjective world to which it belongs as being its own real truth. Let us consider further the presupposed 'cognitive' dynamics of forgiveness.[123]

To forgive means to say of the offending other, 'she had to act that way'; that is, forgiveness means seeing the other to be animated by a lived experience of necessity, just as one is oneself. Furthermore, in order to forgive the other it is not even required that the other preface its actions with the claim of conscience that 'I had to act that way'; for it is equally

necessary to forgive the failure of the other to come to the level of self-consciousness required to make this claim. To forgive, then, means to see the actions of the other as precisely the expression – the being-for-another – of the other's animating selfhood. To forgive, then, means precisely to treat what one faces as the *logos* – the expressive bodiliness – of the other, and to do this requires, as we learned when we first analysed the category of *logos*, the enacting of two cognitive operations. First, that to be read must be posited as a single totality; second, it must be posited as intrinsically unified. Since all determinate particularity trespasses in one's lived experience, it is the totality of what one faces that must be thus forgiven. Therefore, the process of forgiveness culminates in the interpretation of all one's otherness as an intrinsically unified – a self-determining – totality.

This operation of forgiving, then, requires that the forgiving consciousness take up an investigative stance towards its otherness. Forgiveness, recall, is not an activity in which it arbitrarily chooses to engage, but it is, rather, the act it has been driven to by its animating drive to be moral. Thus the conscientious self finds itself morally driven to understand the other, that is, its duty is to see the other as in process of self-determination. Recall, too, that the pursuit of duty is the attempt of the self-conscious self to identify its empirical ego with its transcendental ego, that is, to be autonomous; here, in the culmination of conscience in forgiveness, we see that the project of identifying with the transcendental ego – the project of being autonomous – is realized only in identifying my self with the self of the other; that is, I posit as right that which animates the other's behaviour. I thus allow myself to be determined by the law that animates the other, or, rather, I sanction this determination, which I have always already allowed. In conscientious forgiveness, the right of the other to make and to have made demands upon me is my highest ideal, and the project of autonomy is thus realized only in the most radical heteronomy.

But note, finally, that if I now treat all otherness as the *logos*-body of the other, and if, further, I treat the other – or, rather, the unity of myself with the other – as my true self, then all otherness must be the *logos*-body of *my* self, that is, experience is the sphere in which what I am is expressed to me. The adequate form of the *hexis*-body of self-conscious selfhood, then, is that form in which the institutional basis of social relations is the demand that the self recognize the sphere of its otherness as its own *logos*. We shall pursue the articulation of this notion and its implications in Chapter 5, in which we shall consider the notion of absolute knowing. Let

us summarize the relation between conscience and the body as *Sittlichkeit*, or the founding institution of a society.

b. The Embodiment of Forgiveness in the Forgiving Body

Sittlichkeit was the social system that thought of itself as simply natural, and this error of self-recognition was its downfall. Yet, at the same time, we have argued in the preceding paragraphs that the *ethos* really *is* the *phusis* of the human self. Of course, the difference is that this nature is a second nature, or a habit. *But it is not for that reason any less properly regarded as the living body of the functioning self.* If, as I have just argued, and as the practice of conscience tacitly recognizes, it is the social substance itself that acts through me, not just a detached singularity, as enlightenment individualism would have us believe, then *of course* the social substance is the body of the action. Conscience is the only completed and stable form of selfhood precisely because *it is the only form of self-consciousness which gets the story right about its relation to its body.* The world of *Bildung*, and the individuated shapes of rational and faithful consciousness that it supports, is rather like the warrior in the struggle to the death in that its goal of confirmed separate existence is impossible because it has not recognized its dependence on its *phusis* – its system of life; this dependence, furthermore, is not the dependence of one determinate being on another, but the dependence of a unity on that *of which* it is the unity. Conscience is the perfected product of that movement that began with the slave as the effort to set up an institutional world (*hexis*) on the basis of choice in which the two sides of self-conscious existence can be given their due, where those two sides are the material conditions (living body) of the form of life and the unitary act of energizing that living body, that is, the self. Conscience, in other words, is the absolute shape of self-consciousness because it has (implicitly here and explicitly in absolute knowing) the proper appreciation for itself as an embodied agency, where this embodiment is precisely the functioning social world in which it lives and to which it is necessarily committed; that is, by being committed to itself, it is necessarily committed to its ethical situation. The commitment is thus parallel to that of, for example, Antigone, but it is fundamentally different in that this commitment is *not* 'natural' (that is, automatic and unexplicatable by the singular self) but is *mediated by self-consciousness*, and the latter condition is what was achieved through but not in *Bildung*. What exactly is this ethical system, then, that embodies the conscientious self and that it adequately recognizes? Let us review forgiveness.

To forgive the other means to see its actions as expressive of its own *Sittlichkeit*, that is, its own innermost animating logic. We have seen, above, that this means that to be conscientious is to see the other's actions as an expressive embodiment. Further, since the other(s) being observed is (are) truly constitutive of the selfhood of the observing self, *the actions of the other are thus the expressive embodiment (logos) of the real self of conscience.* It is thus when it finds its own otherness to be its own *logos*-body that conscience is fulfilled. Thus, the concept of conscience has given us the concept of the proper form of the human body as *logos*.

We have already seen in our analysis above that, *from the standpoint of self-consciousness,* self-consciousness can be complete only when it recognizes this its *logos*-body as what it must understand or forgive in order to complete itself. This completion will be effected, however, only when it can see that this readability that characterizes its otherness is not an accidental determination of this body; that is, it must not be a mere triviality that this body is a *logos* like any other body; it completes itself, rather, when it comes to see that 'to be read' is the very essence of this body, that is, the definitive determination of the body of the completed self-consciousness is the one that asks to be forgiven and thereby is the body that forgives the act of forgiveness perpetrated by the forgiver (and this is, indeed, what we should expect, since, from the start, the analysis of self-conscious selfhood has been rooted in the dynamic of mutual recognition according to which it is only the self-sacrifice of the other through which the self can exist as such). With respect to the issue of the adequate institutional embodiment of self-consciousness, then, we can now see that self-consciousness is completed only in the *hexis*-body for which the defining institution is the law that demands it come to self-consciousness; the duty, then, that defines adequate self-consciousness is the duty to know and, ultimately, to know the other as the self. It is in the effort to enact this imperative of conscience in its fullness in the project of absolute knowing that we shall see this insight carried to completion, and the key to this completion will be that, just as conscience only acts to the best of its knowledge – that is, it can only act as it can only act – so will absolute knowledge have to be forgiven for only being able to know within its own limits; it is its own *self*-forgiveness in this regard that will make it *absolute* knowledge.

Conclusion

In Chapter 3, above, we worked out the basic determinations of the concept of body primarily in relation to the singular self and simple relations

of singular selves. We began with the notion of *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*, where our model for what provided the body of the self was the world of nature. Even though within our account we saw the self develop (through the 'Struggle to the Death,' 'Lordship and Bondage,' and the 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness'), we still tended to focus on singular selves for whom the most obvious candidate for 'body' was that constituted through the immediate actuality of the living agent that is provided by the world of nature. In shifting to *Geist*, however, we are looking at the human self proper, that is, the self as it exists in a community of selves that support each other's self-certainty through institutionalized structures of recognition. In this context we have been forced to recognize something quite a bit more complicated as the proper human body, namely, the social institutions, the material conditions of their support, and the historical conditions of their development. We have moved, then, from body as nature (that is, given nature) to body as history (that is, self-developed nature), or, as I put it in the introduction to this chapter, we have moved from the primacy of the general rubric of *phusis* to that of *hexis*. But just as our analysis of the *phusis* of self-consciousness led us to posit the primacy of *hexis*, so has our analysis of *hexis* now culminated in the need to posit the primacy of *logos* as the proper conceptual form of the body of self-conscious selfhood. What we must do now is complete our story by moving to this third and last determination of body, *logos*, and here we shall see the absolute body of spirit emerge with the absolute form of self-conscious selfhood in absolute knowing.

Section C

The Absolution of the Body

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Responsibility and Science: The Body as *Logos* and *Pathêtikos Nous*

Introduction

From our analysis of Hegel's Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' we concluded that 'the body' is always a relative determination, that what it is relative to is the self (or, ultimately, an activity), and that its relationship is that it is the *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos* of that self. From our analysis of Hegel's Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' we concluded that the self-conscious self reaches its proper form only within a system of *Recht*, and that only the system of conscientious forgiveness can be the proper fulfilment of this requirement. The dependence of the self on a social system of *Recht* allowed us to conclude that the body of the spiritual or self-conscious self (its *phusis*) is necessarily an institutional body (a *hexis*), and the culmination of this institutional system in conscientious recognition entails that it is necessary for the spiritual self to posit its identity with the totality of its world; absolute knowing, by enacting the latter identification, will thus be the fulfilment of the attempt initiated in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' to set up a system of mutual, equal recognition. In other words, not only must the substantial social fabric be the body of the self, but the self must further see itself reflected in this body: it must see itself expressed in and through its world. Thus, the very fact that the spiritual self has to have a system of *Recht* for its *phusis* equally demands that that *phusis* be its *logos*, and that it be this *logos for itself*. In conscience this project is enacted in principle; it is absolute knowing, that is, philosophy, that carries the project to completion.

   In what follows, then, I shall show how absolute knowing is the culmination of the project of being conscientious and how this fulfilment of selfhood carries with it the last development in our phenomenology of

the body by seeing the body as *phusis* and *hexis* reach its absolute form as *logos*. My texts for this section will be Hegel's Chapter VIII, 'Absolute Knowing,' the 'Preface' to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (which I treat as roughly the second half of Chapter VIII), and, in general, the rest of the 'system' as articulated in the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia* (which I treat, like the 'Preface,' as being an amplification of the conclusion of Chapter VIII). We shall see that for the completed self-conscious self-hood, its *phusis* is the *logos* through which it sees how it is a *hexis*, and that, indeed, the culmination of the dialectic of the body is in its becoming mind. Along the way we shall note some implications of this argument for understanding the Hegelian philosophy of religion.

1. Systematic Science as the Completion of Conscience

a. Absolute Knowing as Ethical Imperative

Chapter VIII, 'Absolute Knowing,' does not really introduce any new determination over and above what we have already considered in conscience; absolute knowing grows out of the demands of an institutional situation, and it is simply the coherent working out of the implications of the conscientious response to the exigencies of social life. We can develop this notion by reconsidering the 'cognitive operations' we developed in analysing how forgiveness can be carried out.

In Chapter 4, above, we determined that conscience must perform those operations that we initially identified in the transition into the relation of master and slave, namely, the operations of totalization and integration. That is, to forgive the other is to understand that other as self-determinedly doing what it has to do, which means, first, recognizing its appearance as its appearance (totalization) and, second, seeing the appearance as the unified expression of a single force, that is, seeing it as *systematically* integrated. We have already determined that the subject performing the operation is the transcendental ego, which gets its enactment through the singular self, and our analysis of conscience has shown that this transcendental ego is constituted by the totality of the human situation, or the totality of the experienced otherness of the empirical ego; thus, to fulfil the project of conscience adequately will mean granting adequate recognition to the totality of that upon whose recognition the self depends for its self-confirmation, which means the totality of the determinations of experience that have already 'trespassed' against the self. The self must 'forgive,' that is, comprehend, this totality. So far I

have argued that the social self depends on the whole *functioning* (and therefore concrete) social world, and this means it must see its self reflected, that is, see propriety, in all the determinations of the world in which it lives. In other words, to forgive conscientiously really requires coming to a full knowledge of what must count for it as being, and, indeed, it requires coming to a knowledge of it *as* essentially this totality, that is, it must be explained why it is right for it to be *this* totality, which means comprehending the whole as a system.[1]

b. Science as Logic, Physics, Ethics

In principle, conscience, if it is to grant adequate recognition to all that upon whose recognition (sanction) it depends, will have to forgive the whole system of nature and the whole system of culture. For the human self merely to be living, it depends on a *phusis* which is 'in itself' *phusis*, that is, an unreflective activity that is *given* thus; this is the world of nature. The *phusikos* body of the merely living self is always a determinate member of the system of nature, and the living being depends on the support of the member itself and of the organic natural system within which it is a member. Thus, the adequate self-comprehension in absolute otherness, which is absolute knowing, will have to comprehend nature.[2]

Equally, we learned that the self-conscious self can exist only within, that is to say it depends upon, a social system of *Recht*, and this social fabric we also recognized as its body, now construed as primarily a *hexis* or habit, that is, something that has been *made* into a unreflective system of activity but has become such only through being institutionalized by free subjects. Fully to forgive as oneself that otherness that really is oneself, and to achieve that autonomy through an identification with radical heteronomy that was our ultimate definition of conscience, then, will also require a comprehension of the spiritual world as a systematic whole.[3]

This forgiveness, we have noted, can be adequately effected only by an agency that is *capable* both of *identifying* the phenomenon to be understood and of identifying it as *a* phenomenon, and that is capable of seeing it in its integrity as internally unified; it must be able to recognize both the proper extent and the proper intent, and this means the logic of its own comprehension must be adequate to the logic that actually animates the thing. So the method of approach to the object must find in the structures of its knowing the very same structures as those that characterize the being of its object. It must know the object as animated by the internal dynamic that actually animates it. This is the sense of Hegel's

remark that 'In science the determinateness ... is the self-directing inner soul of the concrete content ... True scientific knowledge ... demands abandonment to the very life of the object, or, which means the same thing, claims to have before it the inner necessity controlling the object, and to express this only.'[4] The first task of this absolute knowing, then, will be to develop an adequate method for approaching its object;[5] this task is carried out in the *Science of Logic*. The second task will be, as indicated just now, to comprehend the nature and the culture that embody itself, and comprehend them *as* embodying itself, which is the task carried out in the *Realphilosophie* that is given in outline in Parts II and III of the *Encyclopaedia*. Let us go one step further in our consideration of the method, the development of which is the project of the *Science of Logic*.

We already know the root of this method to be the conscientious questioning that aims to identify its object as a totality and as an internally unified totality, and it is not hard to see how the famous 'dialectical method' is the culmination of this project. The truest definition of dialectical method is the method that lets the other speak for itself, or, better, lets being speak for itself; but the most familiar aspect of it is its role in understanding one-sided forms of experience, that is, its role of watching one-sided standpoints work out inner contradictions. We have already seen that absolute knowing requires seeing how the other is self-determined. This means seeing the other as providing its own 'law' according to which its actions are to be understood; it means seeing the other as animated by a logic comparable to that of the relation of transcendental ego and empirical ego. It is possible, however, for a system to operate on the basis of contradictory principles, and in such a system its characteristic action would be the demonstration of its contradiction.[6] We have seen obvious instances of this in, for example, the dynamic of *Sittlichkeit*, which is animated by the contradictory status of being both natural and cultural, or the dynamic of master and slave, which is animated by the contradictory status of the master as both independent and dependent. In both cases the phenomenology of the given system requires the asking of the following question, which I shall articulate in two ways. First, we can express the question as two questions: 'What is the law that this system posits for understanding its behaviour?' and further: 'Does its behaviour express exactly this law?' In this formulation we look to the relation between the system's self-understanding and its actions. But its expression of its self-understanding is indeed a part of its behaviour; thus, the two questions are really just the single question: 'What does your behaviour express?' In those

cases where the motive force that explains the unity of its action is at odds with its own behaviour in articulating this law, we shall see that the former, that is, the real motive force, will be the concept of a contradiction, and the behaviour will be the dynamic expression of this contradiction. The behaviour will reveal the disparity between what it apparently is and what it really is, or between what the situation is *für sich*, and what it is *an sich*. Thus to speak of conscientious forgiveness does not mean a simple advocacy of the status quo,[7] whether the issue is the respect for an epistemological position, such as 'Sense-Certainty,' or whether the issue is the respect for one's existing social conditions; rather, conscientious forgiveness means that any critique of the subject-matter must be the self-critique of the subject-matter itself. The last point allows us to say one final thing about the nature of the science of the method of forgiving the other that is articulated in the *Science of Logic*.

The simple wish to understand the other is no guarantee that one can do so. To let the other speak for itself is not something that one can accomplish by simply claiming to put in abeyance one's own biases; rather, such an '*epochê*' can be accomplished only through a process of developing not an absence of standpoint but an educated standpoint, that is, a standpoint that is *capable* of recognizing the self-determining logic of the other's actions. Thus the argument is simultaneously an *epochê* and a 'journey of the mind to God.' The form the development of the *Science of Logic* takes could be characterized as a dialectical analysis of possible forms of self-determination; that is, it offers an education in how an other – how being – can be, and, at the same time, it is an education into how each form can serve only as an inadequate pigeon-hole for any more sophisticated category. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* both implies and depends on this same education, but it has as its proper subject-matter an education in how spirit can appear, which amounts to what forms experience can take. Where the *Phenomenology of Spirit* demonstrates concretely how this subject-matter itself has demanded that it be listened to by a dialectician, the dialectic of the *Science of Logic* demonstrates that the logic of self-determination itself calls upon dialectic as providing the only medium within which it can consistently be enacted.

It should be clear, then, why the exigencies of social life demand, as their adequate response, the articulation of the philosophical encyclopaedia: society needs conscience, conscience needs absolute knowing, absolute knowing is science, and science is the system of logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. Having now laid out the basic task of

absolute knowing as the fulfilment of conscience, I shall return to the notion of absolute knowing's comprehension of its object *as* embodying itself, first, to consider further the form that the method and process of absolute knowing take, and, second, to determine the form its body takes.

2. Dialectical Method and Otherness as Object

a. The Sanction of the Object: The Culmination of Recognition

Again, we have already seen in the analysis of conscience that the treatment of experience as the *logos*-body of the other must culminate in the treatment of this same otherness as the *logos*-body of the self; for this whole project of conscience is here premised on the identification of the self with the other, that is, recognizing as *my* law, or what *I* acknowledge as just, the law that animates the behaviour of the other. But even before the self learns who it is concretely by seeing itself as expressed through this otherness, we know the governing logical principle that is definitive for this self, namely, this self is defined by the act of universal forgiveness. Let me explicate the last point.

Recall that the two operations demanded of this forgiving self are the totalizing and the systematizing of its experienced otherness; we already know, then, that the basic logical determination that will found the systematization is the definitive determination of *being* the expression of the self, and, further, that the self thus expressed is this universally forgiving self. We already know, then, that self-conscious selfhood can complete its project of achieving self-consciousness through a system of equal recognition only if it can comprehend its otherness as the *expression* of its act of forgiveness; that is, being must *be* the act of universal forgiving.

Further, because we are now considering the forgiving self as forgiving its own *logos* – that is, its own body, that is, again, its own self-as-expressed – being must be the act of self-forgiveness. Again, for one last logical twist, since the definitive self of this 'self-forgiveness' is the act of forgiving, being must forgive itself *as* the act of universal self-forgiving. What this amounts to, then, is that the object must be comprehended as sanctioning the act of understanding that is trespassing against it.

This argument can be translated back into the more concrete terms of the dynamics of experience if we begin by remembering one point, namely, that the self doing the comprehending is *already* recognized to be an agent of a transcendental ego that determines for the empirical self what it can take as object, how it can approach it (method), and

why it feels the imperative to do so, so that, indeed, it must rather be said that, through the empirical self, the situation brings itself to self-comprehension. Let us pursue these issues more carefully.

b. The Concrete Presentation of Otherness as Already Incorporated

It might appear that to demand of one's experienced otherness that it conform to one's unifying interpretation is indeed to do the greatest violence to it, rather than to give it adequate recognition. For absolute knowing, it is possible to say that 'the object of my knowing is a unified system'; yet it is precisely the ground of this systematic unification that the act of absolute knowing itself has contributed. It might seem, then, that precisely what fulfilled conscience, that is, absolute knowing, does not do is identify with its other. Its mistake in reading its *logos*-text, it might thus seem, is precisely to treat it as a text; for an act of reading a text not only engages in interpreting what it takes as text, but furthermore, its very act of taking its text *as a text* is an act of interpretive totalization that forces the *hexis* out of which the text comes to be unified to be this way rather than that. That is, it actualizes only one of many textual possibilities and, in so doing, excludes the other possibilities, including especially the possibility of not being read at all. Thus, totalization, one might say, is totalitarian. The same relationship holds for absolute knowing. Absolute knowing intends to identify with the other, but its very act of identification is such as to ensure it encounters only itself. This critique of absolute knowing, which is comparable to the accusation of textual totalitarianism, would be to challenge the right of absolute knowing to posit its own self as that which was being supported by that multiple material *hexis* out of which it has constructed its object that it calls its otherness. We need to see how Hegel's analysis resolves this problem.

Essentially, this critique is launched from the position of the 'beautiful soul,' that is, the 'isolationist' judge whom we considered in connection with conscience;[8] indeed, the whole dynamic of forgiveness out of which the project of absolute knowing emerged was *already* a response to this very challenge,[9] and the critique is thus logically out of place at this point. None the less, we can still articulate a response to this critique in terms of the issues involved at this stage of the dynamic.

The mistake of this critique, like the mistake of the beautiful soul, is to think that there is a point of view from which the trespassing is something that has yet to transpire; in both cases, rather, trespassing is not something about which one has a choice, but is something that has always

taken place already. In relation to this critique of the project of absolute knowing, the mistaken characterization is the insistence that it is *in and through the project of absolute knowing* that the other is forced to conform to the self and is forced into the totalitarian system of reflecting only the self. In fact, the very existence for the self of an other already indicates that that other has been inscribed within the experiential system of the self. Just as we noticed with Antigone that the important judgment was the unconscious acceptance of a law that *made possible* for her a social world within which narrowly circumscribed determinate judgments could be made, so within experience must it be the case that a judgmental stance has *already* been taken in order that there might be, for the self, an other upon which to pass further judgments. By its very definition, other-ness can exist only in definitive relation to what is other to it (a self), which recognizes (*setzt*) it as other;[10] thus, in advance of any explicit interpretive operations on the other, there must be a primordial act of positing the other as the not-self (*voraus-setzen, ur-teilen*). The trespass, then, that is, the act of treating the other as a product of the operation of the self, has always already happened by the time the other can be recognized. Absolute knowing, then, is not the instituting of an act of violence; it is the attempt to take responsibility for the institution of violence, which is necessarily already the foundation of all its experience, all its relations with the other.

When we recognize this point, we can see that this has indeed been our premise throughout the whole analysis. The entire task of the dialectic of chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' was to develop a system of society from within the impenetrable world of the singular ego. Initially, this appeared as the moment of experienced challenge, that is, the desiring self found within in own experience a need to adopt a respectful attitude towards determinations that it experienced as other. The culmination of this dialectic in the unhappy consciousness marked the recognition of the constitutive dynamic within its own self of a relation between a real and an apparent self, and it is within the last moment of the latter relation that all our investigations have been contained.

Again, the dialectic that is the immediate source of the imperative to systematic science is the dialectic of *Geist*, itself a form of this dynamic of unhappy consciousness. Here again, we saw from the start the need to recognize the founding moment of singular initiative for any system of law, and the culmination of the dialectic in conscience was a revelation of the need to develop any system of responsibility *from within the singular self itself*. It therefore can be no criticism at this stage to insist that absolute

knowing is conditioned by what is effectively the transcendental unity of apperception, that is, the organization of the totality of experienced otherness from the point of view of a single experiencer;[11] on the contrary, it is the critique that is at odds with itself, since, like the beautiful soul, it falsely posits itself as something that can escape the circuit of necessary and mutual trespass and thereby shows itself to have a view of itself (an empirical ego) that is at odds with its reality (its transcendental ego). Even so, however, this recognition that experienced *otherness* is always *experienced* otherness is not enough to understand the argument of absolute knowing; for this logical feature does not differentiate the stance of absolute knowing from the stance of simple desire. This notion gives the 'major premise' of absolute knowing, but we still have to see the definitive determination that differentiates absolute knowing from all the other species of experience and allows it to make the claim of having completed its project of self-identification. We see this definitive determination in its claim to demonstrate *concretely how* its object sanctions, or rather, how its object demands, its act of recognition; that is, it will have to show how the object 'asks for it,' where what it asks for is the supportive fulfilment of its own latent potential, which is the request to be understood.

The task of this absolute knowing is to comprehend its experience as a unified totality. This comprehension must be a systematization, a 'theodicy,'[12] that posits the determinations of experience as the expression of an animating force, and already we have seen a variety of reasons why it must include its own act in this comprehension (since this act constitutes one of the moments of the totality) and include it as the definitive moment (since this act provides the ground of the unity of the experience). To integrate this comprehension of the self within the systematization of experience, however, we shall have to show the *systematic* need for this self. We have seen the a priori ground for this need as the major premise, but the a posteriori ground for this claim is what uniquely characterizes absolute knowing. This will be the 'concrete' presentation I have mentioned, and it is precisely the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*[13]

The basis for this demonstration is to be found in the arguments we have already considered with respect to *Geist* as the transcendental ego or 'real self' of the self-conscious self. We saw in relation to Antigone that this real self determined for her what would count for her as her object, and what would count as the legitimate means for dealing with her object, and that this had the force of duty, or the lived imperative to operate in this fashion. The real self, in other words, provided the ground for

the material and the form of her action and the ground for the act itself or, again, it provided object, method, and desire: it did not do this consistently, especially with respect to the issue of desire, but it did so none the less. What *we* have done *in our phenomenology of 'True Spirit*,' in Chapter VI, Section A, is to show *how* this is so; that is, we have 'forgiven' Antigone's action by showing how her operations serve to fulfil demands that she finds set for her by her situation. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a whole performs exactly the same function with respect to itself, and it is this that provides the substance and the justification for absolute knowing; it is, in other words, the phenomenology of its own phenomenology.¹⁴

What makes absolute knowing complete, that is, what lets it fulfil its project, is that it is the act of showing how it has been compelled to do what it has done. Absolute knowing amounts to telling the story of how it has come to have the object it has and how it has been driven to adopt its method; or, again, it is the comprehension of its situation that shows how its operation is the resolution of an animating tension within its world. What absolute knowing must show is that *the material conditions of its existence are such as to demand the systematic synthesis.* To show this would be to show how responsibly living up to the demands of the situation produces absolute knowing. This can be put more strongly. Since *Geist,* which provides both object and method of operations for the singular self, dictates a certain course of action, and since *Geist* provides the arena, it is really the real self itself that acts through the act of the singular self. Thus, absolute knowing rests its claim on its demonstration of the constitutive imperative within the dynamic of equal recognition to totalize and systematize experience, since it thereby shows the situation to be comprehending itself. Absolute knowing must be, and must show itself to be, the activating of a dynamic already inherent in its material,¹⁵ such that it recognizes itself as providing a space within which the demands of the object/body are brought to bear on itself; that is, the method of interpretation must already be the dynamism of the object, and the object thus read must be that same body itself, now unified according to the demands of its own dynamic.¹⁶ Further, this comprehension must necessarily be *retrospective,* since its project of universal forgiveness – of seeing the necessity in all determinations – must include its recognition of the necessity of *its own act,* which can occur only if it sees its own act of self-justification as being its compulsion to provide that which its situation is compelled to need.¹⁷ The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is precisely the articulation of this argument, and our analyses of the demands of self-consciousness have developed the same argument. Absolute knowing is

what we have been working at all along, and it is what we have completed in understanding the logic of conscience, since conscience was precisely the *lived imperative* to see the determinations of experience as asking to be understood; *Geist* showed the compulsion *that the demands of its situation forced upon the singular self always* to be adopting a found method in relation to a found object, and conscience showed itself to be the only consistent way of responding to these demands.[18] Precisely what has *already* been shown is that 'I' always acts for 'we,' and absolute knowing is just the acceptance of this situation, and the concrete analysis of how it has in fact come about.

To sum up, then, it is precisely the writing of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that is the action that institutes the culmination of conscience; it is the self understood as a philosophical response to its social situation, and, as we shall see, it is that selfhood for whom its embodying *phusis* is the *logos* through which it sees itself as the *hexis* that it is. I want to make one final observation about this situation of conscientious systematization before concluding with a discussion of this body of absolute knowing.

c. Communication: Language, Religion and Logic

I want to make a digression, but an important one for understanding what is involved in this position and where it can lead. We have seen in conscience and its culmination in systematic science that the entire medium of existence – that out of which existence is constructed and that which forms the founding operations of existence – is *logos*, or the body as expressive (which will be discussed below). What this means is that self-conscious selfhood is completed when it finds itself to be engaged in discourse, in a system fundamentally to be understood as an effort at (self-)communication. Given that this is the culminating 'name' of existence, then, we can see that our efforts at dealing adequately with existence will be efforts at learning how to communicate, which means learning how to send and receive, read and write. Our argument is properly about the dialectic of selfhood and its embodiment, and this argument is completed in the transition from conscience to absolute knowing and does not require reference to religion; none the less, this notion of embodiment in systems of self-communication does have implications for understanding what is involved in the Hegelian philosophy of religion.

Hegel's phenomenology of religion is essentially the phenomenology of systems of human communication – systems of language. Religion is

precisely the system of discourse according to which we communicate ourselves to ourselves.[19] Since our argument has shown that this project of self-communication is that with which we are always engaged, we can conclude that religion is the best name for the basic phenomenon of the experience of self-conscious selves.[20] This is why, first, the phenomenology of self-consciousness (Chapters I to VI) must be brought to completion before the phenomenology of religion is engaged in Chapter VII; for only in the completed concept of self-conscious selfhood in conscience do we have the adequate conceptual orientation to comprehend *the basic phenomenon of self-conscious life,* namely, religion. Expressed in terms of the dialectic of selfhood, this is to say that religion is the basic phenomenon of self-consciousness as a 'we'; Chapter VI, '*Geist,*' deals with a self-conscious selfhood that is not aware of itself as a 'we'-self, and the dynamic of this chapter is precisely aimed at developing this level of self-consciousness. Chapters I to VI are thus necessary to bring the singular self-consciousness to the recognition that it is already a 'we.'[21] Expressed in terms of the dialectic of the body, this is to say that religion is the basic phenomenon of self-conscious embodiment as *logos;* Chapter VI, '*Geist,*' deals with the development of the institutional embodiment of self-conscious selfhood that does not adequately (institutionally) recognize its own character as institutional embodiment, and the dynamic of this chapter is precisely aimed at developing such a self-adequate embodiment. The dialectic of the body in Chapters IV to VI is thus necessary to develop an institutional embodiment for self-conscious selfhood that is adequate to accommodate the necessity of discursive embodiment. Religion is that 'holy communion,' that 'we,' that is spirit, and all discourse is, by definition, religious.[22]

Our argument has followed the logic of embodiment by starting with a concept of the body of the natural organism and developing from that point a comparable concept of the body of self-conscious selfhood, and this has led us to recognize the primacy of expression for the embodiment of free self-consciousness. Equally, however, an argument could begin from the notion of the expression of thought, and such an argument would begin where we end (with art and religion) and would proceed to recognize that these forms initially are only abstract or one-sided forms of the expression of thought, which have to be brought to identify their own projects with what we now call the more primitive forms of the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood. Thus, whether we begin with the 'secular' or with the 'sacred,' the argument must proceed to a logical reconciliation of these two realms with the primacy of the body as expressive,

or expression as embodied. Let me elaborate briefly on what it means to take religion as the basic phenomenon of the body as *logos*.

Just as it is a mistake to confuse Hegel's transcendental arguments with the *Vorstellungen* in which they are presented, it is a mistake to think that one has understood the concept of something when one can simply recognize it as a phenomenon. Hegel's phenomenology of religion deals with familiar phenomena of human life, but, as Hegel notes in his 'Preface,' the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not yet understood,[23] and what Hegel means by religion is not familiar. Religion is the living discourse that provides the mediative systems of signification by which the community of self-conscious selves can recognize and hold itself together as such; it is essentially the phenomenon of instituting a language in the mutual acceptance of which a 'we' shares a common self-consciousness. Thus, the core phenomenon of religion comes much closer to the founding role we identified for *Sittlichkeit* than it does to the reflective phenomenon of 'faith' in the world of *Bildung*,[24] just as the phenomenon of law in general has more fundamentally to be identified with the immediate, rather than the reflective, commitment.[25] Hegel's phenomenology of religion thus follows the dialectic of the founding systems of self-characterization, or, more literally, self-imagination (*Vorstellungen*) that make it possible for a community to engage in common discourse.

Where does that leave our discourse? It may not seem that we have had to have recourse to a system of imagination – a system of *Vorstellungen* – to make our philosophical account. In fact, however, we have. Our discourse throughout has been premised on the categories of speculative logic, that is, concepts such as 'being-for-self,' 'particularity,' 'reflection,' 'syllogism,' and so on. These are functioning members of a form of religious discourse because they are the categories that allow for a communicative communion of self-conscious selves in which each can find the recognition of others in its commitment to its own selfhood. They are categories that are true for any one self precisely because they are the product of that absolute knowing that is the completed system of mutual recognition in which what is spoken from the point of the view of the 'I' is necessarily equally spoken from the point of view of the 'we.'[26] Absolute knowing is thus the project of fulfilling the self-communication of the absolute, and the systematic articulation of a science of communication (logic) and the science of how the discourse has been carried out (*Realphilosophie*) is the culmination of the inescapable commitment of every self-conscious self to conscience and religion in that it culminates in recognizing this inescapability. Science

does not need *Vorstellungen* any less than any less reflective religious community needs them; science, however, knows the images *as* images, and through thus identifying itself with its religion, it achieves the freedom that comes with self-determination.

At this stage, however, these can remain only undefended claims, and anticipate further study. Rather than pursue this project, we must return to the ground we have legitimately covered in our analysis of absolute knowing and articulate the logical determinations of the body of this culminating form of self-conscious selfhood.

3. The Body of Knowledge: *Logos* and *Pathêtikos Nous*

We have already seen, first through our analysis of conscientious forgiveness, and now through our amplification of this in our analysis of absolute knowing, that the body of absolute knowing must have *logos* as its fundamental ontological determination. All that is left for us to do here is to explicate a bit further what this means, and to discuss it in relation to a number of issues that are of concern when the body is discussed.

a. The Sign as the Hexis of Knowing

Within the activity that is absolute knowing, we must, as always, distinguish between a self and a body, where the self is the principle of the unity of the activity, and the body is the material *hexis* that is activated into a functioning unit in and through this activity. The activity of absolute knowing is simply the holding together as a system of the totality of its materiality; thus, for absolute knowing, its object and its body are indistinguishable. The life of absolute knowing is identical with its activity of knowing the object,[27] and thus the material *hexis* for its living and the material *hexis* for its knowing must be the same; that is, that out of which its body is constructed is identical to that out of which the object is constructed, and the act of informing this – the act of constructing – is likewise one and the same act. Thus neither the body nor the object of absolute knowing is strictly identical with either the body or the object of the self that is immediately antecedent to absolute knowing; rather, the cognitive or existential orientation, the material conditions of support, and the animating selfhood together provide the materials that make possible the animating of the body of absolute knowing. This new body, indeed, is not produced by adding new 'parts'; rather, it is just this old material, but this material as now informed by – formed by the institu-

tionalization of – the activity of absolute knowing. Let me just recall a few points to make this distinction clearer.

All along, we have had to recognize the necessity of the formal dimension within the body; that is, we have known since our analysis of Hegel's Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' that the body of the living being could not be just qualitatively indifferent matter, but that the material conditions of action themselves had to be already formed matters and, further, not just statically formed matters but actual systems of action. Thus, we called the material of the body its *hexis*, intending thereby to call attention to the structured (*gebildet*) dimension of the material conditions. It was this category that allowed us to make the transition to the body as social, that is, to the body as the institutionalization of a system of *Recht*, which acts as the un-self-consciously functioning mediating system of social relations on the basis of which intersubjective life is possible. Here again, then, we are seeing the necessity of acknowledging a change in the body because of a change in the formal dimension: with absolute knowing we do not add on new material determinations; rather, we hold together the already existing formed matter – the *hexis* – in a new unity. The nature of the transformation it has undergone is like that we initially diagnosed in our consideration of the transition from the struggle to the death to the relation of master and slave; that is, we have here a transformation of the body from being the unconscious mediative system for satisfying the will to being a gesture, that is, the system for communicating the will. Now, however, we have come to recognize all determinations of being as being constitutive members of this body; in other words, absolute knowing is that act in which all determinations of being are taken up as its bodily organs, but they function as organs (that is, constitutive members of the mediative system of support) *by* being *signs*.[28] For the absolutely knowing self, the body must have as its definitive operation the function of gesture, which means *logos* is not just the particular mode in which the body is functioning, but is its definitive conceptual determination. We can pursue this issue further by reflecting on the categories of *phusis* and *logos* and on the difference between the body as lived (subject) and the body as known (object).

b. The Body as Subject, Object, and Object-for-Itself

We must begin by returning to our initial distinction of the concepts of *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos* and consider how these three determinations are not simply three indifferent sides of the same coin, but themselves are

dynamic moments that pull the body in different directions. Indeed, what we have been watching throughout our analysis is how the internal dynamic of these moments has systematically propelled us through three stages of analysis in which each of these moments in turn provides the general logical context. Let us consider these different determinations.

According to the form our analysis has taken, we can differentiate these three moments as follows. Within the living organism *phusis* is that which is *in-itself* unconscious. Thus, within any bodily system we can determine a moment as *phusis*, and this will be the moment of unreflective operation; equally, we can consider a *phusis* proper, or something whose definitive ontological determination is precisely to be in-itself unconscious, not in relation to this or that shape of consciousness, but in relation to the whole system of being.[29] This is the world of nature; for (recalling the definitions of nature that we studied in relation to the first sections of Hegel's Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness') it is precisely our definition of nature that it is what needs another to effect its return-into-self. Our analysis of self-conscious selfhood has shown us (a) that every level of self-conscious selfhood has a constitutive moment of embodying *phusis* that is uniquely defined in relation to the form the self-conscious selfhood takes, and (b) that this embodiment must always be systematically tied to *in themselves phusikos* bodies, that is, natural bodies functioning in the natural world.

Now *hexis*, understood as habit, or a *phusis* that has been institutionalized (a 'second' nature), is that which *has been made* unconscious. It is what was conspicuous, but has become inconspicuous. The *hexis* of human life most properly so called we saw in Hegel's Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' to be a *Sittlichkeit*, that is, the institutions of a social world or 'culture' (which conveniently translates *Bildung*, which in turn translates *hexis*).[30] *Hexis*, or the world of culture, is the second nature in which the spiritual world has embodied itself. It is important to recognize why this *hexis* can be called a *phusis*. Although it is true that, from the point of view of the singular self that undergoes integration into the society, this is the developing of a 'habit,' from the point of view of the consciously functioning self that has come to be through the instituting,[31] these habitual operations *in themselves* are unconscious; that is, the extent to which they are not unconscious is the extent to which the spiritual self *does not exist*. Thus, again, we must understand *hexis* as both (a) the constitutive moment of qualitative determinateness that characterizes any bodily system, and (b) the body that is *in itself hexis*, that is, the *Sittlichkeit*, which is the only form of body that can support self-conscious life.

If *phusis* is what *is* unconscious, and *hexis* is what *has become* unconscious, *logos* is the unconscious that *needs to be made* self-conscious. *Phusis* (whether 'given' or 'second' nature) is that mediation that is *overlooked* in order to get to the object it provides. *Logos* is that mediation now making itself the object. *Logos* is the unconscious that needs to come to full-consciousness. And, just as we can only return to ourselves through other-ness, otherness as *logos* has its own *ek-stasis* – it fulfilling – in and through our act of interpreting it. To be *logos* is to call upon a reader to interpret. *Logos* is precisely that which sanctions the act of interpretation. As is the case in the concepts of the other two determinations of body, we see two aspects to the concept of *logos*. First, it is the moment of being-for-other which characterizes any bodily system, that is, any bodily system is vulner-able to observation and interpretation, and this moment of the body is actualized only through being recognized. But equally, there is a bodily system for which *logos* is the definitive determination, and this body-as-*logos* properly so called is, of course, precisely the body of the self that has achieved self-consciousness as absolute knowing. Again, just as we have seen that the first two determinations, *phusis* and *hexis*, are in tension, such that they properly embody opposed forms of life (respectively, nature and culture[32]), this third determination, *logos* cannot rest peace-fully with the others, but can only achieve its own proper form through a struggle with the others in which it refuses to either one the position of primacy for embodying self-conscious life. Let me further clarify this con-cept of the body as *logos* by considering this internal opposition.

When we are considering *phusis*, we are considering the animating project of an active system, which can explain why the behaviour of the system takes the form that it does. For absolute knowing, however, that is, for the body as *logos*, the only project that can correspond to this charac-terization is the project to become self-conscious; thus we must say that the *phusis* of absolute knowing is to become self-conscious. But the very notion of *phusis* is the notion of that which in itself *resists* self-conscious-ness. Absolute knowing, then, is committed to the project of leaving noth-ing as *simply* natural; that is, whatever it cannot account for must count as a refutation to its claim to absoluteness. For absolute knowing, then – that is, for the self-conscious body for which all the determinations of being (*Sein*) are its bodily organs – being is entirely *mediated*[33]; but the very concept of being is to be *immediate*.[34] Thus, *logos*, when it attains its proper form, will not simply rest peacefully with *phusis* but demands that the lat-ter be only a one-sided determination that cannot sustain itself in the absence of a founding relation to the former.[35] But if the body as *logos*

cannot be a body that is simply natural, equally it cannot be a body that is simply cultural, that is, a simple *hexis.*

Again, in *hexis* we operated with an inseparability of two determinations which cannot both be taken up into *logos. Hexis* was the 'built-up'-ness of the body, which, in its proper form, had to be understood as a product of self-conscious initiative. If *phusis* is a *pros hen* equivocal, exemplified most properly in the world of nature, *hexis* is a *pros hen* equivocal exemplified most properly in the world of pure culture, which, indeed, bears its name, *Bildung.* What we have learned in the dialectic of self-consciousness, which has led us to the body as *logos,* however, is that the self cannot simply take responsibility for its construction of its *hexis*-body, but must equally see its self as a product of that body. Indeed, precisely what the absolutely knowing *logos*-body has as its characteristic act is the demonstration that it is as much a product of its *hexis* as is this *hexis* a product of it.

We can then sum up how *logos* is the *Aufhebung* of both *phusis* and *hexis,* that is, how it completes the dynamic of each determination only in and through the act of superseding the ability of each to maintain itself as the self-identity it proposes for itself, in the following characterization: *logos* is the body of absolute knowing by having as its *phusis* the activity of coming to self-consciousness *as* the product of its material *hexis;* this means, among other things, that absolute knowing is that stage of self-conscious selfhood in and for which its body is identical with its transcendental ego. The other articulation we adopted for what it means to have a body as *logos* was to say that absolute knowing has for its body the infinite system of signs. This formulation will let us show the oppositional structure of *logos, phusis,* and *hexis* in a different fashion.

Our argument has allowed us to conclude that the element of absolute knowing – its body – is *logos,* that is, existence understood as communication or language. This, then, is the fundamental ontological determination of whatever counts as being; to be, that is, is to be a sign. This conclusion allows us to see something about the structure of the system of science. If to be is to be a sign, then the science must be founded in the science of the sign as such; this is precisely what is articulated in Hegel's *Science of Logic.* We have already noted (in Chapter 3, n.66) that reflection, or the relation of show and essence, which is the subject of Book II of the *Science of Logic,* is the basic logical form of the sign. Book I of the *Science of Logic,* the 'Doctrine of Being,' is the presentation of the dynamic by which the concept of being as such shows itself to be in truth a sign, that is, essence. Books II and III work out the concrete logic of the sign as

such, with Book III, the 'Doctrine of the Concept,' showing the inseparability of the concept of the sign from the concept of a founding self-consciousness. Thus, the *Science of Logic* as a whole is the science of communication as such, which shows why being as such is always inscribed within the self-conscious sign system that is the dialectical method of absolute knowing.

The system is completed in the *Realphilosophie*, that is, the science of nature and the science of spirit. It should be clear enough from our discussion so far that, whereas the *Science of Logic* is the science of *logos* as such, the sciences of nature and spirit are, respectively, the sciences of *phusis* proper and *hexis* proper. What our *Science of Logic* has already shown us, however, is that both of the latter are forms of *sign systems*, or systems of actual signs. Thus, neither nature nor culture exists simply on its own, but each is, rather, a moment in the overall dialectic of the sign, or of the project of self-communication.[36] Thus, regarding the traditional question regarding the independence of the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften*, we can now see why they are necessarily not independent, but both are, rather, intrinsically incomplete articulations of the only absolute science, the science of language. We can thus say (equally of its self and its body) that self-consciousness properly speaking is neither simply natural nor simply cultural, but that its essence is language as such, which is the actuality of a 'we' in self-animated self-expression and self-interpretation. Thus, nature, culture, and logic are the spheres in which the moments of, respectively, *phusis, hexis,* and *logos* are one-sidedly emphasized within the overarching concept of the body as *logos.* Let me conclude this part of the analysis with an interpretation, in the light of these notions of the body, of Hegel's claim that substance must become subject.

Our analysis of absolute knowing and the body as *logos* has shown that absolute knowing is *the body itself* become self-conscious; rather as Hegel says that substance must become subject.[37] From the beginning of our analysis with the concept of life, we have known that the body is, so to speak, conscious; that is, we saw the need to posit the body itself as an intentional system, indeed, the founding intentional system on the basis of whose intelligent operations the self-conscious will was able to enter into immediate relations with the object of its desire; our whole concept of *phusis* has been rooted in this notion of a non-reflective discriminative practice. What we have seen is that the only body that can support a self-conscious self is the body *that itself comes to reflect*; that is, only a self-consciousness can adequately embody a completed self-consciousness;

indeed, the completed self-consciousness itself must *be* this self-conscious body. What our phenomenology of the body has been observing, then, is the immanent dynamic of the body of self-consciousness by which it develops itself to the point at which it can reflect on itself and become self-conscious; we have watched the progressive dynamic within this (merely 'conscious') substance by which it ultimately brings itself to self-conscious subjectivity. It is finally with this *logos*, this life of signs that is the body as self-reader, that the disparity between the body as lived and the body as observed is overcome, and this is because the very 'to be' of the life of this body is 'to be read.'

If we reflect back on the path we have traversed, the body simply as observed – that is, the body understood as *only* the abstract moment of *logos* or being-for-another – is where we began in our analysis of Hegel's Chapter V, Section A, 'Observing Reason.' Under reason's abstractly self-identical gaze, the experience of the body (that is, the reflective relation to the body) was of an inert *res extensa*, and the reflective relation of this self-conscious self to its own embodiment culminated in the absurdity of phrenology. In other words, not only does it not follow that one's body is what one thinks it to be, in fact the methods of observing reason preclude in principle an adequate approach to the body. This was articulated conceptually as reason's failure to operate with a concept of unity in and through difference.

The problem of this relation of observation is not, however, simply a conceptual one, and we can see this if we remember the characterization of the body as *phusis*. The body simply as *phusis* is where we began in our analysis of the body as such in 'Life,' in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' and at that point we defined the *phusis*-body 'adverbially' as the self as it comports itself non-reflectively towards its world; as *phusis*, then, the body is not some fixed determinate being, but characterizes, rather, a *way* of being of the self. Returning to observing reason, then, we can see that the very fact that an approach to the body takes place within a context of reflection must automatically misrepresent the body, since the authentic experience of the body is to *live* it.[38] This is a problem in principle, not just a problem for Chapter V, 'Reason'; for, as long as it is definitive of the body that it be an un-self-conscious mode of comportment, the only adequate 'knowing' of the body will be that very immediate knowing that is doing. Thus we could re-articulate the beautiful soul's attempted criticism of absolute knowing by arguing that the effort to comprehend its body that is the animating project of absolute knowing is precluded in principle from being successful because the act of reflective totalization

and integration necessarily transforms the living *phusis* of its amorphous embodiment into a neatly packaged, dead, misrepresentation.

But, just as this criticism was ineffective when articulated in terms of the logic of self-consciousness, it is ineffective when articulated in terms of the body. The reason for this should be clear: the very transformation of the self that *is* the enacting of absolute knowing is the transformation in which 'substance becomes subject'; that is, it is the body *becoming self-conscious*. This, again, is just the same point we made above in considering the dialectical relations of *phusis* and *logos*, at which point we concluded that the culmination of the development of the body in *logos* is precisely the self-transcendence of the category of *phusis*. So, whereas we began with the two opposed approaches to the body – reason which acknowledged only *logos*, and life, which acknowledged only *phusis* – our whole progress throughout this analysis could be rearticulated in terms of the dynamic of the difference between these two aspects of body, and precisely where this dialectic has concluded (by way of the mediation of the moment of *hexis*) is in the body, whose very *phusis* is *logos*.[39]

Hegel thought it fitting to end his *Encyclopaedia* with a quotation from Aristotle, and I want now to do the same thing. Our analysis throughout could be construed as an Aristotelian response to Cartesianism, and I shall turn to a famous Aristotelian text, which is often taken to be evidence of Aristotle's ultimate Cartesianism,[40] but I want to indicate how our analysis of the Hegelian philosophy of body actually can allow us to conclude the exact opposite.

c. Mind and Body

In *De Anima* (Book III, Chapter 4) Aristotle argues that mind, '*nous*,' in order to be the 'form of forms,' that is, in order to be capable of an openness to all determinations of being, itself must not begin with a determinateness of its own that would limit its openness. This Aristotle uses as an argument that mind cannot have any bodily organ. I quote the translation of W.S. Hett (slightly modified): 'Hence the mind, too, can have no characteristic except its capacity to receive. That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgments) has no actual existence until it thinks. So it is unreasonable to suppose it to have been mixed with the body; for in that case it would become somehow qualitative, e.g., hot or cold, or would even be some organ, like the sensitive one; but in fact it is none.'[41] A complete exegesis of this passage would allow us to connect up the notion

that mind is only actual – only is – in its thinking with the notion above that absolute knowing is self-caused, but I want to note only how Aristotle discusses the relation to the body. What he does not want is for the mind to have a *determinate* bodily organ. To the extent that it had such, it would be this *and not that*; that is, it would still be characterized by an unreconciled relation to otherness.

Now when Aristotle here discusses the non-existence of a bodily organ for the mind, and when he calls mind separate (*chôristos*) (in *De Anima*, Book III, Chapter 5), it is often taken to mean that the mind is, for Aristotle, a really distinct, non-extended, Cartesian *res cogitans*. Yet we can see that the reason for the objection to body is to its *determinate* character,[42] and this problem is solved in absolute knowing (mind in its actual existence as thinking) in virtue of the fact that, for it, *all determinations of being are its bodily organism*, and equally we can see that mind is thus *separate* in the sense that there is no other in relation to which it is defined. It is separate in that it is the *only* existence: it is self-determining, self-contained.

Furthermore, *De Anima*, III, 5 announces the relation of active and passive intellect, and we can see, from our analysis of the relation of self and body generally, and of absolute knowing and its body in particular, that this body of absolute knowing is precisely that material *hexis* that is systematically unified by its act of knowing; that is, its body is equally its object. Thus the body of absolute knowing – the absolute *logos* – is precisely passive mind, *pathêtikos nous*.[43] These texts of Aristotle, then, sound Cartesian only if one has not yet worked through the logical dynamics of Hegelian absolute knowing. In absolute knowing the body, as *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*, reaches its culmination as *pathêtikos nous*.

Conclusion

We have watched the intrinsic development that is the dialectic of the concept of body within and between the three moments of *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos* that characterize the concept of body, and we have seen the embodiment of self-conscious selfhood develop from a fundamentally *physical* body through a primarily *ethical* body to a fundamentally *communicative* body. These three stages are characterized by the primacy of the moments of, respectively, *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*, although all three moments of the body are present under each of these three overriding determinations.

We have learned that the body of self-conscious selfhood is necessarily

uniquely dependent upon a participant member of a natural world; that it is a social world of *Sittlichkeit*, and that it needs to be understood. The last aspect is the role the body plays is the ongoing project of the self-conscious self to constitute a world in which the natural and social orders achieve a self-conscious communion as a 'we,' and thus the ultimate name for the body is passive mind.

Our initial phenomenology of self-conscious selfhood revealed the logical structure of this selfhood to be 'unhappy consciousness' or the dynamic relation of an empirical and a transcendental ego. It is this conception of selfhood that has guided our whole endeavour, and it allows us to describe the situation of embodied humanity with which we have concluded.

The logic of unhappy consciousness reveals that synthesis is always enacted through the singular self, such that that self is compelled retrospectively to announce, 'so that's who I was'; that is, the synthesis in which the empirical ego is brought into identity with the transcendental ego is always a self-presentation of the *ti ên einai*, the 'what it was to be,' of a determinate, material situation. We have now seen that for absolute knowing, its transcendental ego is identical with its body. Thus, what the singular self is able to do in this world is to work at building the *hexis* that will be the potentiality, the *dunamis*, for this synthesis, that is, one can only ever struggle to bring the situation to the time of ripeness in which it will enact its self-comprehension through the singular ego. All our efforts can be only towards preparing the situation in which we can self-commune as thought thinking itself, *noêsis tês noêseôs*.

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Appendix: Hegel's Explicit Remarks on 'Body'

Hegel's general 'off-hand' use of '*Leib*' and '*Körper*' usually focuses only on the natural body of the simply living being. His most explicit discussion of (*naturliche*) *Leiblichkeit*, (*naturliche*) *Körperlichkeit, Leib,* and *Körper* in relation to spirit, is in *Encyclopaedia,* section 401, and *Zusatz.*[1] That the spiritual body differs *qua* body from the natural body is clear: 'In physiology the intestines and organs are treated only as moments of the animal organism, but they *also constitute a systematic embodying of what is spiritual,* and so come in for quite another interpretation.'[2] The discussion of the role of the body 'in human inwardness'[3] considers the role of the body in the most primitive forms of spiritual subjectivity in a way that reveals dynamic dimensions of bodiliness. Essentially, body is defined here as the restricted sphere within which the self can confront itself and that plays the role in relation to that self of enabling resistance-free communication.[4] In the following pages of this *Zusatz* there is a discussion of corporeality in relation to signs and in relation to 'universal' issues like ethics; the material dealing with signs and language is relevant to my own discussion of the body as *logos,* but the purpose of the discussion of the body in relation to universal concerns bears little resemblance to that of my own examination of this issue, since Hegel's concern in this text is to show that the body of the *natural* soul is not that in which ethical concerns primarily manifest themselves. Sections 403 and 409 also deal explicitly with the body; here, Hegel's chief interest is to insist (i) on the intrinsic relation of the natural soul to its body and (ii) on the need, again, to not mistake this corporeal subject for the subject of more sophisticated spiritual life.[5] Showing that the subject of more sophisticated spiritual life remains a corporeal subject, but not this simply natural one, has been the objective of my work in this book.

The discussion of the body in Chapter V, Section A, 'Observing Reason,' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, again focuses primarily on the body of the merely living subject. Hegel's main points here that are relevant to this study are (i) his insistence on recognizing behaviour rather than matter as the body and (ii) his focus on the role of the body as expressive.[6] Some of these texts have been discussed peripherally in relation to the analysis of life in the notes to Chapter 3, above. Overall, the explicit treatment of the body, both here and in the *Encyclopaedia*, unsystematically offers a view of the body that is compatible with the systematic philosophy of the body that I have developed in this work. Let us consider further how Hegel explicitly refers to the body within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; for these uses, too, nicely accord with the conception of the body unfolded in the course of this study.

The phenomenology of the body, like the phenomenology of nature and the phenomenology of art, has no proper place in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, not because it is some excluded 'other' to Hegel's analysis, but because it does not happen to be the subject of the study and its inclusion would amount to a digression. None the less, periodically Hegel does talk about body – about *Körper* and *Leib* – within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Other terms, most notably *Gestaltung, Gliederung,* and *Dasein,* are frequently used by Hegel in ways that could also be profitably illuminated by reference to the dialectic of embodiment, but these concepts are subject-matter for another study.

It is primarily within three sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that *Körper* and *Leib* come up for discussion:[7] in the 'Observation of Nature' portion of 'Observing Reason,' *Körper* and its variants appear a number of times;[8] in the section of 'Observing Reason' entitled 'Observation of the Relation of Self-Consciousness to Its Immediate Actuality: Physiognomy and Phrenology,' *Leib* and its variants receive considerable attention;[9] finally, variants of *Körper, Leib,* and *Fleisch* are used in Chapter VII, 'Religion,' especially in the section called 'the living work of art.'[10]

In 'Observation of Nature,' body is treated as the subject of the laws of physics and mechanics, as in 'the law of falling bodies'; most of these uses are in the context of Hegel's argument that a universal (like electricity or heat) must not be thought to be a body.[11]

In the treatment of physiognomy and phrenology, what is developed is the concept of the body as the expression – both given and achieved – of the self[12]; the focus of these texts is the problem of identifying immediate, natural, organic actuality with such an expression of self-conscious selfhood.

It is the references to body in Chapter VII, 'Religion,' that are most noteworthy, especially the usage in the treatment of the 'Art Religion.' Here Hegel is interested in the corporeality of spirit as such,[13] and the point is that the 'living work of art' that is the Greek religious festival itself is 'the living corporeality of essence';[14] that is, the performance of the institutionalized celebration of spirit *itself is the body of spirit.*

There is no systematic philosophy of the body articulated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but the discovery of the inability of immediate actuality to live up to the concept of body (in 'Physiognomy and Phrenology') and the discovery of the embodiment of spirit in the ritualized communal celebration of spirit (in the 'Art Religion') do reveal some of the salient features of what I have argued is the philosophy of body implied by the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

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Notes

Introduction

1 This is the way the project is formulated in the 'Introduction,' M88, W/C 68; Hegel's discussion of this program can be found in the 'Preface,' M36, W/C 28. *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseyns* was also part of the original titling of the work; for a discussion, see W/C 547–8, Nicolin, 'Zum Titelproblem der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*' and Verene, *Hegel's Recollection*, 'Appendix,' 121–6.

2 For the 'Anthropology' sections, see Greene, *Hegel on the Soul: A Speculative Anthropology*, Stegmaier, 'Leib und Leben: zum Hegel-Nietzsche-Problem'; McCumber, 'Hegel on Habit'; Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, 2–22; Reyburn, *The Ethical Theory of Hegel*, chapter V; and van der Meulen, 'Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele und Geist'; *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 19 (1979), is devoted to *Hegels Philosophische Psychologie*, hrsg. v. Henrich. Petry, in his notes on *Hegel's Philosophy of · Subjective Spirit*, Vol II, 'Anthropology,' makes some remarks which bear on the issue of body. Derrida, in *Glas*, offers an analysis of Hegel that addresses the concept of habit in Hegel. See also Scheiber, '"Habitus" als Schlüssel zu Hegels Daseinslogik'; Elder, 'Hegel's Teleology and the Relation between Mind and Brain'; and Dodd, 'The Body as "Sign and Tool" in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*.'

For 'Physiognomy and Phrenology' in the 'Observing Reason' section, see Herbenick, 'Hegel's Concept of Embodiment'; MacIntyre, 'Hegel on Faces and Skulls'; and von der Luft, 'The Birth of Spirit for Hegel out of the Travesty of Medicine.' Marcuse, in *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, addresses the notion of life in relation to the 'Observing Reason' section of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

See Taylor, *Hegel*, 81–90, and 'Hegel and the Philosophy of Action,' for a general account of Hegel's conception of body. Taylor is, as far as I know, the only commentator who has taken an approach similar to my own. Like me, he

argues that (i) the basic conception of the relation of life to its body is rooted in Aristotelian physics, and (ii) the expression of thought in language and gesture literally embodies thought; but unlike me, Taylor does not unite these notions into a systematic theory of the body and is thus left with two determinations of body that seem unrelated, without recognizing that, in good Hegelian fashion, the one is simply the culmination of the development of the logic of the other. Precisely what his analysis lacks is the category I shall call *hexis*, which is the category in which the *development* of the body can be understood and that thus mediates between the immediate form of the body as simple Aristotelian *phusis* and its completed form in expression or language.

3 Taylor, *Hegel*, 81–90 and *passim*, explicitly links Hegel's approach to embodiment to Aristotle, calling Hegel 'an anti-dualist who overcomes dualism by uniting Aristotelianism with expressivism' (81); Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, 263, links Hegel's account of the living body to Aristotle; Stegmaier, 'Leib und Leben: zum Hegel-Nietzsche-Problem,' 187, links Hegel's anti-dualist account of body to Aristotle; van der Meulen, 'Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele und Geist,' 253, 259, 269–73, discusses Hegel's 'Anthropology' in relation to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; von der Luft, 'The Birth of Spirit for Hegel out of the Travesty of Medicine,' *passim*, posits two metaphysical approaches, a hierarchical (Aristotelian) approach, and a reductionistic (Cartesian) approach, and, using texts drawn primarily from 'Physiognomy and Phrenology,' argues that Hegel is defending the former approach at the expense of the latter; Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 1–9, contends that Hegel is out to refute Cartesian logic as it appears in any sphere; Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 49, sees Hegel's account of self-consciousness as indebted to Aristotle's account of mind; McCumber, "Hegel and Hamann: Ideas and Life," links Hegel's philosophy with the expressivism of Hamann; and Greene, 'Natural Life and Subjectivity,' *passim*, shows how Hegel articulates his philosophy of natural life and subjectivity in terms of Aristotelian categories (although Greene's point is to show the difference between Hegel and Aristotle, which he is able to do, I believe, only by constructing a straw Aristotle). In general, what I shall be doing is giving a systematic articulation to the implications of these already current ideas.

4 *Physics*, II, *passim*, especially chapter 1, 192b8–16. See also the general discussion of *phusis* in *Metaphysics*, D.4, 1014b16–1015a19, especially 1014b36. See *Philosophy of Nature*, section 360 and remark and especially the *Zusatz.*

5 The principle of motion in physical substances with complex bodies is called *psuche*; see *De Anima*, II.1, *passim*, especially 412a11–16. The progressive degrees of *empsucha* – of ensouled bodies – is articulated throughout *De Anima.* I have discussed my interpretation of these texts in 'Aristotle's Animative Epis-

temology' and 'Self-Consciousness and the Tradition in Aristotle's Psychology.' The status of the elements is more complex than I indicate here.

6 *De Partibus Animalium* is an example of an analysis of the bodily organization that corresponds to activities with a high degree of organization. In general, all of Hegel's treatment of organics in Part III of the *Philosophy of Nature* should be read for the concept of body in relation to natural existence (*phusis*). (Note especially his remark about *Habitus* in section 370 [368 in 3rd edition]).

7 See also 'The Philosopher and his Shadow,' in *Signs*. This issue of the body of anatomy vs. the lived body is also thematic for Sartre in *L'Être et le Néant* in the section entitled 'Le Corps,' 353–413.

8 See *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, 166–79. In relation to this notion (which will be a central theme of this work), compare the discussions of property and contract in the *Philosophy of Right*. Compare *La Structure du Comportement*, 227; I have discussed my interpretation of this text in 'Embodiment and Responsibility: Merleau-Ponty and the Ontology of Nature.'

9 For the response to the rationalistic argument against both the Aristotelian and the Merleau-Pontean positions that the whole concept of intentionality must be severed from the concept of embodiment we shall have to wait for the analysis carried out below, especially in Chapter 2.

10 See treatise V.1.

11 Plotinus here alludes to the stoic distinction between the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos*, which is essentially the thought as expressed vs. the thought as in the mind. His point is that the sense in which the thought is in the mind in advance of the expression is not the same as the sense in which it is in the mind after the expression; that is, the soul's – our – self-possession is inherently mediated by the practices of self-expression and self-interpretation.

12 See McCumber, 'Hegel and Hamann: Ideas and Life'; Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism'; Merleau-Ponty, *La Phénoménologie de la Perception*, chapter 6, 'Le Corps comme Expression et la Parole.'

13 M177, W/C 127.

1. Unhappy Consciousness and the Logic of Self-Conscious Selfhood

1 *Genèse et Structure*, I, 184; but whereas Hyppolite understands unhappy consciousness to be the problematic form of self-consciousness, which all the later portions of the book struggle to resolve, I shall argue that Hegel's phenomenology of unhappy consciousness includes the stage of resolution or completion, and that, when understood in its completeness, unhappy consciousness is the successful, completed form of free self-consciousness. I contend that the

later chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are progressively more sophisticated developments of what is implicit in the final (third) form of unhappy consciousness.

2 Scholars who have made the historical connection include Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 100–2, who claims that the 'Unhappy Consciousness' is an analysis (and a poor one) of medieval Christendom; Lauer, in *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 113–24, who treats 'the Unhappy Consciousness' as a 'burlesque' of medieval Christendom; and possibly Shklar, *Freedom and Independence*, 29–30. This view has been rightly criticized by Burbidge, in 'Unhappy Consciousness in Hegel – An Analysis of Medieval Catholicism?'; Hyppolite, in *Genèse et Structure*, I, 172–3, 189 (although his use of the inadequately defined notion of history at I, 214–15, 218, makes his position unclear); and Kojève, in *Introduction à la Lecture*, 180–2. I have addressed this issue in 'Hegel's "Freedom of Self-Consciousness" and Early Modern Epistemology.'

3 M197–201, W/C 136–40.

4 This point comes out most clearly when the 'honest' bumpkin encounters the wit in M521–4, W/C 343–7, especially 344.29–345.2, 345.29–37.

5 See M198–9, W/C 138.9ff for Hegel's references to the historical stoics in this section.

6 Epictetus, *Manual*, 1.

7 Ibid., 6.

8 Hazlitt and Hazlitt (eds), *The Wisdom of the Stoics*, 5.

9 For Hegel's description of this notion of a judgment upon given appearances, see M200, W/C 139.26–31. Cf. M195, W/C 134–5.

10 *Manual*, 8.

11 For this ideal of the 'reasonableness' (*Vernünftigkeit*) of assent, see M200, W/C 139.37–8.

12 See M200, W/C 139.10–13.

13 See M479, W/C 317.7–14. Here is where it is important to differentiate portable transcendental psychology from history. This absence of an imperative for *rapprochement* does characterize the logic of the stoic self-consciousness as I have characterized it above, but it does not adequately characterize the standpoint of ancient stoicism as a historical phenomenon. In Hegel's argument, it is precisely the imperative for a *rapprochement* that distinguishes 'reason' from 'stoicism': the stoic remains like the 'self-willed' slave (M196, W/C 136.15–27), a singular self for which its selfhood is constituted as a withdrawal from and indifference to actuality, whereas Reason is doing 'God's' duty, that is, Reason's self is a universal self for which its selfhood is constituted as an imperative to identify with actuality, to do science. In fact, however, ancient stoicism was to some extent characterized by this scientific ideal.

14 See M199, W/C 138.32–6. This is summed up in M201, W/C 140.5–11, in which the transition to scepticism is also initiated; the remark here, 'this thinking consciousness ... is thus only the incomplete negation of otherness. *Withdrawn* from existence [*Dasein*] only into itself, it has not there achieved its consummation as absolute negation of that existence' (emphasis in original), marks stoic negativity as operating on a logic of Being, according to the categories of the *Science of Logic*, that is, as a negation of one determinate being by another. (The logical analysis of this issue is played out, among other places, in the transition from the 'Doctrine of Being' to the 'Doctrine of Essence' in the *Science of Logic*, where the transition is made from an immediate to an absolute negation.)

15 See M197, W/C 137.35–9, for the general notion of free, thinking self-consciousness as that which recognizes itself in its products/judgments. For the abstractness of the judgments in which the stoic recognizes herself, see M197, W/C 137.39–40.8, M199, W/C 138.18–27, and M200, W/C 139.5–140.4.

16 M202–206, W/C 140–4.

17 The corresponding logical move to this discovery that the distinction between the internal and the external itself is a distinction that is posited internally is found in the transition from external to determining reflection in 'The Doctrine of Essence' in the *Science of Logic*.

18 M202, W/C 140.15–21: 'In Scepticism, now, the wholly unessential and non-independent character of this "other" [the independent existence or permanent determinateness that stood over against reflection] becomes explicit *for consciousness*.' Again, M204, W/C 141.24–5: 'what Scepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it.' In the 'Introduction,' Hegel compares his own philosophical method with scepticism, and in the context of this discussion, he notes as the positive contribution of scepticism that it achieves that transformation whereby 'what first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to the level of its way of knowing it' (M87, W/C 67.32–3).

19 M202, W/C 140.36–8.

20 M205, W/C 142.8–18; for Hume, see *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 252. A discussion of related issues by a younger Hegel can be found in 'Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One.' Whether one takes Hume or Sextus as a model, one must remember that one is dealing with theorists of scepticism; what Hegel's account really addresses is a lived psychology of scepticism, and this is probably better represented by the schizophrenic consciousness than by the philosopher.

21 M205, W/C 142.25–8.

22 See Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 180–3, especially 182, for a good account of this.

23 M205, W/C 142.32–143.12.

24 M205, W/C 143.3–5: 'es spricht das absolute *Verschwinden* aus, aber das *Aussprechen* IST, und dies Bewußtsein ist das ausgesprochne Verschwinden' (emphasis in original).

25 Kojève's claim (often repeated by others) that Hegel claims stoicism collapses because it is boring, (*Introduction à la Lecture*), although based on a remark of Hegel (M200, W/C 139.38–140.4), misunderstands the argument; what is wrong with stoicism is that its own principles necessarily lead to scepticism; that is, when pursued rigorously, its own methods preclude its achieving its intended goal. Indeed, this is how Sextus characterizes scepticism, namely, as what a would-be stoic in fact achieves while trying to become a stoic sage; see *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Book I, Chapter 12, Section 26.

26 M207–30, W/C 144–56.

27 M208, W/C 144–5.

28 Note, too, that in this culminating form of self-consciousness we recognize that the ultimate object of consciousness is its own real self; this should be treated as a complementary argument to the argument that ends Chapter III, 'Force and the Understanding,' where the absolute object of consciousness is found in the concrete universal that contains the self in itself.

29 The recognition that the syllogism of unhappy consciousness is the completed *Gestalt* of self-consciousness is the fruit of the tradition begun with Jean Wahl's *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*, which continues in Hyppolite. Kojève does not follow this line of the French interpretation of unhappy consciousness, and his analyses are plagued by his erroneous identification of the dualistic master/slave dialectic as the adequate concept of selfhood; such an identification is unable to escape enlightenment individualism, since it does not locate a dynamic of reality and appearance within the self and cannot accommodate a logic of law as *ethos*.

On the general issue of transcendental psychology, Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, Chapter 2, considers Hegel's development of the notion of a transcendental ego, and his analysis of the 'I' in terms of the cognition of the intrinsic universality of the object is worthwhile; Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism* is entirely devoted to understanding the relationship of Hegel's argument to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Useful fragments also are given in Pinkard, 'Freedom and Social Categories in Hegel's Ethics,' 209, and in Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, who articulates certain movements in Hegel's argument in terms of a relation of the pure and the empirical self (which derives from his reading of Hegel's description of

Bildung in M485, W/C 321); see, for example, 109–10, 129, 145–6, 151–2.

30 M210, my translation; W/C 145.29–39: 'Es ist dadurch die dreifache Weise für dasselbe vorhanden, wie die Einzelnheit mit dem Unwandelbaren verknüpft ist; *einmal* geht es selbst sich wieder hervor als entgegengesetzt dem unwandelbaren Wesen; und es ist in den Anfang des Kampfs zurückgeworfen, welcher das Element des ganzen Verhältnisses bleibt. Das *andremal* aber hat das *Unwandelbare* selbst *an ihm* die *Einzelnheit* für es; so daß sie Gestalt des Unwandelbaren ist, an welches hiemit die ganze Weise der Existenz hinübertritt. Das *drittemal* findet *es sich selbst* als dieses Einzelne im Unwandelbaren' (emphasis in original).

31 M210–11, W/C 145–6.

32 We shall see the same basic three relations, now *within* the third (reconciled) form of unhappy consciousness (that is, in the kingdom of the spirit), in *Sittlichkeit, Bildung,* and *Moralität,* respectively, in chapter VI, '*Geist.*'

33 M211–12, W/C 146–7.

34 M210–11, W/C 145–6; M231, W/C 157.

35 M212–30, W/C 146–56; M214, W/C 147 describes the three modes.

36 Hegel himself does this as a 'shorthand' in later chapters. See, for example, his remarks at the beginning of Chapter VII, 'Religion' (M673, W/C 443), and in the treatment of 'Physiognomy and Phrenology' (M344, W/C 194). A similar situation holds with the terms 'understanding' (*Verstand*) and 'reason' (*Vernunft*), which Hegel can use both in a narrow, critical sense as names of attitudes that are abstract and one-sided and in a sense in which they name the ultimate standpoint.

37 *Contra* Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination,* 101–2, I see the logical relations involved in the image of the priest as not at all mysterious, but as indeed paradigmatic of the movement from external relations to internal relations that characterizes virtually all of Hegel's transitions. (That this is the regular pattern of Hegel's argument is noted by Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure* I, 151.)

38 See M26, W/C 19–21.

2: Reason and Dualism

1 Note that these three shapes of dualism form a logical progression of, roughly, the self as pure being to the self as determinate being to the self as the infinite (according to the categories of Book I of the *Science of Logic*), or, again, positing reflection to external reflection to determining reflection (according to the categories of Book II). There is also a fourth crucial appearance of a self/body dualism in the *Phenomenology*, and this is the whole dynamic of *Bildung* in

Chapter VI, '*Geist.*' The story of this phenomenon will be analysed in my Chapter 4, below.

2 Note that this is close both to the logic by which stoicism is seen to culminate in scepticism, and to the logic that marks the problem of the first form of unhappy consciousness.

3 See *Encyclopaedia*, paragraph 389 (*Hegels Philosophie des subjectiven Geistes*, Bd 2, 4.24–34, 5.26–35); and see M325 W/C 217 on the issue of material mediation of mind and matter (as in the textbook portrayal of Descartes's proposal of the pineal gland as the mediating organ). We shall see various forms of the problem of dualism and the attempt to defer resolving the problem through an infinite multiplication of inadequate middle terms emerge in the course of the dialectic of observing reason.

4 M233, W/C 158–9.

5 *Aufheben* is the verb Hegel uses to characterize the transformation by which a constitutive feature of a relatively primitive form of relationship is maintained in a modified form within a more sophisticated relationship. To say that the equivalent feature in the more sophisticated relationship is the 'sublimation' of the feature in the more primitive comes close to capturing this relationship except insofar as the notion of sublimation carries with it the sense of misleading distortion: rather than being a repression of the feature's rightful position, the feature as *aufgehoben* is, according to Hegel's argument, the bringing of the feature closer to its proper form; in many ways, 'developed' would be a closer translation of *aufgehoben*. See M113, W/C 80.14–19 and *Science of Logic*, 106–8, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, 113–15.

6 As scholars such as Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 224, Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, and Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 107, have noted, the historical figures whose ideas provide the raw material for Chapter V, Section A, 'Observing Reason,' range from Bacon and Descartes to Kant and Schelling. It is certainly true that the simple conception of a substantial identity that excludes difference, more obviously accords with Descartes's metaphysics than with the much more sophisticated metaphysics of the *Naturphilosophen*, but precisely what this section of Hegel's text reveals is that even the later figures remain ultimately Cartesian in their projects. The same point can be made, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other two sections of Chapter V, 'Reason.' For the disparity that exists between reason's posited identity with all reality and the necessary dualism that comes with this conception of substantial identity, see Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*, 118–19, and the discussion of relative and absolute otherness.

7 Hegel makes this point explicitly in his *Science of Logic*: 'for reflection, the omnipresence of the simple in a multiple externality is an absolute contradiction, and, in so far as reflection at the same time must take this omnipresence

from the perception of Life and must thus admit the actuality of this Idea, it is an incomprehensible mystery [*unbegreifliches Geheimniß*]' (trans. Johnson and Struthers, Vol. II, 403.34–9, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, 181.23–7). The task facing reason, and that to which it will be logically driven in the course of our phenomenological investigation, is the self-conscious recognition of a unity in and through difference. A similar situation characterized the dialectic of understanding in Chapter III, 'Force and the Understanding.'

8 For Chapter V, Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, and Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure* are particularly helpful. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, is helpful for Chapter V, Sections A and C, but poor on the logical structure of the chapter as a whole, especially Section B; Taylor, *Hegel*, explicates themes of Sections B and C in his general discussions of enlightenment culture.

9 M245–7, W/C 166–9, '*Beschreiben überhaupt, Merkmale.*'

10 M254–97, W/C 173–200, especially from M265, W/C 180, '*das Innre*' to M290, W/C 194–6, on '*spezifische Schwere.*'

11 M245–7, W/C 166–9.

12 M286–90, W/C 192–6.

13 M298–308, W/C 201–6, especially M300, W/C 202, and M303, W/C 203–4.

14 M309–46, W/C 206–33.

15 M242, 244, W/C 164–5, 166.

16 Note that this is reason acting in the general mode of 'Consciousness' as it is defined in Chapters I–III of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In Section B of Chapter V, we shall move on to reason operating in the mode of self-consciousness, and we shall conclude, in Section C of Chapter V, with reason's finally struggling to adopt its own proper form as reason; it is in reaching this last point of the explicit self-determination of reason that we shall be in a cognitively adequate position to proceed to the research that is the proper subject-matter of my analysis, namely, the conception of body implied in the dynamic of self-conscious selfhood. See M348, W/C 233–4.

17 See M232, W/C 157–8.

18 The coming to self-consciousness of this animating imperative is what is developed at the end of Chapter V, 'Reason,' in the dialectic of 'Individuality real in and for itself,' and the full implications of this move are worked out in the remaining three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. That reason itself is not aware of its implicit imperative is simply another way of expressing the remark of M233, W/C 158–9, that reason does not recognize its own history. M233 and 234, W/C 158–60, discuss the difference between the *lived practice* of reason (science), which operates with the *assurance* (*Versicherung*) that it is all reality, and the *philosophy* of reason (idealism), which makes the *assertion* (*Behauptung*) that it is all reality. Miller's translation obscures this point by translating both

these terms as 'assertion.' Hyppolite offers some discussion of the relation of reason and idealism in *Genèse et Structure*, I, 217–24. For the 'instinct' of reason, see M246, W/C 168.6–8; the term *Vernunftinstinkt* first appears at M248, W/C 169.35.

19 See M238–9, W/C 162–3, for the statement of this problem as it appears in the *philosophy* of reason, *viz.*, idealism.

20 These basic moves are contained in M245–54, W/C 166–73; the remainder of the observation of nature is devoted to various developments within the observation of the organic.

21 The move out of the observation of nature to the observation of self-consciousness, and beyond that to the observation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality, likewise are moves which represent the recognition of a more appropriate object within which to find a reflection of reason, but all the basic problems that attach to the observational method are manifest by the time we reach the observation of organic nature; for life has the logical form of the infinite (see M162, W/C 115.16–17) and thus already demonstrates the situation in which reason should see its own reflection but is limited by its method. Consequently, my analysis of the problems of observation will focus only on the observation of nature. On the hierarchy of subjects for observation, see Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*, 122–36; for biology's limited reflection of reason, see 124–5.

   Thus I shall not analyse here Hegel's discussion of physiognomy and phrenology, where the human body is subjected to observation, since it makes no real advance in the problematic of self-identity and difference in relation to the rational self. In this section, however, Hegel does make interesting editorial comments about the nature of the body, and they are discussed in Herbenick, 'Hegel's Concept of Embodiment,' and by MacIntyre, 'Hegel on Faces and Skulls.' See also Verene, *Hegel's Recollection*, 80–91.

22 For chemistry, see M246, W/C 167–8.

23 See, for example, M254, W/C 173.

24 This is recognized by Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 223–4, 234–6, 239–49, although Hyppolite treats 'Observation of Nature' as if it actually presented Hegel's philosophy of nature, whereas in fact the argument bears on Hegel's philosophy of nature but is not that philosophy's systematic presentation, and Hegel's philosophy of nature is not a constitutive moment of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

25 Cf. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 16.

26 See M251–2, W/C 171–3, for reason's attempt to observe laws.

27 See M258, W/C 176–7, for the positing of the end in an alien intelligence. On this issue of end, compare *Philosophy of Nature*, Section 360.

28 See M251–2, W/C 171–3, on the issue of the observability of laws; for teleology and the limits of observational reason, see M256, W/C 175–6.

29 Shklar, *Freedom and Independence*, 32 articulates something similar when she argues that, in its continued attempts to observe, reason 'gets thrown back on the solipsistic dead end of "ego = ego," from which it ... turns away ... by discovering a new science.'

30 The detailed articulations of the different variants of the logic of immediate being and the logic of reflection are the subject matters of, respectively, the 'Doctrine of Being' and the 'Doctrine of Essence' in Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

31 That is, its self-observation produces the logical laws of simple identity, or tautology, which we have seen to be the truth of its method; see M299, W/C 201–2.

32 *Contra* Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 109, who calls the transition from Section A to Section B, 'one of the most arbitrary somersaults in the whole course of [Hegel's] dialectic,' and Shklar, *Freedom and Independence*, 98, who says, 'One may well wonder why Hegel called these highly irrational expressions of subjectivity reason at all.'

33 Here again, however, self-actualizing reason will still posit the achieved *state* as what is rational, and will again fail to adequately comprehend the primacy of action.

34 Note that the self-actualizing '*vernünftigen Selbstbewußtsein*' of the title is ambiguous; it refers, on the one hand, to the singular agent who carries out the revolution (for this agent is making her essence actual) and, on the other hand, to the society that is thus revolutionized (for the very thesis of the revolutionary is that she is only enacting the latent essence – the destiny – of the self-consciousness that is her object). It is this very ambiguity of the individuality that, in its fulfilment, is identical with both the singular and the universal, which self-actualizing reason will not adequately comprehend; self-actualizing reason will vacillate between the two identifications because it will hold fast to the distinctness and self-containedness of the identity of each, again falling into the error of observing reason of positing what are merely moments of a process as inert substances.

35 M360–6, W/C 240–4.

36 M359, 361, W/C 239, 240.

37 M362, W/C 240–1. See Hyppolite's discussion, at *Genèse et Structure*, I, 155, 158, of the distinction between *désir* (Hegel's *Begierde*) and *l'amour* (and compare Gadamer, '*Hegels Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins*,' 55, n.4).

38 M360, W/C 240.

39 Ibid.

40 M362, W/C 240–1.

41 M364–5, W/C 242–3. On this issue of love as making oneself vulnerable to the pain that accompanies the necessity of the death of the beloved, see Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 29, 48.

42 M363; W/C 242.12–15: 'Was dem Selbstbewußtsein also in der genießenden Lust als sein Wesen zum *Gegenstande* wird, ist die Ausbreitung jener leeren Wesenheiten, der reinen Einheit, des reinen Unterschiedes, und ihrer Beziehung' (emphasis in original).

43 M363; W/C 242.26–9: 'Einheit, Unterschied und Beziehung sind Kategorien, deren jede nichts an und für sich, nur in Beziehung auf ihr Gegenteil ist, und die daher nicht auseinander kommen können.'

44 M369, W/C 244–5. Compare Freud's analysis of Saint Francis in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 49.

45 M375–7, W/C 248–50.

46 M381, W/C 251–2.

47 M385, W/C 254.

48 M381–2, W/C 251–3.

49 M389, W/C 256–7.

50 M392–3, W/C 258–9.

51 M391, 382, W/C 258, 252–3.

52 '*Die Individualität, welche sich an und für sich selbst reell ist.*'

53 Findlay's translation of '*Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug*' as 'The Spiritual Zoo and Humbug' (*Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 112), nicely captures the notion, in M402–4, W/C 265–6, that the different real individuals are differentiated in terms of their eccentricities and 'energy of will' rather in the fashion of museum pieces or animals in a zoo.

    Die Sache selbst is notoriously hard to translate in this situation, primarily since a periphrastic translation that would suit parts of Section C would not suit others and certainly would not be suitable outside this section of the text. A simple rendering of it as 'the fact itself' conveys nothing to the English reader. Miller's 'the matter in hand' seems far too casual and also does not easily lend itself to translating the difference between *seine Sache* and *die Sache selbst*, as in M415, W/C 273, where the real individual is revealed to be pursuing merely idiosyncratic rather than essential, universal interests. Baillie's 'the real intent' seems better in that it captures the sense of real versus apparent and because intent really is the focal issue in this particular stage of real individuality. This translation is limited, however, in that, by being usefully interpretive of this stage of the development, it is quite out of order with other stages, even within Section C, such as M420, W/C 277–8, where *die absolute Sache*, the direct descendent of *die Sache selbst* is now *die sittliche Substanz*. The sense of *die Sache selbst* that must be captured is really 'the Good,' but such a

translation would be too vague here, and would again not easily adapt to variants which would accord with the other uses of *die Sache*. 'The real thing,' which can be opposed to doing 'one's own thing' (used by Harris), is perhaps the best one can do in English. I shall leave the phrase untranslated in my text.

The concept of *die Sache selbst* is given extensive coverage by Shannon, *The Question Concerning the Factum of Experience.*

54 M398–401, W/C 261–5.
55 M400, W/C 262–3.
56 See M401–3, W/C 263–6.
57 M409–15, W/C 269–73. Compare Sartre's account of the vacillation between facticity and transcendence, in 'La mauvaise foi' in *L'Être et le Néant*, 82–107.
58 This was the conclusion of 'Virtue and the Way of the World,' and it is summed up in M394, W/C 259–60.
59 M419, W/C 277.
60 M419–22, W/C 277–8.
61 M420–1, W/C 277–8.
62 M424, W/C 278–9.
63 M425, W/C 280.
64 See M426, W/C 281.
65 M427, W/C 281.
66 See M419, W/C 277.
67 M428, W/C 281.
68 M429–30, W/C 281–3.
69 M430–1, W/C 282–4; Hegel also shows in the same analysis, using his own notion of concrete reason, that *neither* of these laws is simply self-identical, but rather, that both are intrinsically self-contradictory, but this is more than the abstract reason of the real individual can observe.
70 M434–6, W/C 284–6.
71 M436–7, W/C 285–7; this law, which already constitutes self-conscious actuality, will be what we study when we come to Chapter VI, 'Spirit.'

3: The Condition of Self-Consciousness

1 For a treatment of Hegel's concept of life that looks at works throughout all the periods of Hegel's writing, see Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit.*
2 M167, W/C 120–2, especially 121.17–122.3.
3 M167, 169, W/C 120–2, 122–3. Hyppolite's commentary on this section is worth reading: *Genèse et Structure,* I, 152–8.
4 M167. W/C 121.31–33: 'und sie ist hiemit für es ein Bestehen, welches aber

nur *Erscheinung,* oder Unterschied ist, der *an sich* kein Sein hat' (emphasis in original).

5 M167. W/C 122.4–6: 'Das Selbstbewußtsein stellt sich hierin als die Bewegung dar, worin dieser Gegensatz aufgehoben, und ihm die Gleichheit seiner selbst mit sich wird.'

6 In other words, the experience of desire (as in hunger or sexual desire) is the experience of a pain, that is, a *feeling* of the disparity between what is and what ought to be; see *Science of Logic,* trans. Miller, 770.11–771.1, *Wissenschaft der Logik,* II, 187.19–188.9. See M171, W/C 124.18–19, where what is achieved through consumption is 'the *feeling* of its unity with itself' (my emphasis).

7 These three moments are detailed at M167, W/C 121.17–37, and especially 121.37–122.3.

8 Note that this is the logic of 'determinate negation' or *Aufhebung,* which Hegel considers in the 'Introduction' (M79, W/C 62). 'Desire' is the root concept of Hegel's analysis of self-conscious selfhood, itself the centre of Hegel's ontology (see M166–7, W/C 120–2), and the story of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will be the story of the education of desire (see M168, W/C 122, and M78, W/C 61.21–4).

9 M168, W/C 122.20–4: 'und dieser Begriff *entzweit* sich in den Gegensatz des Selbstbewußtseins und des Lebens; jenes die Einheit, für *welche* die unendliche Einheit der Unterschiede ist; dieses aber *ist* nur diese Einheit selbst, so daß sie nicht zugleich *für sich selbst* ist.' I have changed Miller's 'notion' to 'concept,' and I shall do so throughout, for three reasons. (i) 'Notion' seems to me to mean little to the contemporary English reader as a technical philosophical term. (ii) Hegel's *der Begriff* is the first moment of a triad that, in traditional English renderings of the history of philosophy, is translated as Concept, Judgment, and Syllogism, and it seems important to translate *der Begriff* in a way that immediately communicates this membership in the triad to the English reader. (iii) 'Concept' is derived from the Latin *concipere* (root *cipere/ capere*), meaning 'to take together,' which captures some of the sense of the 'grasp' of *der Begriff*; 'notion' derives from *gnoscere* which in turn has its root in the Greek *gignosko,* and although this verb has the important *gn-* root, the sense of this verb that English seems to me to retain is only 'acquaintance'; for it seems to me that 'notion' communicates the sense of a merely idiosyncratic, subjective knowledge, rather than the comprehensive grasp one gets with the proper 'concept.'

I am here not analysing this quotation in its full context. The point of this quotation, according to M168–9, W/C 122–3, is that *the* concept (that is to say, the proper object of the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* the development of which we have been observing) divides into life and self-consciousness, and the object is

life because it is posited as being. What this means is that *I need* the other, and, because *my* positing of it as being is *its* reflection into self, it thus becomes an organ, as we shall go on to see; thus *every* self-conscious unit is a life and a self-hood, the life being the *in itself* necessary relation, the self being the *for itself* centre, which views its own primacy one-sidedly. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* gives us these two logically distinct determinations in logical order, so we must first consider life before turning to self-consciousness proper. (On Hegel's reference to 'the Concept' see Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 142–8.)

10 M169–70, W/C 122–3.

11 M169, W/C 123.7–10, .14–18: 'Ebendiese Flüssigkeit ist als die sichselbstgleiche Selbstständigkeit selbst das *Bestehen*, oder die *Substanz* derselben, worin sie also als unterschiedene Glieder und *fürsichseiende* Teile sind ... Der *Unterschied* dieser Glieder *gegeneinander* aber *als* Unterschied besteht überhaupt in keiner anderer *Bestimmtheit*, als der Bestimmtheit der Momente der Unendlichkeit oder der reinen Bewegung selbst' (emphasis in original). Compare *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, 764–7, 'A. The Living Individual,' Section I, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, 182–4.

12 See M254, W/C 173 (in Chapter V, Section A, 'The Observation of Nature'), for a definition of 'organism' that is relevant to this point; see also M256–7, W/C 175–6. In M258, W/C 176.39–177.1, Hegel says, 'the instinct of the animal seeks and consumes food, but thereby brings forth nothing other than itself,' showing that the relation to food is comparable to the relation to the organ. Compare on this point the discussion of 'Assimilation' in *Philosophy of Nature*, Section 357, *Zusatz* 1. Hyppolite, in *Genèse et Structure*, I, 238.19–22, equates the relation of the living being to its environment with the relation of organ to organ; see also Greene, 'Natural Life and Subjectivity,' 102–3.

13 Hegel refers to *unmittelbare Wirklichkeit* in Chapter V, 'Reason,' Section A, Part c.

14 Compare M293–4, W/C 198–9.

15 This logic of unity as the active unity of a system is the source of Hegel's method, which Taylor notes (*Hegel* 84, n.1), of 'top down' explanation. For contemporary debate surrounding this issue of 'downward causation' and 'emergence,' some of the more useful pieces are Meehl and Sellars, 'The Concept of Emergence,' Haugeland, 'Weak Supervenience,' Campbell, 'Downwards Causation,' and Maturana and Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition*.

16 See the *Logic* of the *Encyclopaedia*, Sections 166–8; this discussion of the category of 'judgment' ends with Hegel's using the relation of body and soul to illustrate what he means by judgment. (On the notion that body is here being considered in relation to the moment of particularity, see below, Chapter 4, n.115).

17 Since the organs exist only in the context of the organic functioning, it follows that they do not pre-exist what they constitute, and the act of forming the organs into a single active unity thus is equally the act of bringing the organs into being; organizing of a larger unity thus is simultaneously its organ-izing, in the sense both of embodying the new unit (making organs for it), and of bringing into being for the first time those members that are thus organized. This means that we must never mistake the corpse for the living body; the corpse is not even 'the dead body,' but is rather dis-integrated lesser bodies, none of which can be correlated with the members of the former body, since none of them has the constitutive relation to *the unity of functioning* that was *definitive* both for the organized totality *and of each member,* see *Science of Logic,* trans. Miller, 766, *Wissenschaft der Logik,* II, 183.34–4.16. Compare M276, W/C 186.29–40 (in 'Observing Reason'): 'Since the *being* [*das Sein*] of the organism is essentially a universality or a reflection-into-self, the *being* of its totality, like its moments, cannot consist in an anatomical system; on the contrary, the actual expression [*der wirkliche Ausdruck*] of the whole, and the externalization of its moments, are really found only as a movement [*als eine Bewegung*] which runs its course through the various parts of the structure [*der Gestaltung*], a movement in which what is forcibly detached and fixed as an individual system essentially displays itself as a fluid moment. Consequently, that actual existence as it is found by anatomy must not be reckoned as its real being, but only that existence taken as a process [*als Prozeß*], in which alone even the anatomical parts have a meaning [*einen Sinn haben*].' It is worthwhile to compare the entire paragraph with the analysis I am here giving. Immediately before this passage, Hegel makes his point by reference to the separation of functioning parts. See also *Encyclopaedia,* Section 281, *Zusatz* (*Philosophy of Nature,* 107, *Enzyklopädie,* Teil II, 135.32–8).

18 M169, W/C 122.40–123.1.

19 Marcuse notes, in *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit,* 265, that, already in Hegel's Frankfurt system fragment, '*Organisation*' is the name for '*Individualität*'; indeed, this notion of a systematic, active unity is the basic form of the infinite, that is, the complete unit. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination,* 255, also makes this last point. He notes that the 'distinguishing mark of an organism is its all-pervasive unity.' He explains (paraphrasing *Science of Logic,* trans. Miller, 766–7, *Wissenschaft der Logik,* II, 184): 'the organism is a manifold not of parts but of *members,* which, though they may be mutually external, and to that extent mechanically or chemically related, are also swayed by a unifying Urge, which makes them reciprocally End and Means, each member sustaining and being sustained by the others.' He rightly draws

the conclusion that 'the living is, in fact, the type of all that is comprehensible and intelligible.'

20 The differences seem to be that in nature the preconditions we must understand are the physical components of its construction, in logic we must understand how the logic of life carries on the project of self-adequation, and in spirit we must understand it in terms of the spiritual pursuits for which it is serving as body.

21 *Science of Logic,* trans. Miller (slightly modified), 762.37–763.1; *Wissenschaft der Logik* II, 180.33–6: 'Das Leben als solches also ist für den Geist theils *Mittel,* so stellt er es sich gegenüber; theils ist er lebendiges Individuum, und das Leben sein Körper, theils wird diese Einheit seiner mit seiner lebendigen Körperlichkeit aus ihm selbst zum *Ideal* herausgebohren' (emphasis in original). Compare the phrase 'lebendigen Körperlichkeit des Wesens' in M725, W/C 473.7.

22 For this notion of embodiment in actions or behaviours, see M276, W/C 186. In his translation of this and of related paragraphs, Baillie often renders *Gestaltung* and *Gestalt* as 'embodiment'; while this might not be acceptable as a reproduction of Hegel's text, the sense is exactly right, and Baillie's translation of this and of the surrounding paragraphs is worth reading as a first-rate commentary on Hegel's position; Miller likewise finds 'embodiment' to be the appropriate translation of *Gestaltung* in M447, W/C 292.37, in a context in which Hegel is discussing the *praktische Gestaltung der Vernunft* of Chapter V, Section B.

23 In the treatments of Hegel's view of body that focus on the 'Anthropology' section of his *Encyclopaedia* a common refrain is the identification of what Hegel there analyses (under the title of the 'natural soul') with the 'unconscious' or 'preconscious' dimension of life. See, for example, van der Meulen, 'Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele und Geist,' 254; Petry, *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,* II, 431; and Kelly, *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis,* 42.

24 Because an act is always a reflected unity achieved through constitutive but vanishing moments, the unity of an act must always be understood projectively, that is, as the actualizing of an 'ought.' Whatever *is,* then, is fundamentally rooted in an *ought.* I thus take Robinson's analysis of Hegel on 'is' and 'ought' in *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology,* in which he argues that Hegel, like a good empiricist, altogether denies that 'one can get an ought from an is' (see, for example, his 'Introduction,' Chapter 3, Section 2, and 128), to be entirely off base in his understanding of Hegel.

25 This is the mistake that reason characteristically made in Chapter V. See, for example, M260–2, W/C 178–9, in 'Observing Reason,' for how this comes up explicitly in relation to the observation of organic nature. A slightly different

form of the same problem is what we diagnosed as the definitive problem of the spiritual animals in Chapter V, Section C.

26 See M171–2, W/C 123–5, and M291–4, W/C 196–9; *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, 772–4, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, 189–91; *Philosophy of Nature*, Sections 348, 367 ff.

27 M171, W/C 123–5, M291, W/C 196.18–24: 'If we define being-for-self as *simple, self-preserving relation-to-self*, then its otherness is simple *negativity*, and organic unity is the unity of a self-identical relating-to-self and pure negativity. This unity is, *qua* unity, the inwardness of the organism; this is thereby in itself universal, or it is *genus*' (emphasis in original). See also *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, 768–9, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, 186. For Aristotle, see *De Anima*, Bk II, Chapter 4.

28 Note that sexual gratification already requires a treatment of the other that accords the other more independence than does the simple consumption that gratifies hunger. We noted above that the food *source* functions as an organ and must be preserved if life is to continue; in a comparable way, mates serve as organs through which the preservation of the species is effected.

29 M171, W/C 125: 'das sich entwickelnde, un seine Entwicklung auflösende und in dieser Bewegung sich einfach erhaltende Ganze.' This should be compared with the 'Absolute' in the 'Doctrine of Essence' in the *Science of Logic.*

30 This last point surfaces in Hegel's discussion of the observation of nature, where he presents nature – *mere* life – as incapable of fully reflecting the rationality of the observing rational consciousness. For nature does not build upon itself in such a fashion as to have all its distinctive forms – all its species – function as progressive stages in the fulfilment of its concept; only self-consciousness does this (and how it does so is what is studied in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), while mere nature remains unconscious to its own production, not advancing through its development of new species, and, therefore, not demonstrating an intrinsic necessity in the infinite variety in which it exhibits itself. See M292–7, W/C 197–200. On this contingency in nature, see Fackenheim's careful analysis in *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*, Chapter 2, *passim.*

31 While the contingency of nature precludes our direct dependence on all the singularities of natural life, the existence of self-consciousness still depends on the *whole* of nature *in its systematic structure*; Hegel's philosophy of nature lays out precisely those structures of nature that are necessary. Note that, unlike the philosophy of spirit, which has the moment of actual human history as a constitutive moment, the philosophy of nature does not involve a constitutive turn to the details of natural existence.

32 Hegel's analysis of the relation of master and slave runs from M189–96, W/C 132–6. I have found worthwhile the analyses of this relationship found in Hyp-

polite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 166–71, and in Gadamer, 'Hegels Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins.' The account that runs throughout Kojève, *Introduction à la Lecture*, while influential and provocative, seems to me to be inaccurate, and, at points, outrageous; Kelly, *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis*, Chapter 2, gives an account that is worth reading as a critique of some aspects of Kojève's analysis.

33 For nature as the chain by which the slave is held, see M190, W/C 132.32–7.

34 Each of them begins to realize this in stoicism; stoicism is the first situation in which the self-conscious agent begins to recognize herself only in and through her products, namely, the abstract determinations of the rational will, and, in scepticism, the totality of the determinations of self-consciousness; in the first two shapes of the unhappy consciousness, it is precisely the identification with these 'bodily' determinations that 'weighs down' the empirical ego in its pursuit of identification with the transcendental.

Kojève's analysis wrongly places all the power of and responsibility for development in the slave (see *Introduction à la Lecture*, 26, 33–4, and *passim*); in fact, one must see it as present either in both master and slave, or in neither. The sense in which each has achieved something that the other must develop is indicated in my text; the sense in which neither is the torch-bearer is precisely the extent to which each remains a master or slave and does not make the transition to free self-consciousness, that is, stoic, sceptic, or unhappy consciousness. Both Gadamer, 'Hegels Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins,' 55–6, 60, and Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, I, 173, 178, argue that the slave-consciousness is logically higher than the master-consciousness (as is indicated by Hegel's text, M193–4, W/C 134), and carries the logical ground for progress, but both seem more sensitive to the notion that the free self-consciousness that supersedes the relation of master and slave can be neither a master nor a slave consciousness, but must be some form of synthesis; see especially *Genèse et Structure*, I, 151: 'l'indépendance du maître et la dure éducation de l'esclave deviennent la maîtrise de soi du stoïcien.' At the other extreme, Shklar, *Freedom and Independence*, 60–1 (who seems heavily influenced by Kojève), sees the master-consciousness as the protaganist arguing that the stoic consciousness is the triumph of mastery in which now both participants are unshackled masters, indifferent to the physical world (62).

35 M194–6, W/C 134–6, especially 136.1–27.

36 *Hexis* seems to me to be translated both by *Bildung* and by *Gewohnheit*. Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* entry for 'habit' ('*Gewohnheit*') in his 'Anthropology' section articulates this category of 'second nature' in a manner very much in keeping with the ideas I am here developing about the nature of body.

37 Hegel's analysis of the 'Struggle to the Death' is found in M186–9, W/C 129–32.

38 M186, W/C 129–30.

39 This inability of the primitive self-consciousness to recognize an indepen-
dence constituted in and through dependence should be compared to the
above diagnosed inability of reason to recognize an identity constituted in and
through difference.

40 *The Concept of Mind*, 16–18. MacIntyre, in 'Hegel on Faces and Skulls,' likewise
refers to Ryle as moving in the same direction as Hegel on certain issues
regarding the relations between self, behaviour, and body. A more extensive
comparison with Ryle in relation to the concept of habit is given by McCum-
ber in 'Hegel on Habit.'

41 See M188, W/C 131.

42 Gadamer's 'Hegels Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins' gives a useful account of
why the very concept of a self-adequate self-consciousness depends on the
notion of an independent other (a) that one recognizes as independent, and
(b) that sacrifices itself; see especially 53–5. Hyppolite makes related points in
Genèse et Structure, I, 157; one should also note what Hyppolite says about his
translation of Hegel's *Begierde* as *désir* rather than *appétit*, and why *l'amour* is not
appropriate, (I, 155, 158); Gadamer discusses problems of this translating
Begierde as *désir* on 55 n.4. Shklar, *Freedom and Independence*, 26–9, offers an
interpretation of Hegel's account of self-consciousness in terms of a distinc-
tion between a consumptive and a creative ego, which is fruitful for under-
standing the issues raised here regarding the independence of the other; she
uses Plato's *eros* as the key to interpreting desire (as does von der Luft, 'The
Birth of Spirit for Hegel out of the Travesty of Medicine,' 26).
    Regarding Hegel's argument, we should note two things about this inde-
pendent other. First, we are going 'back' to an independent other, but, unlike
the other of Chapters I–III, 'Consciousness,' this is an other that has *returned*
to independence *in the context of its dependence*. Second, note that the ability to
recognize the other as a challenge – the ability to be challenged – is precisely
what will open the door to overcoming the challenge.

43 See M189, W/C 132. It is the desire for mutual recognition that is definitive of
self-consciousness (see M178–85, W/C 127–9), and it is the theme of adequate-
ly establishing a mutuality of recognition that will be the real heart of the
whole dialectic of self-consciousness from the 'Struggle to the Death' to 'Abso-
lute Knowing.' Andreas Wildt, *Autonomie und Anerkennung*, and Robert R. Wil-
liams, *Recognition*, focus explicitly on this question; Vittorio Hösle focuses on
the closely related theme of intersubjectivity in *Hegels System*. See also Harris,
'The Concept of Recognition in Hegel's Jena Manuscripts.'

44 See M189, W/C 132.15–17: '[The lord] is the independent consciousness
whose essential nature is to be for itself, [the slave] is the dependent con-

sciousness *whose essential nature is simply to live* or to be for another [*dem das Leben oder das Sein für ein anderes das Wesen ist*]' (my emphasis).

45 Note, however, that, unlike the simple *phusis* considered above, the maintenance of this relation demands that the body be explicitly self-conscious in its carrying out of the master's orders. This will be the root of my distinction between an 'external' *hexis*-body and an 'internal' one.

46 M192, W/C 133–4.

47 The point should again be made that this is not just an observation we make about the individuals involved; this is a problem *for the master* because *her behaviour* indicates a tacit acknowledging of this – she knows she has to give the slave the order in order for the grapes to arrive. The contradiction between actuality and concept in the relation is philosophically articulated by us, but it is felt by the participants and revealed and demonstrated in their behaviour.

48 The role of choice in the transition from the 'Struggle to the Death' to 'Lordship and Bondage' will be considered in Section 3, below, on the body as *logos*. At that point we shall see that the need to commit one's initiative (that is, choose) does not require that one reflect explicitly.

49 Compare the discussion of the slave's *Eigensinn* in M196, W/C 136.15–27; if this new society is to advance at all, it requires the slave's absolute existential commitment to the situation, that is, the slave must actually have acknowledged that she is a lesser being. (The relationship of pimp and prostitute may be a good example of the phenomenon of slavery.)

50 Compare the analysis given for 'Pleasure and Necessity,' in my Chapter 2, above.

51 Of course, even though *from the point of view of what the master-self is for-itself,* the slave-organism is only an external *hexis,* from the point of view of the progress of *Geist,* it is internal. In other words, in the development that we are watching in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' spirit is developing for itself 'habitual' systems of *internal* mediation, such that the whole master-slave *relation* does have an internal *hexis*-body in which the slave is an organ, and in which, too, the master is an organ. *This* self, however, that is, the self that is constituted in and through the whole relation, is not equivalent with the explicit self-consciousness of the master-self, but is the self as understood in terms of the progress of the development of spirit that we are watching throughout the whole *Phenomenology of Spirit.* This is the real self from which the unhappy apparent self distinguishes itself in the 'Unhappy Consciousness.' The need to look for the proper body of this self – and to identify just what this self is – will be the topic of my two subsequent chapters.

52 Notice that I am here describing the whole master-slave relation as a *development* of spirit that makes it possible for the same spirit-self which entered into

this relation to enter now into more sophisticated relations. Growing up through the whole *Gestalt* thus develops a *hexis* for spirit, and precisely what this *hexis* is is a potential for a new relation.

53 M194–6, W/C 134–6.

54 In the next section we shall see that this means she has to read the master's body, or, rather, as will become clear through our discussion, first, of scepticism, and, later, of conscience and absolute knowing, she has to read her own body, and she does this in terms of her valuing of certain determinations within the realm of her otherness, namely those issuing from what she calls 'master.' Like the self who becomes master, the slave, too, must interpret. This fact is part of what frees the slave here, (it is the essence of stoicism), since it means the slave is really acting on her own decisions, but it will equally turn out to be a binding determination for the 'Unhappy Consciousness,' because this will be what enforces finitude on the believer and seems to preclude her ever doing God's work purely.

55 We shall see this again in revolution and terror, where, *just by virtue of existing*, the self is a challenge to the true self of the human community and thus is open to suspicion and execution.

56 We shall again see the self that becomes guilty just by acting when, in Chapter 4, we come to consider the plight of Antigone in our study of *Sittlichkeit* as a situation of mastery and servitude.

57 When we come to study absolute knowing, these two necessities will come up as the necessity in method and the necessity in determining the object.

58 One might look here for a pragmatic basis to a Hegelian epistemology.

59 Or, rather, she must learn how to translate her desire to translate *her* reading of what she recognizes as her master's orders into what she recognizes as what that master will recognize as satisfaction, all in the context of her (the slave's) way of recognizing what the world is.

60 M227, 231, W/C 154, 157. See Chapter 1, n.37, above.

61 The 'Struggle to the Death' and the transition into the 'Master and Slave' are found in M186–9, W/C 129–32.

62 See *Encyclopaedia*, Section 431 on the 'corporeity of self-consciousness' [*die Leiblichkeit des Selbstbewußtseins*]. This passage is discussed by James Dodd, 'The Body as "Sign and Tool" in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia.*'

63 In this situation in which a society has not yet been instituted, the state of affairs is comparable to that recognizable by the positivist, whom Hyppolite calls a 'realist': 'Pour le réaliste je ne connais d'abord l'autre que par son corps ou son être-pour-un-autre qui est seul donné dans mon expérience sensible' (*Genèse et Structure*, II, 313).

64 The slave likewise demonstrates implicitly this trait of mastery in the ability we

studied above to interpret and fulfil the master's orders by transforming the objects in the world according to an interpretation of what they will allow.

65 Note, too, that to read is also to write, for it involves treating the body as expressive. Here it appears to be the other's body that is being read, but our analysis of life has already implied, and our upcoming analysis of 'Absolute Knowing' will show, that one always can read only one's own body.

66 These two acts are the twin negations of 'Reflection' in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, and the characters 'signifier' and 'signified' are, respectively, 'show' and 'essence.' See *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, 394–408; *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, 244–57. On the concept of the sign, compare M333, W/C 222–3.

67 For the cunning of reason, see *The Philosophy of History*, 33, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 49; for a discussion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of this notion that the important movement happens behind the back of consciousness, see M87, W/C 67–8.

68 This, too, explains why there need not be an experiential continuum between the 'Struggle to the Death' and 'Lordship and Bondage': what makes a relation of master and slave is not the situation from which the participants came, but how they behave under specific circumstances of interaction.

69 Cf. M310 (in 'Physiognomy and Phrenology'): 'This *being*, the *body* of the specific individuality, is the latter's *original* aspect, that aspect in the making of which it has not itself played a part [= *phusis*]. But since the individual is at the same time what he has done [= *hexis*], his body is also the expression of himself [= *logos*] which he has himself *produced*.' W/C 207.4–8: 'Dies *Sein*, der *Leib* der bestimmten Individualität, ist die *Ursprünglichkeit* derselben, ihr nicht getan haben. Aber indem das Individuum zugleich nur ist, was es getan hat, so ist sein Leib auch der von ihm *hervorgebrachte* Ausdruck seiner selbst' (emphasis in original). To understand this comment properly, its context needs to be taken into account, but as it stands it is sufficient to show that the three determinations are logically inseparable. Compare *Encyclopaedia*, Section 431.

70 Winfield, 'Commentary on "Hegel's Concept of *Geist*,"' 22, puts this well: 'Hegel understands consciousness to be the very concrete structure that can only be conceived as the embodied awareness of a living individual inhabiting a world of nature common to others.'

71 *Hexis* fundamentally names simply this moment of qualitative determinateness, not its being a product of self-conscious design. In the embodiment of the spirit, however, self-consciousness is constitutive of its very embodiment, and thus the *hexeis* are, literally, habits. It is this fact that will allow the body to become self-conscious in the act of absolute knowing, the analysis of which will culminate the phenomenology of body by working out the full implications of moment of *logos*.

72 For the sake of clarity, I refer here to human life, but it is not clear to me that there is any reason in principle why Hegel's account applies to this specifically; it seems to me conceivable, for example, that the forms of the 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness' are met within various species of the animal kingdom, and that the forms of the 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness' are met by at least some non-human primates. I thus find Kojève's account, which presents (and, I believe, depends on) a simplistic differentiation of animal and human, to be misdirected; see, for example, *Introduction à la Lecture*, 11–14, 170–1, 179 n.1, 181. Preuss, in 'Selfhood and the Battle: The Second Beginning of the Phenomenology' (especially 77, 80), gives a more determinate and more interesting account of why animals are not spiritual, but, while the conditions for spirituality that he gives seem reasonable, I am not satisfied that he has adequately identified and comprehended the phenomena of 'animal' existence.

4: The *Zôion Politikon*

1 Indeed, in each of the three stages of reason, the problem it faced was its inability to differentiate its reflective relation to its experience from its lived relationship to that experience; that is, it did not acknowledge that its reflection is a transformative, mediative act – a conversion.

2 Although I take 'spirit' to be an adequate translation of Hegel's *Geist*, and although I do not at all accept the oft-repeated claim that no one understands what Hegel means by this term, I am leaving it untranslated in order that its sense may be provided by the concrete analyses I provide in this chapter. In general I take the *Geist* of Chapter VI (which Hegel defines as '*das sich selbsttragende absolute reale Wesen*' at M440, W/C 289.24–5) to refer to *situations or systems of equal recognition*, and I want to avoid a historical or large-scale cultural definition, typified by Shklar's treatment in *Freedom and Independence*, which excludes the analysis of Chapter VI, Section C, '*Moralität* (see M443, W/C 291.6–8). Shklar claims that '"spirit" is the political culture or the dominant political values of a society revealed in specific deeds and words,' and that spirit is 'the totality of attitudes, rules, institutions, habits and beliefs that make up a political culture' (42–3). While it is true that this list applies well to the situations analysed in Chapter VI, Sections A and B, it is not obvious how it applies to Section C (on which point, see her own remarks on 204–5), and, further, even if it does apply, it does not capture the definitive determination of the concept. Findlay, in *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, Chapter 2, sees *Geist* as the descendent of the transcendental ego, and his analysis of what Hegel means by spirit (39–47), while no doubt open to various specific criticisms, is suffi-

ciently suggestive as to warrant reading by anyone, not least because of its capacity to illuminate the concept of unhappy consciousness.

3 See Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity*, 23–8. He here gives a good account of how *Recht* has to be understood in terms of, and as the fulfilling of, the dynamic of recognition found in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness.'

4 Thus the properly human *phusis* is necessarily a habit, that is, an instituted rather than a 'natural' system, since it has as its founding principle recognition or the self-willed choosing to adopt such a system of interpersonal relations. See M436, W/C 285–6; M439, W/C 288–9; and the beginning of M462, W/C 302.1–4 (note *einheimischer*), where Hegel identifies (ethical) law (*Sitte*) in a way that accords nicely with his definition of habit (*Gewohnheit*) in the *Encyclopaedia*, as 'being at home with oneself' (*Beisichselbersein*) (*Zusatz* to paragraph 410, Bd. 11, 188): *Ethos*, or the world of *Sittlichkeit*, will always remain the name of *spiritual* 'nature' precisely because it is a habit. Compare on this point the discussion of habit in the *Philosophy of Nature* (*Encyclopaedia*, paragraphs 375–6 and *Zusätze*).

5 Just as it was essential to differentiate the conceptual, transcendental argument from the empirical analogue that provides its *Vorstellung* in the case of the 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness,' which I analysed in Chapter 1, above, it is crucial in Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' to differentiate the logic of the argument about the philosophy of right from the actual human history to which Hegel alludes throughout his analysis; Hegel's analysis should be understood in terms of the relations of the universal, the particular, and the singular, that is, the logical dynamics of the Concept (*Begriff*) (or of 'the absolute relation' [*das absolute Verhältnis*], on which point see n.62, below). It is common among commentators to ignore this distinction and to treat this chapter of Hegel's text as a treatment of history. Harris, 'Comment on Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy,' addresses the issue of the place of history within the philosophy of right. I am in agreement with what I take to be Harris's claim, namely, that history provides the very horizon of all our investigations, but (as I claimed in relation to the 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness') I do not find this claim about the status of history to vitiate the argument that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is here providing a transcendental argument for which our history provides the *Vorstellung*. While it is true that after we have achieved the absolute standpoint we can find great layers of *Realphilosophie* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in its definitive task of providing a ladder to the absolute, the argument remains transcendental.

6 Cf. M451, W/C 294.10–16; M452, W/C 295–7.

7 M444–5, W/C 291–2, tells the basic story of the rise and fall of the ethical substance; see also M446–7, W/C 292–3, for the constitutive need to recognize sin-

gularity (*Einzelnheit*). Miller's translation throughout this section (and, indeed, through much of the book), is seriously inadequate because it fails to differentiate the English terms *singular, particular,* and *individual* and quite arbitrarily uses them to translate Hegel's *einzeln,* and *individuell* (although I have not noticed a mistaken rendering of *besonder*); these terms should definitely be kept separate, since they are crucial Hegelian technical terms, and, furthermore, it is their dynamic that is precisely at issue in this section of the text.

8 When living, one identifies either with the government (*Regierung*) or with the family, and when dead, one returns to the family as a member; the singular selfhood that appears with one's death is never recognized (that is, one might say, never 'sanctioned'). These issues will be considered in greater detail below.

9 Just as the second form of reason reversed this in a pure self-centredness, so will the second form of spirit turn again to the primacy of the singular being-for-self (in its act of converting) as the real source of value.

10 Recall the body as *phusis.*

11 M434–7, W/C 284–7, especially M437, W/C 286.34–7: 'They *are.* If I inquire after their origin and confine them to the point whence they arose, then I have transcended them; for now it is I who am the universal, and *they* are the conditioned and limited.'

12 See Shklar, *Freedom and Independence,* 71, for a discussion of fate in this context; cf. M463, W/C 303.30–1; M472, W/C 311.14–18, for what fate amounts to.

13 M445, W/C 291–2; also M463, W/C 303–4. See M588, 590, W/C 388–9, 389–90, for remarks that bear on this issue of the organ-ization of society.

14 M448, W/C 293. Pinkard, 'Freedom and Social Categories in Hegel's Ethics,' 220, defines the notion of universal self-consciousness as 'awareness of ourselves as sharing a world with others, of being an ingredient in a world of multiple perspectives, and of not having everything being good as a means to my ends, i.e., awareness of ourselves as being non-instrumental goods and of others as being likewise so.' This seems to me to be on the right track, although it is crucial to ensure that one not assume this awareness to be a reflective or explicitly self-conscious one.

15 M449–50, W/C 293–4.

16 See, for example, M460, W/C 301.

17 See M462, W/C 303.4–9.

18 See M727, 731, 736, W/C 474–5, 477–8, 480–1; cf. M474, W/C 312–13.

19 M436–7, W/C 285–7.

20 This will become thematic in the transition to legal status, at which point the

whole ethical substance becomes a mere 'predicate' to the singular self. See M749, W/C 488–9.

21 See M461, W/C 302.26–31. It is because the laws provide the pre-reflective structure for the experience of the object that they are the consciousness of the community, where religion is the self-consciousness. See M444–5, W/C 291–2, M677–8, W/C 444–5, and M441–3, W/C 290–1.

22 M349, W/C 234.32–5; cf. M351, W/C 236.1–4.

23 M466, W/C 305–6, especially 306.4–6. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, all the determinations within philosophy of right, that is, everything in the '*Geist*' chapter, must fundamentally be understood under the rubric of *hexis*; *Sittlichkeit* is that form of this *hexis* that – precisely because this *hexis*, like any *hexis*, is equally a *phusis* – conceals itself as a mediating determinateness and appears simply as being, that is, as immediately, obviously, and naturally the way things are. Following the parallel of *Sittlichkeit* to nature, then, we can see that the law functions for the ethical individual as an 'instinct.' Compare on this point *The Philosophy of History*, 38–40, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 56–7.

24 See M457, W/C 300.12–20. As character-types thus defined, 'man' and 'woman' clearly are ethical categories, not natural ones (see M459, W/C 301). This is not, however, apparent to the members of the ethical community, and the identification of these roles with the natural sexual divisions seems to be not a mapping on, but just a specification of the natural determination itself: 'it's what men do' and so on would be a suitable statement here; see M465, W/C 305. On these issues, see Dove, 'Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy,' 37; Donougho, 'The Woman in White,' 85–6; and Ravven, 'Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists,' *passim*. When Hegel's philosophical understanding of women is under consideration, it is crucial to bear in mind his remarks about the body in *Encyclopaedia*, Sections 403, 409, and the *Zusatz* to Section 401, as well as his discussion of the relation between 'immediate actuality' and self-conscious selfhood in his discussion of 'Physiognomy and Phrenology' in the *Phenomenology*.

I refer in the text to 'basic' character types to allow for distinctions that do not have institutional significance. Thus one may still grow up to be aggressive, where another is shy, and so on. Now it turns out in the *Antigone* story that these distinctions are of 'world historical,' significance; for it is only because Antigone has an aggressive nature unlike Ismene's conservatism that the ethical situation of the mythical Thebes collapses. This situation, however, is really just an anticipation of what we learn in legal status: the distinctions that the institutions of ethical life relegate to the level of insignificant singularity turn out to be essential dimensions to the whole. Francis Ford Coppola's film *The*

Godfather is a good anthropological portrayal of the logic that operates within the institution of 'ethical' family, especially with regard to this lived sense of commitment to family members and the specificity of the roles defined for people within the context of the family; the film very clearly makes this point that singularity is of decisive, even though institutionally unacknowledged, import.

25 See M457, W/C 300.8–12. This, then, could be called the society of pure duty – the society where the self only counts as representative of a 'real' self that itself has no need of its representatives.

26 See M455, W/C 297–8, especially 297.33–7; cf. M461, W/C 302.1–2.

27 That is, a community that goes beyond the level of the extended family and has some sort of explicit forum for the determination of group policy in which people count as decision-making representatives of the universal interest rather than partisans for the particular interests of their families. On this point, see Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment,* 99–100, who maintains that *Geist* begins with the ethical substance, not with a patriarchal tribal society, because the former is the first form in which the various members operate in a system of equal recognition. The instituting of such a non-partisan council to replace the system of vengeance that characterizes the institution of the family is the theme of Aeschylus's *Oresteia;* see n.40, below. Compare the role of the council of the heads of the five families in *The Godfather.* See *Philosophy of Right,* Section 349.

28 See M461, W/C 302.10–13. Recall that work was the mark of the slave and the ground of *hexis.*

29 See the distinction between the known and the unknown laws, M448–9, W/C 293.

30 M455, W/C 297.35–7

31 We must be clear here that recognition would mean *institutional* recognition of singularity; what *Sittlichkeit* gives us, however, is institutional denial of singularity. Even though the institution of the family recognizes the singular individual in the death rites, (M452–3, W/C 295–7), this is still a recognition of particularity, not of singularity, in that it is *as a member of this family* that the individual is being memorialized; indeed, the purpose of the rite is effectively to deny any significance to the 'mere singularity' of the individual that is marked by the unique natural body (the mere *Sein*) that lives and dies (see M464, W/C 304.22–7, M477, W/C 316.12–17). The ethical world differentiates the various dimensions of the individual and acknowledges two while denying one. This can truly be overcome only by the recognition that these three are not distinct parts, but are differential views on the same single totality, namely, the individual (rather as we already had to recognize that the *whole* ethical sub-

stance is taken up in both the divine law and the human, both family and state).

32 See M446–7, W/C 292–3.

33 M464–76, W/C 304–16. For Hobbes, see Book I, Chapters 13–16.

34 Compare *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 348.

35 This moment of singular initiative is the same moment as that which we diagnosed in the transition from the struggle to the death into mastery and servitude as the moment of choice; these two situations are indeed parallel, since, just as singular relations of mastery and servitude are premised on choice, so too is this situation in which what is at issue is essentially the singular self adopting a stance of servitude in relation to the mastery of the *polis* as such. Note, too, that the argument here differs from Hobbes's argument to that extent that Hobbes views this initiative as necessarily a reflective choice; our analysis of the transition into slavery in Chapter 3, above, has shown how this choice that institutes a *hexis* need not be reflective.

36 M464, W/C 304–5.

37 M462–3, W/C 302–4.

38 See M475, W/C 315.12–19; M476, W/C 315.39–316.2.

39 M465, W/C 305.

40 M463, W/C 303.33–4. Just as Sophocles's *Antigone* provides for Hegel a *Vorstellung* for the logic of the collapse of the city-state system, Aeschylus's *Oresteia* provides the *Vorstellung* for its harmonious functioning; see M740, W/C 483–4.

41 Compare the problem discussed in relation to the relation of master and slave, namely, that the master is constitutionally dependent upon the slave's recognition, but is equally constitutionally incapable of acknowledging the slave's recognition.

42 See M466, W/C 305–6, especially 306.8–18; M468, W/C 307–9.

43 M469–70, W/C 309–10; cf. M473, W/C 311–12.

44 See M475, W/C 315.10–12: 'Because the existence of ethical life rests on strength and luck, the *decision is already made* that its downfall has come.'

45 Compare the problem faced by law-giving reason in Chapter V, Section C, as diagnosed in Chapter 2, above.

46 For comedy, the sophists, and Socrates, see M744–7, W/C 485–8, and M750, W/C 489; for stoicism and legal status, see M751, W/C 489–90.

47 This 'social self' is here treated as not a self at all (see M472, W/C 310–11, especially 311.1–5), but it demonstrates its selfhood through the history of the ethical substance (see M477, W/C 316, especially 316.23–7; M486, W/C 322.13–17).

48 See M479, W/C 317.1–5.

49 M477–80, W/C 316–18. Note that both the selves of the master-slave relation

of spirit make this transition, as they do in Chapter IV; the 'self' that is the social being itself (the former master) is now recognized as a singular self: the emperor. For that reason this 'real' self counts just as one self among many. The 'master' of the ethical substance has thus lost its status of mastery in two ways: first, its 'selfhood' is ontologically only on par with its former subjects; second, as we shall see, its substantiality is now at the mercy of the evaluation of individuals.

50 M480, W/C 317–18.

51 See M748, 750, W/C 488, 489.

52 M477, W/C 316.9–11; M488, W/C 324.13–16.

53 I am here using this term as a characterization for the *phusis* of human life in general (which is how it is used in the *Philosophy of Right*), not, as I shall immediately make clear in the text, simply as the name for the first society studied in Chapter VI, '*Geist.*' The latter *Sittlichkeit* of Chapter VI, Section A, which we are studying throughout this portion of my chapter, is that form of the former, 'generic' *Sittlichkeit* of which the formative law *advocates Sittlichkeit* as the *entire concept* of self-conscious existence.

54 See, for example, M486, W/C 321.35–8 for the notion that really it is the laws that act, and they act through the singular agents.

55 M484, W/C 320.16–18: 'Essence has, therefore, the simple determinateness of mere being for consciousness, which is directed *immediately* upon it, and is the essence in the form of custom.'

56 M468, W/C 308.26–309.3.

57 At a political level, this problem is the failure to institutionalize a system of mediating the universal and the singular: the *Liberté, Egalité,* and *Fraternité* of the French revolution do not organize themselves into a system of laws and institutions.

58 Whereas *Sittlichkeit* and *Bildung* try to exclude, respectively, singularity and particularity, we see that precisely what each is accomplishing is in fact the development of these two determinations. We are watching the *Bildung* of the universal self as it first builds itself up to the position in which it can (institutionally) acknowledge the primacy of the negativity of singular selfhood, and then proceeds to further develop itself (that is, develop an institutional '*hexis*' or 'body') such that it can develop institutions to acknowledge particularity, and so on. We are here watching the phenomenology of the *hexis* of the real self, even in those forms in which the real habits being developed are precisely those that are being manifestly denied by the shapes that enact this developing.

59 What we learn here dynamically and concretely, as we already learned in principle at the end of Chapter V, 'Reason,' is that it is *to one's own particular society/*

self that one must be committed. The point is that it is *this whole self, this 'we'*, that is engaged in having a history, and the only real change is its change. This will be worked out in greater detail in 'Conscience and *Ethos*' below.

60 M481–2, W/C 318–19.

61 M483, W/C 319–20; M484, W/C 320–1, especially 320.36–321.6; M751–3, W/C 489–91; see M486, W/C 322.13–25 for the truth of these developments as articulated in terms of the concept of the self.

62 M483, W/C 319.35–7, 320.4–5, M488, W/C 323.29–324.13, M749, W/C 488–9, especially 488.32–489.6. In terms of the *Science of Logic*, Book II, Section III, Chapter 3, 'The Absolute Relation,' we are shifting from a logic of 'Substance and Accident' in *Sittlichkeit* to a logic of 'Cause and Effect' in *Bildung. Moralität* will complete this working out of the logic of 'the Absolute Relation' in acting out a logic of 'Reciprocity.' It is in the culmination of morality in reciprocity of conscience and its working out as absolute knowledge that we make the final transition to a logic of the *Begriff.* Compare on this point Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity*, 66. Kolb argues that these three shapes of society work out progressive stages of the logic of the *Begriff* as articulated at the beginning of the 'Subjective Logic' of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, not the stages of *Wesen* that I indicate. Kolb is certainly right in his analysis, but this does not conflict with my account. Kolb rightly identifies what the logic of these societies is *in themselves* (or perhaps *in and for themselves*), whereas I am analysing the logic of the conception these societies have *for themselves;* see on this point Stern's review of Kolb, 189–90, 187. For an account of why it is that we are dealing with the Concept in Chapter VI, see Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 99–100. For another profitable attempt to understand the argument of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* in relation to Hegel's *Science of Logic*, see Dove, 'Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy,' 34–8.

63 M486, W/C 322.7–31 outlines the two forms that *Bildung* takes, 'faith' and 'enlightenment,' and outlines the general path of their development and culmination in revolution. That 'faith' names a form of self-alienated spirit that is present from the start, that is, that is not a form that comes up midway through the development of this system of right, is evident from the account in M486, W/C 321–2; see especially W/C 322.7–12.

64 M489, W/C 324.19–22; recall the notion of the ethical substance as *phusis.*

65 M489, W/C 325.35–7, 325.37–326.16; Miller is here more careful and accurate in his use of 'singular,' 'particular,' and 'individual.'

66 M488, W/C 324.9–13.

67 M488, W/C 324.13–16.

68 M489, W/C 324.18–19.

69 The way I am here portraying medieval Christianity should be compared with

the account that runs throughout Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. Compare also Findlay's reference, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, 100, to 'the positive, often joyous attitude of Mediaeval Christendom.'

70 That is, all ways that actualize natural possibility, not those ways that destroy potency; see Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, 90–4.

71 M489–90, W/C 324.30–3, 325.28–40, especially 325.29–33.

72 Compare the doctrine of *credo ut intellegam* as exemplified in Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, II, 2, 13–14; see also Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 1–8, for the doctrine of the compatibility of faith and reason.

73 See M486, W/C 322.34–7, where Hegel notes that enlightenment upsets faith by using this-worldly tools that faith has already accepted; recall here that the claims of reason are convincing because they appeal to the very selfhood of each of us; that is, they do not argue from a position of external authority but are, in each case, the dictates of our own selves. M491, W/C 326, gives a summary view of this process, in which faith, as it were, perverts itself; recall the identity of conversion and perversion at the conclusion of 'Virtue and the Way of the World,' in Chapter V, 'Reason,' M391, W/C 258.

74 See M486, W/C 322.2, for the distinction of essence and actuality, which is definitive for the whole sphere of *Bildung*.

75 See M541, W/C 357.18–24; cf. M581, W/C 384.15–18.

76 See M486, W/C 322.26–31, M541–2, W/C 357–8.

77 See M541–3, W/C 357–8. I thus consider to be quite wrong the view of Kojève, *Introduction à la Lecture*, 108, 162, and Cooper, *The End of History*, 158, that Chapter V, 'Reason,' documents apolitical stances and Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' documents political stances; Chapter V, 'Reason' (especially Sections B and C), and Chapter VI, Section B, '*Bildung*,' in fact deal with the same figures; they are considered in Chapter V, 'Reason,' to be singular approaches to experience, and in Chapter VI, '*Geist*,' in terms of the social world that is the integrated system of these figures and provides their context; see M440, W/C 289.25–30. On the last point, note Hegel's remark (M355–7, W/C 237–9) to the effect that the shapes of self-actualizing reason and of real individuality presuppose a shape of *Geist* that is either before or after the integrated society; that is, it presupposes the shape of society that Hegel calls *Bildung*. I thus equally take issue with Hinchman, who claims, in *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 106–7, that the difference between the characters of Chapter V, 'Reason,' and the characters of Chapter VI, Section B, '*Bildung*,' is that the former see themselves as isolated individuals, whereas the latter recognize that they exist only in and through the social institutions that define their culture; the latter portion of this claim seems to me diametrically opposed to Hegel's whole argument in this section.

78 Compare the transition into the third form of Unhappy Consciousness, M210, W/C 145, M231, W/C 157.

79 M485, W/C 321.

80 See M488, W/C 323–4.

81 See M493, W/C 327.

82 The tension between particular interests and universal interests in the case of the monk is one of the scenarios within which the second form of unhappy consciousness in Chapter IV, 'Self-Consciousness,' can be *vorgestellt*; see M217, W/C 148–9, for the first mode of the second form of unhappy consciousness, which provides an immediate form of this tension, and especially M225–6, W/C 153–4, for the third, ascetic, mode of the second form of unhappy consciousness, which offers a more reflected form of this tension. The conceptual need to recognize private vs. public as a tension and the corresponding conceptual inability to resolve the tension was the theme in the shapes of individuated consciousness in Chapter V, Sections B and C.

83 M500, W/C 331.

84 M491, 493, W/C 326, 327.

85 M496, W/C 329–30.

86 See M497–9, W/C 330–1.

87 M500, W/C 331; cf. M499, W/C 331.11–13.

88 See M494, W/C 327–8.

89 M494, W/C 327–8.

90 M500, W/C 331.

91 The frequent translation of this term as 'base' (Baillie, Hinchman, Shklar) or 'ignoble' (Miller) consciousness is misleading. First, it fails to bring out the fundamental notion that this consciousness is defined by its *criticism* of society. Second, it obstructs our seeing this consciousness as itself an attempt to be loyal to the good; indeed, the contemptuous consciousness is precisely the result of attempting to the fullest to be noble. Kojève's 'les Non-conformistes' seems superior to his 'les Vilains' (see *Introduction à la Lecture*, 124).

92 M501, W/C 331–2.

93 Ibid.

94 M501, W/C 332.3–4; note *Empörung* at M506, W/C 334.24; M517, W/C 341.6; and M520, W/C 342.30. At the end of M501, W/C 332.4–11, Hegel notes that the contemptuous consciousness knows its dependence on wealth but despises it – and therefore itself – none the less. This will reach its culmination in the wit whose absolute 'condemnation' (M520, W/C 342–3) of being is equally a self-condemnation (M525, 526, W/C 347–8).

95 I shall not go through this phenomenological analysis here since our conceptual analysis makes it clear why the various transformations take place.

96 See M521, W/C 344.7–13; cf. M519, W/C 341.27–31.
97 On the inverting of values, see M521, W/C 343–5.
98 See especially M513, W/C 339; M519, W/C 341.27–31; M523, 525, W/C 345–6, 347.
99 On the need to 'convert,' that is, the primacy of choice within the social sphere, see M495, W/C 328–9, especially 328.32–5. For the related notion that *judgment* was the premise of this whole sphere right from the start, see further W/C 328.40–329.3; on this primacy of judgment, see further, M584, W/C 386–7.
100 In other words, both section (a) Culture and its realm of actuality (M488–526, W/C 323–48), and section (b) Faith and pure insight (M527–37, W/C 348–55) follow directly on M487, W/C 323. In general, the logical shape of Hegel's argument in Chapter VI, Section B, '*Bildung,*' with its double – or, rather, quadruple – strategy, is complex, and it has eluded many commentators. The form Hegel's phenomenological method takes is always uniquely determined by the demands of its subject matter, and consequently it cannot be specified in advance as if it were some dry formalism; this is why a claim such as Cooper's, in *The End of History: An Essay on Modern Hegelianism,* 159, that 'simply from its position in *Phenomenology,* we know already that Enlightenment would amount to a negation of the particularist nihilism expressed in *Rameau's Nephew*' is certainly wrong *in principle* (apart from its other flaws) because it assumes that Hegel's narrative is always a straight-ahead march along an already prescribed route. In fact, it is only by understanding the immanent dialectic of the concrete content that the *position* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be understood, rather than the reverse.
101 In this note I shall briefly indicate the rationale for the phenomenology taking this form. Recall that we are essentially studying shapes of unhappy consciousness, that is, consciousness that recognizes itself as existing in the form of a consciousness that is being judged by its own true self. Faith adopts the attitude of the judged. Because it is *consciousness,* its object appears as a determinate being existing *outside* it, and thus is a *Vorstellung,* rather than appearing as the determinations of its own being (its *hexis*-body) changing from being its implicit structure (*phusis*) to an explicit object for reflection. Thus, what in our language we call 'the real self' appears to faith (the 'apparent self') as another being, and a being that is essential where all others are inessential. This pure self, however, must also be its ground and support; that is, it must be that actuality that sacrifices itself so that the singular self of the faithful can exist (comparable to the way the noble consciousness sees wealth in the political sphere, just as the first moment of the essential being that is the real self was comparable to the way the noble consciousness sees state

power), and this second moment within the object of faith is God as the Son who actually lived and died for me. Again, however, because this is a form of *consciousness*, the object is in principle alien, so the crucified son is an actuality, which existed in a time and space that is not accessible to the faithful consciousness. Finally, this pure self must be the judge (which stoicism discovered and scepticism universalized) of which the faithful consciousness itself is subject. Thus, the third essential relation in which faith must stand is as judged by the true self. This last form is realized in its struggle with insight: it does not just *happen* that faith and insight clash; rather, this conflict is prescribed by the logic of faith itself (and, as we shall see, of insight), even though, in its 'picture thinking,' faith does not recognize the correspondence of its actual relation and its doctrine of being judged and subsumed within the true overarching self of the holy spirit. The necessity here is, of course, that insight (compare the thesis of Chapter V, 'Reason') is that shape of the third form of unhappy consciousness in which the apparent self immediately identifies itself with the real self. Thus, both faith and insight, by virtue of being forms of unhappy consciousness, acknowledge a relation of two roles, and each identifies with a different member of this pair. Essentially the same story as that just told could now be told for insight, with the difference that its story is told from the side of the moment of *self*-consciousness within the unhappy consciousness. Where, in the end, we must recognize that insight is faith's own real self standing in judgment upon it, insight itself will have to come to see that it is ultimately condemning itself when it condemns faith. 'The truth of enlightenment' shows us this dynamic whereby the conflict between enlightenment and superstition necessarily emerges within the principles of enlightenment itself; the terror will be the political realization of this ideal contradiction. See M530–5, W/C 352–4; M536–7, W/C 354–5.

102   See Hegel's remarks in M491, W/C 326.13–17, and in M521, W/C 343–5, especially 343.28–30 (the latter regarding 'pure culture'), to the effect that the very essence of the determinations in this sphere is 'to-be-perverted.'

   Note here that, like the sceptical consciousness, the revolution needs something to negate. Negativity without positivity is an untenable concept, and negativity can exist only as a return, that is, a return from (denial of, separation from) a particularity. The stable form, then, cannot be just the negative. Even the negative that negates the particular depends on that particularity that it defines and that defines it. See M593, W/C 391–2.

103   See M582, W/C 385.28–32; M585, W/C 387; M589, W/C 389.

104   See M583, W/C 385–6.

105   M586–8, W/C 387–9.

106   M590, W/C 389–90.

107 M591–2, W/C 390–1.
108 Thus we can now understand the point alluded to in the beginning of Chapter 2, above, namely, that *Bildung* is the social system that reflects the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. See M592, W/C 391.18–23, for the notion that *Bildung* is characterized by an institutional Cartesianism, that is, a dualism of thought and extension, and its actual practice is the dialectic in which the immanent dynamic of each sphere (the world of thought and the world of extension) is such as to show each sphere to be already its supposed opposite. Compare on this point, the *'Einleitung'* to the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, Bd. 1, Stück 1, 126.8–25; Harris, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, 91 n.10, says of this text: 'Hegel regarded the Reformation as the religious expression, and the French Revolution as the political expression, of the dualism to which Descartes gave philosophical form.' But indeed, the problem was already present in the Roman Church: 'Christian culture was infected with this dualism from the beginning.'
109 Cooper, *The End of History*, 159, gives an interesting account of the conditions (the *hexis*) that the dynamic of *Bildung* has to achieve in order for the society to be able to have the revolution that is the culmination of this system.
110 That is, the first section of *Moralität.*
111 This could be called the material condition.
112 This could be called the formal condition.
113 Where the particularity provided the material condition *for the conscientious action*, and the universality provided the formal condition *for the conscientious action*, singularity could be said to provide the moment of activity; this synthesizing action thus initiated is the self-conditioned (that is, 'absolute') self-activity of the *individual.*
114 Compare Hegel's discussion in the 'Preface' to the *Philosophy of Right* of '*hic Rhodus, hic saltus.*'
115 Hegelian logicians will note that what I have been doing all along is to develop the notion of body as the logical moment of particularity. While body, that is, a *particular* involvement in existence, has traditionally been seen to preclude access to the universal, with respect to being, knowing, or doing, we here see clearly that Hegel's project is rooted in the rejection of this notion of the 'taint' of particularity – of bias – and is engaged in generating universality *concretely* on the basis of particularity.
116 Here we are addressing conscience as the self that is necessarily already guilty or 'evil'; we have yet to develop the last moment of this aspect of the conscientious self, which is the moment of forgiveness that derives from the concept of conscience as necessarily evil. It is by developing this last moment of forgiveness that we shall be enabled to make the transition to absolute knowing.

117 See Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 171: 'to be a self and to be moral or conscientious are one and the same'; and 173: 'Morality [i.e., as conscience] is thus not so much a relation between my specific situation and a universal law, but between me and you. It becomes a reality when we recognize each other as free individuals and are aware of that mutual recognition as the essence and source of our obligation.' Although it is indeed true that the analysis of conscience is very much a critique of the abstractness of the Kantian-style morality as portrayed in the immediately antecedent sections of the text, it is important not to make the mistake of thinking that this program of morality has been abandoned; rather than being a rejection of the notions of autonomy and of the categorical imperative, conscience is deeply committed to these ideals. The difference between the ideal of autonomy in the moral view of the world and the ideal of autonomy in conscience is that the former is premised on an abstraction from difference (which, recall, characterized the 'category' throughout Chapter V, 'Reason'), whereas conscience recognizes that the autonomy of the will is achieved only in and as radical heteronomy; that is, the self must identify with its otherness.

118 See n.113, above.

119 See M666–71, W/C 438–42.

120 M659–66, W/C 433–8; M588–9, W/C 388–9. Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 181, discusses this notion that one is always 'guilty,' because one is isolated, but that, equally, this isolation cannot be separated from social integration.

121 M666–7, W/C 438–9.

122 This should be compared with the problem faced by the spiritual animals of Chapter V, Section C, as diagnosed in Chapter 2, above.

123 This analysis should be compared with the analysis of the cognitive operations presupposed by the transition from the struggle to the death into lordship and bondage, which is analysed in Chapter 3, Section 3, above.

5: Responsibility and Science

1 On systematic science as the culmination of conscience, and, in general, for the need for knowledge to take the form of science, see M793, W/C 519; M805, W/C 528–9; M5–6, W/C 6–7; M18–25, W/C 14–19; M24, W/C 18; M56, W/C 42; and especially M88–9, W/C 68.

2 M26, W/C 19.22–4: 'A self having knowledge purely of itself in the absolute antithesis of itself [*Das reine Selbsterkennen im absoluten Anderssein*], this pure ether as such, is the very soil where science flourishes, is knowledge in univer-

sal form' (trans. Baillie). The beginning of the comprehension of nature is in M807, W/C 529–30.

3 The beginning of this comprehension of spirit is in M808, W/C 530–1.

4 M53 (trans. Baillie), W/C 39.30–2, : 'in ihr [die Wissenschaft] ist die Bestimmtheit ... die sich selbst bewegende Seele des erfüllten Inhalts ... Das wissenschaftliche Erkennen erfordert ... sich dem Leben des Gegenstandes zu übergeben, oder, was dasselbe ist, die innere Notwendigkeit desselben vor sich zu haben und auszusprechen.' Similar remarks are found throughout M53–4, W/C 39–41, and M58, W/C 43–4.

5 See M805, W/C 528–9; M48–57, W/C 35–43; M37, W/C 28–9.

6 Hegel discusses the dialectical method of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the 'Introduction,' at M84–7, W/C 64–8. Just as scepticism is the logical prefiguring of unhappy consciousness, so is the wit the prefiguring of the dialectician, and the discussion of the contradictory world of the wit in M525–6, W/C 347–8 is an important analysis to keep in mind in a discussion of dialectical method, since it is the ground out of which absolute idealism will emerge.

7 Other than Hegel's own texts, I find the most useful discussion of this issue to be Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Propositions IV and V.

8 See M7–11, W/C 7–10, for a discussion of criticisms of systematic science (primarily 'intuitionism') that closely resemble the logic of the beautiful soul.

9 See M795, W/C 520–1, for the notion that it is in the response to the beautiful soul of the dialectic of evil and forgiveness that the Concept is realized.

10 Cf. *Science of Logic*, 117–22; *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, 125–31.

11 See M802, W/C 325.12–17, and M36, W/C 28.15–16, for this notion of the primacy of experience. On the need for science to be activated in and through the initiative of a singular agent, see M26, W/C 19–21. That this dutiful adopting of a universal task by the singular self is already justified within the analysis of *Moralität* is indicated in M792, W/C 518–19.

12 See the discussion of falsity, evil, and negativity, in M38–40, W/C 29–31; see also *The Philosophy of History*, 9–10, 457, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 20–1, 540.

13 See M27–9, W/C 21–4.

14 For this notion that its substance is its justification see M5, W/C 6.15–18: 'The inner necessity that knowledge should be science lies in its very nature; and the adequate and sufficient explanation for this lies simply and solely in the systematic exposition of philosophy itself' (trans. Baillie).

15 Indeed, its very *showing* of itself to be this activating must be what it is for it to *be* this activating.

16 See M4, W/C 5–6, especially W/C 6.6, for the notion that science will be *die*

Erfahrung der Sache selbst, where this genitive necessarily must be understood both objectively and possessively; see also M17–22, W/C 13–17, for a discussion of the nature of the self-conscious selfhood that is produced and discovered in this science.

17 For a good discussion of the logic of the transcendental 'I' that retrospectively posits itself as the condition for the possibility of its own emergence, see Lampert, 'Husserl and Hegel on the Logic of Subjectivity'; Lampert also addresses the systematic requirements of Hegel's philosophy.

18 This, of course, is just the last moment, and all the preceding sections of the phenomenology are devoted to showing how this situation itself is constructed 'conscientiously,' and so on.

19 See M677–8, 682, W/C 444–5, 448–9.

20 See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* III, 255–6, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion,* Teil 3, 182.29–184.5, for remarks that bear on the notion that all of us always are engaged in religious worship, and that philosophy is just a specialized form of giving witness to the spirit.

21 This is the issue of M26, W/C 21.5–6, in the context of the discussion of the need to provide a ladder to the absolute: 'Science has for that reason to combine that other element of self-certainty with its own, or rather to show that the other element belongs to itself, and how it does so' (trans. Baillie). See also M679, W/C 446. On the logical relations within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* between conscience, religion, and absolute knowing, see M795–8, W/C 520–3.

22 For the interpretation of what Hegel means by religion that I am here advancing, see M802–3, W/C 525–7, and M30–2, W/C 24–6, the latter in relation to the notion of religion and language as concealed familiarity. I have discussed this more fully in 'Heidegger, Hegel and Ethnicity: The Ritual Basis of Self-Identity,' and in 'For Now We See through a Glass Darkly: The Systematics of Hegel's Visual Imagery,' Section 3.

23 M30–2, W/C 24–6.

24 See M674–5, W/C 443–4.

25 This is why questions of theism versus atheism are out of place in relation to Hegel; these remain questions that can animate only a member of the world of *Bildung* (and on these terms, faith will always lose). What Hegel's absolute knowing shows is that both faith and pure insight are more fundamentally committed to religion than either of them knows, and that the religion to which they are committed is no more one that their categories allow them to recognize than is their *Sittlichkeit.*

26 For the notion that the presentation of such a science must thus remain, from the point of view of the singular scientist, only a certain (not yet a true) statement struggling for recognition within the community of which it is a self-

analysis, see M71–2, W/C 52–3, and, indeed, the discussion within the 'Preface' as a whole.

27   Indeed, it must, therefore, be the very life of the object; cf. M18, W/C 14. This conclusion that science itself must *be* a kind of living body is indeed clearly suggested by Hegel in his persistent use of organic metaphors to characterize systematic science; see, for example, M1–2, 12, 28, 56, W/C 3–4, 10–11, 22–3, 42.

28   This is identical to Hegel's claim in M37, W/C 28–9, that it is with the attainment of the situation in which being is entirely mediated that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* concludes.

29   This, in the end, is in relation to a shape of consciousness, namely, absolute knowing. Thus, as we shall see, we can say that the *ultimate phusis* of absolute knowing is precisely the world of nature.

30   Note, then, that it is our category of spiritual embodiment that allows us to see that *Sittlichkeit* is always *Bildung*, and vice versa, providing another conceptual dimension in relation to which we can see the constitutive abstractness that precipitates the downfall of the one-sided shapes of *Geist* that bear these names in Hegel's Chapter VI.

31   Recall that this 'we' supersedes the formerly isolated singular self in that the 'we' is not simply reducible to a mere construction of singulars; rather, the singulars take their definition from the community.

32   Another way to articulate the dynamic tension that precipitates the collapse of 'True Spirit' in Chapter VI, Section A, would be to say that it fails to recognize the opposition between these two determinations of *phusis* and *hexis*.

33   See M37, W/C 28–9.

34   The articulation of this concept is the subject of Book I of the *Science of Logic*, and the notion of *Sein* as immediacy is invoked throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

35   This, again, is the point Hegel makes in the 'Logic' of the *Encyclopaedia* (*Zusatz* to paragraph 159) at the transition point from the 'Doctrine of Essence' to the 'Doctrine of the Concept,' namely, that it is really with the Concept that the true beginning is found, and that beginning with the 'Doctrine of Being' is ultimately both explained and superseded in the 'Doctrine of the Concept.'

36   For the discussion of these notions that the *Science of Logic* is the science of language, that it is the legitimate follower to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and that these two together constitute a demand from hermeneutical reading of that otherness which is already oneself, see Gadamer, '*Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik*,' *passim*, especially 84–5.

37   See M17–18, W/C 13–14; M22, W/C 16–17; M39, W/C 29–30; M802, W/C 525–6; compare also M7, W/C 7.25–32.

38   This is the same issue we considered in relationship to the body as *Sittlichkeit*,

or duty; for we saw that the phenomenon that corresponds to reason's search for a moral law is to be found not in its reflective efforts at positing rules, but in its *immediate* commitment to the law of *ethos*.

39 We have distinguished in each of the different stages of self-conscious experience the moment of self-conscious comportment and the moment of non-self-conscious comportment. We have seen throughout that the non-self-conscious comportment itself is a 'cognitive' relation to being; that is, it is an intentional system. Thus this mere 'life' – this *phusis* – of self-consciousness itself is always a knowing. Ultimately, in absolute knowing, we see that knowing proper is a kind of living: its *phusis* is to read. I take it that the key to the Hegelian epistemology is to see this relationship of knowing and living and to see knowing as always a situation in which one's cognitive situation is brought to life. The inadequacy of any form of knowing, or, better, of any form of experience, is precisely found in the extent to which the body that is the object of its knowing is distinct from the animating of a body that *is* its knowing. Again, we can mark the two extreme endpoints and the mediating term of this dialectic by seeing at the one extreme (a) simple natural life – *phusis* proper – as a living that fails to recognize it is a knowing and reason, which is knowing that fails to recognize that it is a living, and at the opposite extreme (b) absolute knowing, which is precisely the identification of the life and cognition in dialectic, with the middle term again being habit, or a lived knowledge. Articulated in this fashion, we can understand either Hegel's philosophy of mind (which has been the subject of this work) or Hegel's epistemology as contained in the working through of the last three categories of the *Science of Logic*, namely, the idea of life, the idea of cognition, and the absolute idea, that is, dialectical method.

40 Brentano gives a very intelligent Cartesian interpretation of this text in *Der Psychologie des Aristoteles*, 79–81 and elsewhere.

41 429a21–7.

42 Indeed, Aristotle's goal in this part of the *De Anima* is the definition of the thinking soul, and the differentiation of it from the sensing soul, and the point of this passage is better understood as a differentiation of *thinking's relation to body* from *sensation's relation to body*, rather than a differentiation of thinking from body *simpliciter*. Compare also *Metaphysics*, Z, 17, 1041a6–9.

43 My preferred rendering of this Greek phrase would be 'spirit *qua* suffering.' See also *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 343, for a relevant Hegelian gloss on Aristotle's *nous*. Hegel gives an interpretation of Aristotle's passive *nous* in *Encyclopaedia*, Section 389. I have presented my own interpretation of Aristotle's psychology in 'Aristotle's Animative Epistemology' and in 'Self-Consciousness and the Tradition in Aristotle's Psychology.'

Appendix: Hegel's Explicit Remarks on 'Body'

1 See especially the reference to the *sich verleiblichenden Besonderung* and the *Verleiblichung* of spiritual determinations, (*Hegels Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes*, 162.12–13, .24–5). Cf. M327, W/C 218. The other most significant treatments of the body are in the *Philosophy of Nature, passim*, and the *Philosophy of Right*, in the discussion of property.

2 Trans. Petry, 165.4–8 (my emphasis); 'Die Eingeweide und Organe werden in der Physiologie als Momente nur des animalischen Organismus betrachtet, aber sie bilden zugleich ein System der Verleiblichung des Geistigen, und erhalten hiedurch noch eine ganz andere Deutung,' 164.2–7. The "wholly other interpretation" here pertains to the immediate expression of mood.

3 '[V]om menschlichen Inneren,' 182.4–184.2.

4 Ibid., 182.29–184.2.

5 This text, and the text from the *Zusatz* to Section 401 should be borne in mind when Hegel's attitude towards women is under consideration, as should be the whole argument concerning the relation of 'immediate actuality' and self-conscious selfhood in Hegel's analysis of 'physiognomy and phrenology.' See Chapter 4, n.24, above.

6 See especially M276, W/C 186, for the primacy of process for an understanding of body; M310, W/C 206–7, for a conceptual characterization of body; M311, W/C 207–8, for an account that should be compared with the discussion in the 'Anthropology' of corporealization (Section 401) and of habituation (Sections 409–10); and M315, W/C 210, for an account of language as the primary means of self-expression and actualization. See also *Encyclopaedia*, Section 431, for the 'corporeity (*Leiblichkeit*) of self-consciousness, in which as in its sign and tool the latter has its own *sense of self* and its being *for others*, and the means for entering into relation with them' (trans. and emphasis Miller).

7 The following are the uses of *Körper* and *Leib* that do not fall under the three listings that follow in the text: M1, W/C 3.24, which suggests a difference between a living body and the inanimate parts that really exist only in a corpse (and are studied in anatomy); M150, W/C 105.36, where body is used to refer to the massive subject of mechanical laws; M570, W/C 377.3, where the issue of the 'pleasures of the body' is used in illustrating the relation of faith and enlightenment. *Fleisch* is used at M51, W/C 39.6, and at M68, W/C 50.33.

8 M251, W/C 172.17, 172.20, 173.1, 173.3; M252, W/C 173.12; M263, W/C 179.24; M275, W/C 185.28; M290, W/C 195.1, 195.36, 195.38.

9 M310, W/C 207.4, 207.7; M311, W/C 207.27, 207.34; M314, W/C 209.37; M325, W/C 217.9, 217.10, 217.14 (*Körper*); M326, W/C 218.6; M327 W/C 218.25, 218.31 (*Körper*); M328, W/C 218.40 (*Körper*); M334, W/C 223.31, 223.33

(*Körper*); M342, W/C 229.35. The discussion of embodiment in M325–8, W/C 217–19, serves as an excellent statement of the absurdities to which a mind-body dualism must ultimately be driven. M341–2, W/C 228–30 provide a nice summary of the relation of spirit to its natural embodiment, and the need to go beyond nature to find the proper embodiment of spirit.

10 From 'Art Religion': M704, W/C 461.6; M708, W/C 463.19; M724, W/C 472.32 (*Fleisch*); M725, W/C 473.7, 473.19; M726, W/C 473.25, 474.4, 474.9; M747, 487.32. From elsewhere in Chapter VII, 'Religion': M693, W/C 456.5; M754, W/C 491.39; M780, W/C 508.5 (*Fleisch*).

M693, W/C 455–6 is especially interesting, since it is an anti-dualistic statement made at the level of religion where the route out the dualism is portrayed as (i) revealing soul to be embodied in itself and (ii) revealing body to be intrinsically psychic.

11 Related themes of embodiment are treated in the *Philosophy of Nature*, especially in Part 2, 'Physics'; see especially Section 271–2 and *Zusätze* for the transition from mere matter to qualified matter, that is, to body proper.

12 This conception of body is indeed the basis of the argument worked out in this book. Within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel uses primarily *Leib* in this context and reserves *Körper* for the context of physical science, but this is not a strict differentiation in use, since the uses of *Körper* in this section are comparable to the uses of *Leib*, as is the use of *Körper* in M1, W/C 3.24.

13 M725–6, W/C 472–4, and M747, W/C 487–8.

14 The 'lebendigen *Körperlichkeit* des Wesens' (M725, W/C 473.7).

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